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Was the U.S. invasion of Iraq worth it? (1:08).
 

Tavis: Ali Allawi spent most of his life as an active member of the exiled opposition to Saddam Hussein, earning degrees from MIT and Harvard while studying here in the U.S. In 2003, he triumphantly returned to Iraq following the fall of Saddam. From there he served in a number of key positions in the new Iraqi government, including minister of defense and minister of trade.

Now a private citizen, he has penned a provocative new book called "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace." He joins us tonight from Washington. Minister Allawi, nice to have you on the program, sir.

Ali Allawi: Thank you for having me, Tavis.

Tavis: I was considering exactly where I wanted to begin the conversation. I certainly don't speak for everyday Americans, but it seems to me that the one question that most of us, I suspect, as Americans would have to have is this. Every day, we read, hear more about the sectarian violence inside of your country. What is to be done about the sectarian violence, never mind the U.S. occupation?

Allawi: Well, the sectarian violence is really a result of accumulation of both historic and recent grievances that pitted one sect against the other. In the modern history of Iraq, these issues were to some extent camouflaged by a relatively strong state. But as a result of the war, the lids, as it were, were taken off these issues and they broke out into a very violent and virulent form.

What can be done about them is to recognize that the Iraq war, the invasion and occupation of the country, has led to enormous unforeseen consequences which need to be taken into account, acknowledged, and then worked in order to resolve the issue to reconcile the various conflicting elements. What happened in the past was these issues were really ignored or were brushed under the carpet. Sectarianism was always there, but it only took on a violent form recently.

Tavis: Let me ask you, then, to your point, where, how you might perceive that process beginning?

Allawi: Well I think as I said earlier, it's to acknowledge that the invasion of Iraq was not just a simple military operation with small political consequences, and that it unleashed forces not only inside the country but in the region as a whole. And these forces have not been reconciled in ways that would lead to security and civility.

For example, in Iraq an entire community was empowered and another community was disempowered. And in Iraq, the Kurds were empowered while, in the past, they were a marginal ethnic bloc. All of these issues need to be reconciled in a new political agreement, and at the same time we have to recognize that these changes inside Iraq affect our neighboring countries in a very, very serious way.

In some cases in a threatening way; in other cases in ways that enhance and expand their power. And if we let things continue the way they have been in the recent past, they can only lead to greater insecurity and incivility. Military solution is only part of the equation. It can't be the exclusive part to it. And without recognizing these complex forces that have been unleashed and trying to resolve the issues that emerge out of the invasion and occupation, I don't think we will see security in Iraq for a long time.

Tavis: The subtitle of your text, the book is "Winning the War, Losing the Peace." We've just now engaged a conversation clearly about losing the peace. Let me ask about this notion of winning the war. Are we winning the war?

Allawi: Well, there are two wars, really. There was the war that was fought in March and April of 2003, which was not really a contest. I mean, there was no way that the Iraqi army could possibly fight against the might of the United States, so it was the military tussle, the victors were preordained, as it were. There's no way that you could have any kind of equivalence of forces. The post-war war, as it were, is one which I think neither the United States expected or planned for.

Neither, frankly, did the Iraqi political class that emerged after the war expect it to be in this scale and size. And this is really related to the disempowerment of a community, the reempowerment of another community, and the intrusion of a large-scale foreign presence - n this case, the United States - into the heartland of the Middle East.

So the expected reaction, which was supposed to be one of resignation and sullen acceptance of the military predominance of the United States, entered into a situation where people were and are fighting desperately to gain desperate ends, as it were.

Tavis: As one who was in exile, to your latter point now, what did you make of all of that talk coming out of Mr. Cheney's office, Mr. Cheney himself and others, that we'd be greeted as liberators and they'd be kissing our feet and throwing roses at us in the streets. What did you make of that talk back then? Clearly, everybody knows now that didn't happen. But what did you make of that kind of hyperbole and conjecture then?

Allawi: Well frankly, on a personal basis, I ignored it because I was really quite ambivalent about the possibility of the United States invading Iraq. Of course, the former regime was a terrible dictatorship, was a very oppressive tyranny and it's overthrow can only be a good thing. But I did not expect that it would be easily recognized and easily acknowledged, the way in which it was overthrown.

And I did expect and I was on record as stating that the response of the losing side - in this case, the Sunni Arab community - would be extremely problematic. In fact, I wrote an essay on this in 1992, where I said that the Sunni Arabs' response to a loss of power would be very, very dangerous. And I think to some extent this prediction came true.

I did not take it - as you said, it was not more than hyperbole, as far as I was concerned. Unfortunately, a lot of people expected this kind of response, because they were poorly informed about the conditions inside Iraq.

