Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard discusses the continuing fallout over North Korea's missile testing.
"Some of the assurances that we had given North Korea under the Clinton administration seemed to have fallen by the wayside as the Bush administration took office."
Thomas Hubbard: Rational or not, I think the North Koreans have suspicions that our policy is one of regime change, one of bringing down the current regime in North Korea, rather than one of trying to negotiate a solution with this regime. And like it or not, I think the United States, for the North Koreans, is going to remain a focus of their concern. And unless we're willing to talk directly in that six-party context, I don't think we're gonna find a solution.
Tavis: You know the old adage that perception is reality. Tell me what that statement means juxtaposed against the fact that North Korea, or I shouldn't say juxtaposed, but tell me what that statement means if, in fact, the North Koreans, as apparently they do, Kim Jong-il specifically, believe that.
Hubbard: Well, I think Kim Jong-il found that when the Bush administration came into office that the Bush administration failed to pick up on the ongoing dialogue that we'd had between the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, aka North Korea] and the United States, under the Clinton administration, and very quickly suggested that some of the assurances that we had given under the Clinton administration, that among other things, that we have no hostile intent vis a vis North Korea, seemed to have fallen by the wayside as the Bush administration took office.
And fairly quickly after that, the president made his famous Axis of Evil statement in his state of the nation address in 2002. I think Kim Jong-il, rightly or wrongly, took those statements as an indication that the U.S. might have hostile intent, in fact, might be seeking regime change in North Korea. The president has subsequently said on many occasions that we do not intend to invade North Korea; that we have no intention of attacking North Korea.
But I think we need more active, direct engagement in the six-party context with the North Koreans, to alleviate some of the concerns that they still have. In reality, they should not be concerned. But we have to deal with their perceptions, as well as our own.
How should the U.S. respond to North Korea's missile testing?
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