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• Mr. Chandrasekaran's official site
• About Imperial Life in the Emerald City
• The Washington Post online

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Tavis: Rajiv Chandrasekaran is the assistant managing editor at 'The Washington Post' who previously served as the paper's Baghdad bureau chief. His acclaimed book about his time in Iraq is called 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone.' He joins us tonight from Washington. Rajiv, nice to have you on the program.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran: It's a pleasure to be here with you, Tavis.

Tavis: I would be remiss to start this conversation - I'd be, quite frankly, ridiculous, to start this conversation without asking you the question of the day, which is about, of course, the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld. And the question for you is this. Since you were there, since you've covered this, what did Donald Rumsfeld essentially not get?

Chandrasekaran: Well, he essentially not got the real crux of what it would take to really stabilize post-war Iraq. His war plan, in some ways, was smart. The light, fast force to topple Saddam's army and take Baghdad. But from then on, it totally broke down. We just didn't have enough American troops in there to stabilize the country, to go after the nascent insurgency, which then grew to a much larger and more violent and potent insurgency. Enough troops to then deal with the growth of Shiite militias.

That was a clear strategic blunder on Rumsfeld's part. And there was another element to this that was a grave error, and what I spend a lot of time talking about in my book, 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City,' and that was his failure to really take charge and manage the civilian reconstruction occupation effort in Iraq.

The American ambassador in Iraq, the American viceroy, L. Paul Bremer, was reporting to Rumsfeld. And Rumsfeld was in charge there, and it was supposed to be his job that Bremer was sticking to a script that would be manageable, that the White House would find acceptable, and that Bremer's policies would be modest, meaningful, in step with broader American strategic objectives. And Bremer, as I write, sort of deviated from those, and Rumsfeld demonstrated a clear lack of oversight of Bremer during the 15 months of the occupation, Tavis.

Tavis: Beyond the issue, Rajiv, of a lack of oversight, we'll come back to that in a moment, Donald Rumsfeld's undoing, primarily because of his recalcitrance, or because of bad intelligence?

Chandrasekaran: Well, I think it's a combination thereof. I think there was some bad intel going in, but then there was this real failure to adjust. To be nimble and dynamic. There was this sense that he was just digging in his heels, initially telling people that, 'Oh, well, don't worry about the looting, 'cause freedom's untidy.' Then later as the insurgency was kicking up steam, he was saying, 'Well, we don't know what we don't know; it's hard to anticipate the growth of these things.'

And then more recently telling his critics to just back off. There was this sense that he wasn't willing to listen to other opinions, wasn't willing to admit mistakes, and fundamentally recalibrate. And it was just this perception of a fairly stubborn guy at the top of the Pentagon.

Tavis: If you'd seen his press conference today, or his remarks today at the press conference alongside President Bush and his new replacement, Robert Gates, to your point, even today, Mr. Rumsfeld took the opportunity to say that this war is little understood. That people don't understand how to fight wars in a new century. This is the first war of the twenty-first - he took his time, even today, after resigning, to make it clear that we do not fundamentally understand what this war is all about, and how this war needs to be fought.

He made that point very clear today. And beyond that, what also struck me was that he was very clear about suggesting that he believes, he said, 'with certainty,' those are his words, 'with certainty,' he believes that history is going to record that President Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld and the entire team did the right thing on Iraq. Your thoughts?

Chandrasekaran: Well, I will leave that for history to judge. Certainly, the American public aren't the best, shall we say, military strategists out there. But I think what's important here is that a vast number of military generals, senior military officers, military commanders, have either called for Rumsfeld's resignation, or have voiced serious doubts about the strategic plan and direction that has been promoted by Rumsfeld. So, I think those are the people to be listened to, and I think that's the course of criticism that I think has been most important here.

Tavis: I wanna talk in a moment here about the direction inside the Green Zone that we ought to be taking, and come back to your book 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City' in just a moment. First, though, speaking of new direction, I wanna play a clip from the press conference held inside the White House early today, where President Bush was asked about, perhaps, a new policy in Iraq, given the results of yesterday's elections. Here's a clip from the White House earlier today.

Tavis: So what did the American people say, Rajiv?

