Acting Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Admiral David Jeremiah, testified before Congress on the intelligence community's failure to foresee India's nuclear tests. Following a background report, Jim Lehrer and guests discuss the findings of the Jeremiah report.

KWAME HOLMAN: The initial nuclear test explosion set off by India last month was its first since 1974. And it came as a complete surprise to official Washington.

Policy-makers and members of Congress immediately criticized the Central Intelligence Agency for failing to detect preparations for the blast, especially since India's newly elected Hindu nationalist government had made a campaign pledge to make India a nuclear power. CIA Director George Tenet immediately commissioned an outside investigation of what happened. Retired Admiral David Jeremiah was in charge. Yesterday, he presented his classified report to the agency and to members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. At CIA headquarters Jeremiah blamed prevailing assumptions at the CIA.

DAVID JEREMIAH: We had a mind set that said everybody else is going to work like we worked; they're going to-why would anyone throw away all the economic advantages associated with-that they would lose the testing? Why would they hazard all that stuff when there's no reason to do that? We don't think like the other nation thinks.

KWAME HOLMAN: According to published accounts, Jeremiah concluded the CIA did not have enough data-gathering satellites trained on India. Satellites the U.S. did use overwhelmed analysts with information.

DAVID JEREMIAH: We have an imbalance today between the human skills associated with reading photography, looking at reports, understanding what goes on in a nation, and the ability to technically collect that information. In everyday language that means there's an awful lot of stuff on the cutting room floor at the end of the day that we have not seen.

KWAME HOLMAN: Admiral Jeremiah's report also said analysts need better training, and that the CIA had far too little human intelligence--or spies--on the ground in India.

DAVID JEREMIAH: The organization needs to be scrubbed-and I'm talking about the intelligence community organization, not necessarily the CIA, to improve the clarity of the structure, to fix responsibilities, to resource the staff with the appropriate tools, and to inform the organization once that review has taken place.

KWAME HOLMAN: Jeremiah's report, however, did not recommend dismissals or other disciplinary action against CIA officials responsible who failed to warn of the Indian nuclear test.