E-mail a friendDennis Ross
airdate August 14, 2007
Dennis Ross has more than two decades of experience in Soviet and Middle East policy. He was Middle East envoy for George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton and played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process. He also served as director of Near East and South Asian affairs in the Reagan administration. Now a counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he's written several books, including Statecraft, which The New York Times calls "important and illuminating."
Dennis Ross
Tavis: Dennis Ross is a former Middle East envoy who served under both President Bush - that would be the first President Bush - and President Clinton. In that capacity, he's been involved in numerous peace negotiations in the Middle East.
During his decorated career, he is now a distinguished fellow and counselor at the Washington Institute for New East Policy and the author of the new book, "Statecraft, and How to Restore America's Standing in the World." He joins us tonight from Washington. Ambassador Ross, nice to have you on the program, sir.
Dennis Ross: Nice to be with you, thank you.
Tavis: Let me start with two simple but hopefully poignant questions about the book; the title, specifically. Define for me statecraft.
Ross: The essence of statecraft is how a state - meaning our country - uses all the means at its disposal. Its economic means, its diplomatic means, its intelligence means, its capacity to frame issues, describe issues, its military means, to protect our interests, to promote our interests - but it can't only be in a sense the means that you use.
If your means are disconnected from your objectives, you're not going to have very good foreign policy. If foreign policy is going to be done well, if statecraft is going to be done well, you have to marry your objectives with your means; you have to ensure that you've identified the right objectives. It means, in essence, to have good statecraft you have to have reality-based assessments, not faith-based assessments.
Tavis: Second question about the title: "And How to Restore America's Standing in the World," the subtitle. Some argue that the damage done by this administration is irreparable where our reputation is concerned. You agree with that?
Ross: I don't agree with that. I agree that we've suffered terribly or I wouldn't have titled the book the way I did, but I think it's redeemable. I think it's redeemable in part because I think in many respects throughout the world, the American people are not identified as being synonymous with this particular administration.
Let me give you one example that I think highlights the point. I'm not making this as a political point but as an analytical point. If Bill Clinton were the secretary of state or even the president, he could go anywhere in the world right now and be very well received. And he sends a message that the United States identifies with other peoples' needs, we listen to others, we're empathetic to others, we have a capacity to apply our means to what would be seen as broader public goods.
If you have somebody like that who symbolizes what's good and what others will relate to internationally, it demonstrates that in effect if you change the administration, you could do a lot to change our standing in the world.
Tavis: Let me ask you a question that might sound a little strange, but I think you'll be able to read into it. In my own personal travels, I find myself - even earlier this summer - I find myself, as I travel around the world, having to explain to people, always being forced to answer the question as to how it is that our foreign policy - that is to say the stated policy of our government - can be so disconnected from the will of the people when the government is we the people.
I'm not a negotiator, though. I haven't had to sit across a table and try to explain to people how it is that the policy of the government - the stated, the official policy of our government - can be so, again, disconnected from the will of the people. These folk aren't stupid; they have CNN and everything else. They watch news around the world.
You're sitting at a table trying to make the case - whatever the case is. You haven't been in this situation when you worked for Clinton, at least, but if you were Condi Rice or somebody else in the Bush administration, how do you sit at a table and try and negotiate when the person you're negotiating with knows that what you're saying is the official policy, but it ain't what the American people believe, by and large?
Ross: Well, I think you start off - if you represent the administration, you have to take the time to explain things. One of the problems this administration has had is that it's done foreign policy more by slogan than by explanation. So if you're going to sit with others, you'd have to go through and say, “This is what we're trying to do, this is why we're trying to do it. Let us explain to you why we see the problem the way we do, but let us hear from you about why you might see the problem differently, and let's see if there's a way for us to jointly approach a problem.”
Let me give you an example of what the administration could do as an example. I think in the Middle East, even though our standing is extremely low right now, there is a common view throughout the area that Iran is a problem.
Their pursuit of nuclear weapons, their support of terrorism - that's something that is shared by many different governments or regimes within the region that might be highly critical of us on other issues. But they could see that they have a common concern, or we share a common concern about Iran. They might not share the same view about how you deal with it, but let's assume that if we have a common view of what the threat is, we could then say, “All right, why do we each see it as a threat, what is it that we could do about it?”
This is what I mean by saying, “All right, what are your objectives and what are the means?” On our own, we're not going to succeed in preventing Iran from going nuclear. But with others who also have means we might be able to join together and create certain kinds of coalitions. So through political, diplomatic, and economic means you can make the Iranians pay a price so they can understand that going nuclear doesn't serve their interests.
That would be a way to be able to go someplace else, explain that there's a common threat concern, and then try to come to a common understanding of how you deal with it.
Tavis: Your fine example notwithstanding, when you're sitting across the table, that strategy - be it as it may - when the guy across the table looks back at you and says, “But Secretary Rice” or “Ambassador Ross, we know that the American people do not feel the same way that the administration feels. We know.”
And they pull out polls and studies and surveys and documentaries and put them on the table and say, “This is what the American people think. How can you sit at the table and try to push this particular policy? How does our representative respond to that?”
Ross: I think the way you respond is by saying we have one administration at a time. That administration is elected for four years. The democracy is yes, we the people, but the people have a chance every four years to hold administrations accountable. So right now, this administration is empowered; there isn't another one there.