Chandrasekaran: Well, I think the American people said, 'We need a new strategy to win the war.' I don't think the American people went to the polling places yesterday and said, 'We wanna just lose the war in Iraq;' that, 'We want to turn that country into a safe haven for terrorists and insurgents.' But at the same time, I think the American people clearly said that they don't see the current strategy really turning things around in Iraq.

And so, I think the mandate from this election is one where the Democrats really now have to come up with some compelling alternatives, and to engage the White House. And the White House, I think, has an obligation to listen to new competing views, and to engage in a bipartisan discussion of the way forward. Something that the White House has been reluctant to do up till now.

Tavis: The subtitle of the book is called 'Inside Iraq's Green Zone.' Tell me what the Green Zone is, and what Democrats, Ms. Pelosi and others, now running the House, at least, ought to understand about what's happening inside this Green Zone. Or not happening, as it were.

Chandrasekaran: Well, the Green Zone is the seven square mile sort of enclave in central Iraq that is controlled by the Americans. It's the headquarters of the American command there. It's now home to the American Embassy. During the first 15 months of the American presence in Iraq, it was the seat of the American occupation government. The Coalition Provisional Authority.

And it was there that Ambassador Bremer had his offices, and thousands of Americans who came to reconstruct and govern Iraq. And what I write in my book is the Americans who came there set themselves up in this literally alternate reality, in this bubble that was really disconnected from the real Iraq.

It was a place where the electricity was always on, where Halliburton brought in scores of brand new Chevy Suburbans. Where they had bars and discos and swimming pools and cafés and Chinese restaurants. And in the heart of a Muslim country, where many Muslims find pork to be an offensive food product, you had pork served at every single meal inside the cafeteria in the Green Zone.

I think the key point to take away from this now is that, thus far, we've approached this with a great deal of cultural myopia, insensitivity.

And the path forward really has to involve greater engagement with Iraqis. A willingness to work with them in a way that we haven't done as much up till now. And I think that we need to get out of our mindset that we're there with all the solutions, and that the path forward has to be a cooperative one with the Iraqis.

Tavis: Just because you change the guy that runs the Defense Department doesn't mean that all you've just suggested happens.

Chandrasekaran: That's very right. And clearly, Mr. Gates doesn't come in with any magic bullet plans. He hasn't spoken very expansively about what his vision of winning the fight in Iraq is all about. But it's worth noting that he does serve on this new Iraq study group. This bipartisan commission headed by former Secretary of State Jim Baker, which will be coming out hopefully in the next couple of weeks with its recommendations of how the United States should recalibrate its policy.

So, clearly, he has been thinking a little bit about the way forward, and looking at new and novel approaches. And the hope is that he might embrace some of these bipartisan recommendations when they come out, and start to implement them.

Tavis: You used a word a moment ago, Rajiv, 'winning.' Do you have a better sense than I do - you wrote the book - of what it means these days, what it means now, to win in Iraq?

Chandrasekaran: Well, I think the goalposts have really been moving. The old promises of turning that country into a secular, stable democracy with a free market that's at peace with its neighbors, that's a transformative force in the Middle East, I think that's really out of the question now. I think that the best we can hope for, and what the Bush administration might characterize as a victory, is really something where you'd have a government that's a little bit more stable now, with fewer sectarian killings, that is not projecting instability across its borders.

It's really a fundamental recalibration. And even then, the path to getting there is not one that is very clear. Certainly keeping American forces in the country like they are now makes them a magnet for a tax. It leads many Sunnis to continue participating in the insurgency. And with the insurgency showing no signs of waning, it's hard to see how Shiites will step back from participating in militia groups.

I do think, though, that perhaps a fundamental reorientation of American forces, maybe a redeployment of some, up to the northern Kurdish areas, maybe a pull-out from some cities, maybe a redeployment to border areas, as some have talked about, may well lead to some sort of split within the Sunni insurgency, which is gonna be important. And if you can achieve a split there, you might see some resulting gains on the Shiite side from a weakening of the militias.

But again, this is a best-case scenario. I think under any scenario here, we've got many months ahead of some very violent, bloody times there, as rival Iraqi groups really try to duke it out for supremacy.

Tavis: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, the new book is called 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone.' It is a National Book Award finalist. Rajiv, nice to have you on the program. Thanks for your insight.

Chandrasekaran: A pleasure to talk to you this evening.

Tavis: Up next on this program, actor Elijah Wood. Stay with us.