Since the collapse of Asia's economies, the International Monetary Fund's practices have been the topic of much debate. Some experts have criticized the I.M.F. for not preventing the economic crisis, while others have charged that its remedies have made the crisis more severe. Following a background report, Margaret Warner and guests discuss the I.M.F.'s handling of the Asian economic crisis and the debate surrounding its policies.

MARGARET WARNER: For more than a decade a handful of countries in East Asia saw their economies soar, bringing a boom in construction, job creation, consumer spending, and near double digit yearly economic growth. Much of this new prosperity was fueled by investment from overseas. But, suddenly, last July, the currencies of these countries began to falter. Then they plunged. Their stock markets did too.

Within weeks, each one of these countries turned to the lender of last resort, the International Monetary Fund. In the past six months, the I.M.F. has come to the rescue of four Asian countries, with bailout packages worth billions. On July 18th, the fund committed to the Philippines $4 billion; on August 20th, Thailand $17.2 billion; on November 5th, Indonesia $43 billion; on December 3rd, South Korea a record $57 billion.

The Washington-based I.M.F. was founded after World War II to stabilize global exchange rates. Today it manages nearly $200 billion in assets, taxpayer money advanced by its 181-member countries. The United States pitches in the biggest share, 18 percent of the total, giving it the most influence within the fund. When the I.M.F. comes to a country's rescue, the bailout announcement is usually greeted with relief.

But these I.M.F. loan agreements come with strings attached, so-called "I.M.F. conditionality," changes in the way the government and its financial community do business. Typically, the government must slash its budget, impose higher taxes and interest rates, close insolvent banks, end its cozy relationships with leading industries, and open its markets to more foreign competition. The I.M.F. doles out its bailouts in installments, conditioned on whether the country is living up to the agreement's tough terms. These I.M.F. loans are intended, above all, to bolster the confidence of international investors, so that private capital will return to finance a business-led revival of the local economy. So far, that hasn't happened in Asia.

The currencies of all four nations have continued to plummet since their I.M.F. bailouts were announced. The Indonesian rupiah, for example, has slid an additional 65 percent since the I.M.F. pledge last November. Their stock markets haven't done much better. Though South Korea's market is up, the stock markets in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia have all seen dramatic further declines. Day-to-day life in these countries has only worsened as well. Once prosperous Indonesians are lining up to buy subsidized cooking oil and rice. And last week, they embarked on a wave of panic buying, out of fear that their currency would soon be worth next to nothing.

Even the I.M.F. now concedes that some of its prescriptions may have backfired. Last week, the New York Times disclosed that a confidential internal I.M.F. report admitted the Indonesian bank closings demanded by the fund last November had touched off a wave of panicky depositor withdrawals from even healthy institutions, triggering additional financial declines through Asia. The report said: "These closures, far from improving public confidence in the banking system, have, instead, set off a renewed flight to safety." Recently, some members of Congress have questioned whether the U.S. should continue funding the I.M.F.'s efforts to Asia.

REP. DAVID BONIOR, (D) Michigan: The American people are going to be very skeptical of any plan to bail out international speculators and repressive regimes that simply encourages them to repeat the same pattern of abuses and excesses all over again.

MARGARET WARNER: Asked about this criticism in a NewsHour interview last Friday, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin defended the U.S. participation.

ROBERT RUBIN, Secretary of the Treasury: Jim, we would not spend one nickel to help investors or bankers. The only objective of these programs, at least from our point of view, is to restore financial stability in countries where we have an enormous economic or national security interest.