Shaping the State

October 7, 1998
		James Chace answers your questions on Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State who many credit with forming much of America's Cold War policies.

Did Acheson have any regrets about his policies? How well has the U.S. defined its foreign policy? How did he view China and Asia? How did Sen. McCarthy's attacks affect him? What was his policies towards the Third World?

As one of the prime architects of America's Cold War strategies, Dean Acheson was an essential force in such important policies as the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and the Truman Doctrine of containing communism. President Truman and Dean Acheson According to James Chace, the author of "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World," Acheson was both a strong anti-communist and pragmatist who guided the U.S. through the early years of the standoff with the Soviet Union and the Korean War. "While he did not come to high office with an elaborate plan to establish an American imperium, more than any of his contemporaries, more than Roosevelt, Truman, or General Marshall, he perceived what the interests of the United States and its allies required," Chace writes in his prologue. "In this respect, he did the most to create the world that endured from the outset of the Cold War to the collapse of communism almost half a century later, and beyond." Dr. Chace now responds to your questions: Dr. Daniel S. McHargue of Thousand Oaks, CA asks: I have been teaching American History and Politics for 30 years. The Cold Was is my topic next week and I need to know everything in the book! My question is whether after all of the accomplishments of the late '40s and early '50s, did the Secretary had second thoughts about any of the blocks of the plan? Were there unintended consequences? Dr. James Chace responds: There was no plan per se. Did he have second thoughts? I believe he regretted his use of universalistic rhetoric that he used to persuade Congress to vote funds for the Marshall Plan -- evoking a policy of global containment of communism when what Truman and he wanted was a limited containment in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The same may be said about the heightened rhetoric of NSC 68. Otherwise, he regretted that Truman and he had not been more explicit to Gen. MacArthur not to proceed north of the 38th parallel. There were dangerously ambiguous messages sent to the General, which allowed MacArthur to believe that he could go forward, even up to Yalu if he chose. He also regretted that he did not phrase more carefully his description of the U.S. defense perimeter in his January 1950 press conference. Nonetheless, he did not believe that the defense perimeter speech was responsible for allowing the North Koreans to believe they could invade the South, and the perimeter was the official position of the Joint Chiefs. The unintended consequences were in the rhetoric that created a belief among the larger public and government officials that an expansive anticommunism was desirable -- a policy that Eisenhower and Kennedy followed. Back to the top Thomas Kahler of Auburn, CA asks: Is the U.S. defining its national interests in the world after the fall of communism in eastern Europe as well as Acheson did after World War II? Dr. James Chace responds: No, I believe that there has been no clear articulation of America's interests. While it is true that there is no overiding threat to U.S. security, as was the Soviet Union, it is also true that there has been little effort to define a broader picture of U.S. strategy. Back to the top Michelle Wetherwhine of Boulder, CO asks: What were Mr. Acheson's attitudes and policies towards Asia and especially China? Dr. James Chace responds: Broadly speaking, Acheson believed that Mao Tse-tung was going to eventually invade Taiwan and that would be the end of Chiang Kai-shek. At that point, Acheson would have the U.S. recognize Mao as the legitimate government of China. He believed that Mao would resist a close alliance with the Soviet Union. He was less sure about Indochina. He wanted the French to reform their policies and looked for an alternative to Ho Chi Minh, and only reluctantly gave the French aid (largely because the French were using the need for U.S. aid as a quid pro quo for their agreement to arm Europe). Back to the top Philip Franklin of New Orleans, LA asks: How affected was Mr. Acheson by his run-ins with Senator McCarthy? Did it affect his pragmatist policies? Dr. James Chace responds: McCarthy's attacks on Acheson did not affect his pragmatic policies. He was, however, deeply wounded by them, though he did not show it publicly. The accusation of McCarthy (and Nixon) that he was soft on communism may have contributed to his use of heightened rhetoric in his condemnation of Russia's policies. Back to the top Charles Fitzhugh of New York, NY asks: How involved was he in programs to counter communism in the Third World? What role did he see these countries playing in the world order? Dr. James Chace responds: He was not greatly involved in programs to counter communism in the Third World, largely because there was no "Third World" as such. Except for India and Burma, most of the world remained colonies of France and Britain, although Acheson expected they would become free. Although the CIA may have been active in those areas, I do not know Acheson's views. He had been opposed to the creation of the CIA, as he believed it would be impossible for the executive to control it. He opposed the use of covert action in Central America. In general, he was worried about how stable the ex-colonies would become, but I do not think he saw them as playing a role in the world order -- again, remembering the period of time he was in office. Back to the top