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Rep. Jane Harman

A seventh-term Democrat from Southern California, Rep. Jane Harman is a senior member of the Homeland Security Committee and chairs the Intelligence Subcommittee. She's also a member of The Blue Dog and New Democrat Coalitions. Prior to her election, the Harvard Law grad served as deputy cabinet secretary for President Carter, special counsel to the Defense Department, chief counsel and staff director of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and Regent's Professor at UCLA.


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Rep. Jane Harman

Rep. Jane Harman

Tavis: Congresswoman Jane Harman is one of the most influential voices in Congress on matters of intelligence and national security as the former ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. The California Democrat is now chair of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Terrorism Risk Assessment. She joins us tonight from Capitol Hill. Congresswoman, nice to have you back on the program.

Rep. Jane Harman: Thank you, Tavis.

Tavis: Let me start by asking your overall reaction to this report that really kind of turns on its head what the Bush administration has been telling us about Iran.

Harman: Well, it's stunning. I read the declassified summary first, but then a couple days ago I read the entire report. It's about 70 pages long, it's classified, it very clearly states the case, which is pretty persuasive as you read it, that Iran stopped its development of nuclear weapons in 2003 and at least at present has no intention to resume the development of nuclear weapons.

That is very different from what the last intelligence report, which was in 2005, said, and it is very different from the rhetoric from the president and the vice president over recent months.

Tavis: At the risk of sounding naïve, how is that possible?

Harman: (Laughs) Well, an intelligence report is not the same thing as a statement from a policymaker. An intelligence assessment like this is developed by our intelligence community, which is supposed to speak truth to power. The president can choose to ignore intelligence, but surely the impression I've been getting from what he's been saying over recent months is that what he was saying was based on our intelligence assessment.

Tavis: But I guess what I'm asking in another way is after 9/11, how we still have examples like these of how wrong we're getting it on the intelligence front. I'm a taxpayer here. How am I supposed to feel comfortable with what the president's telling me as truth, what you all are making decisions on, on Capitol Hill, is based upon somebody speaking truth to power. I don't feel any more confident now than I felt in 2001 about the information.

Harman: Well, I don't want to speak about - this is not an answer about President Bush, but it is an answer about our intelligence community. Our intelligence community is doing these products better. What has changed is that in 2004, we reorganized - I know this sounds a little dreary, but we did reorganize our intelligence community and we put all 16 intelligence agencies under one joint command.

And that command is what drove the assessment that was just produced, and as I said, I read all 70 pages of it, and it is so much better than what I've ever read before. The sources and how credible they are are explained, the conclusions and how strongly they're believed are explained, where the gaps are are explained, there is not a dissenting view, but one intelligence agency doesn't feel as strongly as the others, and that's clearly laid out.

This is the way it's supposed to be. And the other part of it that I like, frankly, is that it's now out there and the public can read this declassified summary, which is very accurate, and understand that our current picture of Iran is very different from what some of our policymakers are saying.

Tavis: So we compare this report in 2007 to 2005, which comes after the reorg that you mentioned a moment ago. I still don't get it, Congresswoman. How 2007 is -

Harman: All right. It's a work in progress. I think that we have better sources now. It's hard to penetrate Iran; a fair criticism which I am making is our government makes it harder because we don't talk to Iran. It's kind of crazy - 850,000 Iranian-Americans live in Los Angeles, so you would think we would have many avenues to talk to Iran on every possible level, family, business, political.

I'm one of a number of members who think we ought to have interparliamentary exchanges with Iran. If we did these things, we would have a much clearer picture of what's going on on the ground in Iran. But these intel products are improving, they truly are improving.

Tavis: All right, so how does this - you're not the president, but you are certainly a powerful member of Congress - how does this challenge yet again our standing in the world?

Harman: (Laughs) Well, I think it should suggest to the president and the vice president that sheathe the sabers. All this saber-rattling about the need for military action yesterday to stop Iran's development of a nuclear weapons program doesn't seem indicated by the intelligence product we now have.

It says that Iran's change of heart was influenced in part by economic sanctions; those seem to be working. That's the proof we have, and I would hope we would encourage our allies in the world to keep pressure on Iran, to continue to halt its nuclear weapons program, and to join the community of nations. If it wants a civil nuclear program, I think that's something we should talk to it about. But the goal here is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

Tavis: Before I come back to that point in just a moment to talk about how this will impact or change politics inside of Iran, I'm sitting here listening to you and maybe in a few days I'll come around to reading this the way you read it, but in my mind, as an American citizen, in my mind what concerns me is what might have happened - what might have happened, given the hubris of this administration, the arrogance of this administration, if they had decided, as they did with Iraq, to invade Iran based upon what they told us, based upon the intel. If they'd decided to go into Iran the same way they did with Iraq, we could be in Iraq and Iran, two countries, both based on faulty intelligence right now.