There are policies out there; there are threats out there. And the fact is if you're talking to other governments you're saying, “All right, do you consider Iran to be a problem? If you do consider it to be a problem, how can we best collectively deal with this?” We're there. This administration is there until the beginning of 2009. There isn't another administration, and no one else is going to be able to change the policy.
So the world isn't going to stand still. We don't have the luxury of saying we can wait until January 2009. What are we going to do about those problems that exist between now and then?
Tavis: In my reading of the text, I'm not sure that I picked up on this but I want to ask anyway, and that is whether or not there's certain people, by nature of X, Y, or Z, that makes them better equipped to do this kind of work. I'm raising that because I wonder, not even just because of his policies heretofore, but whether or not Bush as compared to Clinton is better equipped or vice versa to sit across from a table and to engage in what you call statecraft.
Ross: Well, actually in the book not only do I talk about policies but I also talk about process, and I also talk about how you negotiate. I have one chapter just on rules for how to negotiate as well as other chapters on when, why, and with whom you choose to negotiate. Someone like President Clinton had a capability that was very important, and it wasn't just his sense of empathy.
It's that he would learn everything there was to learn about an issue. So if he was asking someone to do something that was very difficult for them, he could prove to them that he understood why it was so difficult for them because he understood the issue so well. What made him more equipped to do that was a kind of natural curiosity.
President Bush doesn't, in a sense, dive into issues and learn everything there is to learn about issues, and therefore it makes him less equipped, I think, to sit across the table from many people. He has one strength, which would be if he believes in something he will tell them I'm going to follow through on it. He would be more believable with the people he deals with if he really immerses himself in the subject.
Tavis: Since you spent so much time in the Middle East, I would be remiss to not ask you specifically a question about that. There's been such debate, as you well know, about whether or not Israel should talk to Hamas. And it's not even just Hamas, to broaden the conversation - there are folk in Hamas who have now been democratically elected, which is what we say, at least, we want to export to the world - democracy.
Many in Hamas have been democratically elected. As you well know, the same is true of Hizbullah. Democratically elected. How do you engage in statecraft with people whose strategies you don't like but they have, in fact, been democratically elected to sit across the table from you?
Ross: Well, I think you have to divide the issue into are you dealing with states or non-state actors? Both Hamas and Hizbullah are non-state actors. They don't represent the government. Today among the Palestinians, you have a Palestinian Authority led by Abu Massen in the West Bank. In Gaza, you have Hamas, but they're still not yet a state, not recognized by anybody as a state.
Hizbullah, again, is not a state. So I draw distinction between states and non-state actors. Now, when I choose who to deal with, states are there; they're not going away. And so in a sense, you have to decide when you engage them, when you choose not to engage them. I prefer to engage - I prefer not to, in a sense, say I'm going to deny myself one of the tools of statecraft, which is talking.
Because when I do that, sometimes I make myself the issue rather than the party I want to be the issue. That's with a state. With regard to a non-state actor like Hamas, as an example, Hamas wants recognition. And for them to get recognition they should play by certain rules of the game. Yes, they were elected, but one of the mistakes the administration made - we shouldn't automatically say when it comes to democracy we'll have elections and therefore we'll deal with whoever is elected.
We should have said before those elections, those who run in democracies for elections, if they're political parties, they have to act like political parties. If you're a political party, you give up your weapons. If you don't give up your weapons, then you're still a militia. It's either ballots or bullets - you don't get to have both. As long as you retain the bullets, it suggests that basically if you don't like the outcome, you don't like the direction, then you'll basically use your weapons against the other parties within the political environment that you're dealing with.
So when it comes to dealing with non-state actors, I would create some criteria. One criteria is, if they're going to be in election, they give up the militia. A second criteria would be if they want to be dealt with, then they have to play by certain rules of the game. If you reject your next-door neighbor, if you're going to continue to use violence against you next-door neighbor, then it's pretty hard to deal with you as a legitimate political actor.
Tavis: I got about 45 seconds here, unfortunately. Let me ask, to your earlier point now, about talking versus not talking. What is ever to be gained in statecraft? Or is it not even a part of statecraft to say, “We are not going to talk to X, Y, and Z government. Never mind your non-state actor point; we're not going to talk to this, that government?”
Ross: I think it's a mistake to establish that as a principle, because as I said one of the things they'll end up doing when you're talking about different states, you'll end up making us the issue internationally, rather than a state whose behavior is outrageous. You want their behavior to be the issue, not the fact that we're not prepared to talk.
Now, it doesn't mean I automatically go and talk. I have to think about how to do it, I have to maybe use a third party, maybe I have a back channel where I try to work out and see whether having a discussion is going to lead anywhere. So I don't want to rule out talking as a matter of principle. I want to prepare the ground, though, before I actually go and do it.
Tavis: He knows what he's talking about; he's done it any number of times for not just a Democrat but for a Republican, as well - that would be the first President George Bush. His new book is called "Statecraft, and How to Restore America's Standing in the World." It's good to know that somebody believes - Dennis Ross one of them - that we can still do that. Mr. Ross - Ambassador Ross - thank you for your book and for the opportunity to talk to you, sir.
Ross: Thank you very much, I enjoyed it.
Tavis: I appreciate it.
Back to August 14, 2007