Rumsfeld Resignation

The Washington Post's Rajiv Chandrasekaran discusses the Rumsfeld resignation.

Tavis: What did Donald Rumsfeld essentially not get?

Rajiv Chandrasekaran: Well, he essentially not got the real crux of what it would take to really stabilize post-war Iraq. His war plan, in some ways, was smart. The light, fast force to topple Saddam's army and take Baghdad. But from then on, it totally broke down. We just didn't have enough American troops in there to stabilize the country, to go after the nascent insurgency, which then grew to a much larger and more violent and potent insurgency. Enough troops to then deal with the growth of Shiite militias.

That was a clear strategic blunder on Rumsfeld's part. And there was another element to this that was a grave error, and what I spend a lot of time talking about in my book, "Imperial Life in the Emerald City," and that was his failure to really take charge and manage the civilian reconstruction occupation effort in Iraq.

The American ambassador in Iraq, the American viceroy, L. Paul Bremer, was reporting to Rumsfeld. And Rumsfeld was in charge there, and it was supposed to be his job that Bremer was sticking to a script that would be manageable, that the White House would find acceptable, and that Bremer's policies would be modest, meaningful, in step with broader American strategic objectives. And Bremer, as I write, sort of deviated from those, and Rumsfeld demonstrated a clear lack of oversight of Bremer during the 15 months of the occupation, Tavis.

Tavis: Beyond the issue, Rajiv, of a lack of oversight, we'll come back to that in a moment, Donald Rumsfeld's undoing, primarily because of his recalcitrance, or because of bad intelligence?

Chandrasekaran: Well, I think it's a combination thereof. I think there was some bad intel going in, but then there was this real failure to adjust. To be nimble and dynamic. There was this sense that he was just digging in his heels, initially telling people that, "Oh, well, don't worry about the looting, 'cause freedom's untidy." Then later as the insurgency was kicking up steam, he was saying, "Well, we don't know what we don't know; it's hard to anticipate the growth of these things."

And then more recently telling his critics to just back off. There was this sense that he wasn't willing to listen to other opinions, wasn't willing to admit mistakes, and fundamentally recalibrate. And it was just this perception of a fairly stubborn guy at the top of the Pentagon.

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