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                  Lawrence learnt many useful desert skills when he lived with the Bedouins. He had traveled 
                  extensively in the Middle East and was fluent in Arabic.
                   
                   
                  He both admired and understood the Arabs and respected them 
                  for having a strategy of their own. Well-versed in western military 
                  theory, Lawrence suspected the war might be won without engaging in direct 
                  battles. He had his own theory: guerrilla warfare.   
                  Hitting where it hurt
                   
Lacking men and material to engage a regular army in major battle, Lawrence encouraged small-unit 
tactics, raids by 100 or 200 tribesmen, against the Turks. 
  
Employing the smallest force, in the quickest time, at the farthest place, 
Lawrence's hit-and-run tactics in what he called this "war of detachment" caused maximum disruption to the Turks
with minimum Arab casualties. 
  
                  Explosives                   
With the Ottoman army spread thinly across the empty vastness of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Hejaz Arabs found it relatively easy to strike and sabotage Turkish lines of communication and supply. 
With the Red Sea firmly in British hands, the Turks had no option but to use the Hejaz railway
to move their men, supplies and munitions.
 
Lawrence and the Arabs spent much of their two years on the road to Damascus destroying 
sections of the railway. Small units of men laid charges on the track. Then as the 
Turks defended the track, Lawrence's men formed large moving columns 
capable of rapid hit-and-run operations. 
  
It was a war of attrition; Lawrence used fewer people to attack and sabotage than the 
Turks had to repair the tracks. He favored complicated explosions that required time-consuming repairs.  
A particular favourite was the 'tulip bomb', named for twisting tracks so that they could not be straightened. 
  
An alternative was to 'walk' the track out of service. To cut the line, 20 men walked along 
the track, lifted rails and threw them away which they repeated mile after mile.  
Bridges were blown up to shatter rather than crumble as they consumed more man-hours to fix. 
Drainage holes in the masonry were particularly useful for explosives. 
  
Blowing up trains was a very tricky operation but worked best with ordinary explosives laid 
in parallel along the track fired electrically by an observer. 
  
                  Modern Weapons                   
Late in the war Lawrence introduced modern war machines to the Arabs. Bi-planes joined the 
Revolt and provided wonderful reconnaissance over enemy territory. Rolls Royce armored 
cars, the like of which many Bedouin had never seen, were described as "sons and daughters 
of trains", motorcycles were believed to be "devil's horses".  
  
Lawrence soon demonstrated that armoured cars could powerfully strike the railway. Late in 
1917, he and his commander Colonel Joyce drove at 60 mph to raid a Turkish garrison, 
and safely engaged the enemy. Lawrence called this "fighting de luxe". 
  
It was Lawrence's great skill that he combined elements of traditional and modern warfare so 
successfully. 
  
The Arabs willingness to assimilate Lawrence's views on irregular warfare with their centuries old 
approach to guerrilla operations made them a considerable force, despite their lack of 
numbers.
 
Read Lawrence's Twenty Seven Articles about how to fight with the Arab Bedouin...more 
  
Go back to Lawrence or Background to war.
  
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	                  Hit and 
                        run techniques wore down the Turks 
                        
 
  
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