Tavis: To your ambivalence - to use your word, your ambivalence about the U.S. invasion, the U.S. occupation of your homeland, what do you make now, four years to the day after the fall of Saddam, about the debate in Washington with regard to a date certain for withdrawal? What do you make of that debate, number one, and along with that if you might also address what's your sense of the debate about whether or not - if we are to leave, whenever that date comes, the Bush administration's argument, at least, that it's gonna fall into deeper chaos?

Allawi: Well, I think on the date certain, as it were, for American departure, I would be in favor of that if, and only if, it is related to a grand settlement for the area as a whole, which I don't think the Arab-Israeli side, but on the issues that arose as a consequence of the invasion of Iraq. We need to have a new architecture, as it were, of security inside Iraq, and a new architecture of security for the region as a whole as it has been affected by the invasion of Iraq.

If we have that in place, then I think it is essential that the United States begins to withdraw its forces, because its presence will no longer be a requirement for the maintenance of peace and stability. So I think a date certain can only make sense if it is linked to a concerted, preferably bipartisan, effort to develop a new security and stability structure for the Middle East, or at least for those countries that were directly effected by the invasion of Iraq.

Tavis: And to the argument that the Bush administration makes that whenever they leave, if it's too soon, we're going to fall into greater violence and more chaos in your country?

Allawi: Well, in some cases I would call this a self-fulfilling prophecy. There is no way I think that you can get stability in Iraq if there isn't broad bipartisan support for this policy inside the United States. So if you have divided centers here in the United States, it would reflect on the domestic front inside Iraq. Now, bipartisan support for the former policy, I think, is not forthcoming simply because it has failed.

And the only way out of this, I think, is to recognize that the vase has been broken, but you have to laboriously reassemble it again. And that requires a great deal of political and diplomatic effort. It's not to just brush the shards under the carpet and then declare victory.

Tavis: To your point about diplomatic effort, over the weekend Egypt announced that in the coming days they are prepared to hold talks inside of their country about how to bring peace to Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has indicated she will be happy to attend those conversations. Your thoughts?

Allawi: Well, I think it is obviously a good move. I have been calling for a regional conference really in preparation for this Congress. But in and of itself, I don't think it's enough. Unless you address the real issues that have emerged as a result of the Iraq crisis, this conference won't solve many problems. For example, you have to address the issue that Iran has been strengthened - in many cases, immensely strengthened - by the invasion of Iraq and the changeover of the power structure internally.

You have to take into account that Saudi Arabia is very, very grievously - or feels grievously threatened by a Shi'a empowerment inside Iraq as it might affect its own Shi'a minority. You have to consider that Turkey feels threatened by the possibility of a Kurdish state or a Kurdish-Arab confederation emerging in Iraq. It affects their own national security.

Unless these issues are taken into account, calibrated, and each part recognized and acknowledged and maybe limited in terms of its demands, you're unlikely to get more than set speeches.

Tavis: If there aren't enough challenges already inside of your country, Iran wants to expand its nuclear program. Your thoughts on that?

Allawi: Well, I think at one level, Iran, if it seeks peaceful nuclear technology, should be allowed to do so. The seeking of nuclear armament, I think, has to be carefully examined for whether it is a reality or not. And if it is a reality, it has to also be taken in the context of the fact that nuclear arms are already in the Middle East.

We have a nuclear-armed Pakistan on one side of Iran, and we have Israel on the other side, which has hundreds of nuclear warheads. The question is not whether Iran should be armed with nuclear weapons, it's whether the area as a whole should have nuclear weapons. And whether we should not aim for a nuclear-free zone in the entire Middle East and not just limit it to Iran, albeit it might fall into the hands of a state that appears not to be part of the international concord of nations at present.

Tavis: Let me offer this as an exit question. All things considered, was the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq worth it?

Allawi: A very difficult question. I wrestle with it, really, every day. In the end, there's no - and there's no question in my mind that the overthrow of the tyranny and dictatorship was a good thing. But balanced against that the chaos, the divisions, the violence, the huge amounts of casualties inside the country, the possibility of endemic violence for the next decade, it has to be weighed against that. And I think on balance, the overthrow of the dictatorship barely matches the terrible consequences of that.

So the jury, in my case, is still out. Two years ago I would say yes, it was a good thing. Two years from now I might say it was a good thing or I might say it was a terrible thing. Right now, it's very finely balanced. I can't really give you a straightforward answer to it.

Tavis: I thank you for your insight and for your honesty and your candor. Ali Allawi's new book is "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace." Mr. Allawi, an honor to have you on the program. Thank you, sir.

Allawi: Thank you very much, Tavis. Thank you.

Tavis: My pleasure.