Harman: Well, that possibly could have happened. I would just say, as a member of Congress who has learned some lessons from Iraq, I think Congress is a much tougher customer than it was in 2002 and 2003. There's been a lot of push-back. I know that last year, I spoke out when I was ranking member of the intelligence committee along with the then-chairman Pete Hoekstra, a Republican from Michigan.

And we said together that our intel on Iran is not good enough to base policy actions on. So I think that is a horrible possibility, but I'm just saying that the push-back from Congress, especially now that we have a Democratic majority, would be huge. And I'm very pleased that the current, much-better intelligence product makes it much harder for any rogue elements in this administration to claim that we need to go to war yesterday with Iran.

Tavis: I know I've got just a few minutes to go before you've got to run. Let me ask you right quick how you think, then, internally - we know what the president of Iran is saying? He's basically sticking his tongue out, saying, "I told you so. President Bush didn't believe me, this is a victory for my people in Iran." That's what we're hearing vis-à-vis the news. But how do you think this internally will change the politics inside of Iran?

Harman: Well, I think it's very interesting. I think this is the perfect opportunity for diplomacy with Iran. I think, as I said, we should have interparliamentary exchanges, and I think this administration should reach out at multiple levels. And I think since there is a halt in their nuclear weapons program and since we do not want it to resume - by the way, one of the gaps in this report is it does not spell out what could cause Iran to resume this program - now is the time to pounce and to make certain that our economic actions, both carrots and sticks, and our diplomatic actions encourage Iran to go in a better direction.

I just want to say one more thing, because the debate is raging here about what did the president know and when did he know it. The White House is saying the president didn't know anything about this until just a few days ago, yet the rumors have been surging for months that there was this report and it was being withheld, and there was some issue about whether there would be a declassified summary and so forth.

So I think those questions are legitimate. It is not okay to hype and misstate intelligence, and now we have the truth out there, and I'm watching very closely.

Tavis: Two questions in that regard right quick. Number one, what would be the reason - I'm just trying to explore here - what would be the reason for a president, any president, this president, knowing the intel says one thing and hyping something else? That's just like a lie to me. What would be the reason for that, number one.

And number two, is it acceptable, again, post-9/11, Democrat or Republican, is it acceptable to the U.S. public that the president, until days ago, if we believe him, could not have known this level of intel?

Harman: Well, I was just listening somewhere to Pat Buchanan saying that that's incredible. It's interesting that it's Pat Buchanan saying that. I'm quite dubious; what can I say? Months have gone by; lots of people in this administration had to know about this report since 16 agencies cooperated. Big group of folks had a role in writing it, it's pretty darn good, and I can't imagine how at least the national security adviser, Steve Hadley, didn't know.

And I would have thought he had an obligation to correct the record if his boss is saying something different. On the other question, should the president ever withhold or misstate intelligence? I would say the rule is no, but I can imagine some intelligence putting us in harm's way and if it were revealed, it could be a very dangerous situation. That is not this case, so I don't want to say never, but I think my answer to you is almost never.

Tavis: Let me offer this, then, as an exit question. Your point earlier, which I think is well-taken, about this being a grand - I'm paraphrasing - a grand opportunity, a wonderful opportunity for us to engage in diplomacy. There are many who believe that this administration doesn't know what that word is, how to define it, much less engage in it. So I ask you respectfully whether or not, with egg on its face - with egg on its face now - will this administration heed that call?

Harman: Well, they don't follow my advice much of the time. I hope they heed that call. As former Secretary of State Madeline Albright says, "Diplomacy is not appeasement." You can tell people you don't like why you don't like them. You can also listen to them tell you what you're doing wrong. This is a way to build some kind of relationship to get better ground truth on what each of you is doing, and hopefully, again back to this case, to keep Iran out of the nuclear club.

To encourage it to rejoin the community of nations, to get Iran to help us gain stability in Iraq, and, by the way, with enormous numbers of neighbors, to resolve the long-simmering Israel-Palestine dispute. I guess I think it's almost the new year, and my new year's resolution is to see if after all these years the Middle East can become a peaceful region.

Tavis: She is a Homeland Security subcommittee chairwoman; she is a Democrat of California. She is, of course, Jane Harman. Congresswoman, nice to have you on, all the best to you.

Harman: Be well, Tavis.

Tavis: Thank you very much.