NUCLEAR ESPIONAGE?

April 30, 1999
		Elizabeth Farnsworth talks with Energy Secretary Bill Richardson about the alleged transfer of nuclear weapon technology to China.

April 16, 1999: An assessment of Premier Zhu's visit. April 8, 1999: Nuclear Espionage charges against China. March 9, 1999: The controversy over security at America's top nuclear weapons lab. Browse the Online NewsHour Asia coverage.   NATO U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Senate White House U.S. State Department Serbian Ministry of Information	KWAME HOLMAN: The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico is the focal point of much of American nuclear research and has been since the dawn of the nuclear age. But for the last six months, the lab has been at the center of public allegations about spying. Several news organization revealed that a government scientist had been under suspicion since 1995 in connection with an investigation into how China received information about this country's most advanced nuclear warhead, the so-called W-88. Two days ago, The New York Times published a new and potentially more damaging allegation: That the scientist -- Wen Ho Lee-- transferred large amounts of classified information from a highly secure computer at Los Alamos to a much more accessible computer network. The programs involved were known as legacy codes that comprise decades of nuclear knowledge. Lee was fired last month by the Department of Energy, which runs the lab. The FBI is investigating Lee but has filed no charges. In a statement this week, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said of the alleged downloading of classified material, "This kind of egregious security breach is absolutely unacceptable, and we now have strong barriers in place that will prevent these kinds of transfers." In recent years, the Energy Department has been criticized for lax security at its weapons labs. Yesterday, members on the Senate Intelligence Committee heard testimony from FBI Director Louis Freeh in a closed hearing. Freeh reportedly told the Committee that security questions about Wen Ho Lee were raised as far back the 1980's without triggering a formal probe. The Energy Department suspended all classified computer operations at its nuclear labs early this month for two weeks. The Department also announced a series of security measures covering computers, documents, foreign visitors and counterintelligence. JIM LEHRER: And to Elizabeth Farnsworth.
	Secretary Richardson.
	ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: For more on this story, we have a newsmaker interview with Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson. Welcome. BILL RICHARDSON, Secretary of Energy: Thank you, Elizabeth. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: You confirmed yesterday that classified nuclear weapons computer codes at Los Alamos were transferred to an unclassified computer system. And before we get into what you're doing to make that impossible now and in the future help us understand what was transferred, when, and how. BILL RICHARDSON: Well, what we're talking about, Elizabeth, first of all is this is a very, very serious violation. We're talking about transfers from classified to unclassified computer files. Legacy codes, these are large computer programs that are used to simulate how a nuclear weapon works. So this is very, very serious. How serious we don't know yet. Now, what seems to have happened was during a period between 1983 1984, all the way to '94 and '95 it appears that this individual worked at the Los Alamos laboratories improperly transferred these files. These are very, very serious violations. What we have done to deal with this problem is -- ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Let me interrupt one minute, because I'm going to get into that. BILL RICHARDSON: Yes. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: What would be the key value of the transfer of these codes to another country? Would they be able to build nuclear weapons based on them, counter U.S. nuclear weapons?
	Legacy codes.
	BILL RICHARDSON: Well, first of all, Elizabeth what we're talking about is computer simulations. Now, we don't know the extent of this damage until, number one, we have no evidence yet that China or anybody got this information. And secondly, without nuclear testing, you don't know whether these legacy codes have any utility. And for the record, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which we abide by, does not have nuclear testing. China doesn't do it either. Many other countries don't do it. This doesn't minimize the enormous security concern and damage. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And just so we understand, theoretically, could those codes have been e-mailed to somebody else ones they were on the unclassified computer system? BILL RICHARDSON: There is no evidence of that. Now, the F.B.I. is conducting a very extensive and vigorous law enforcement investigation. It now moves into the law enforcement side because the FBI and law enforcement is trying to build a case. But the evidence on that is not there. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Now, the D.O.E. is in the midst of an investigation, too, is that right, about why Wen Ho Lee this individual, retained access to secrets after 1996, which is when suspicions were first raised about him, or at least officially raised. What can you tell us about your own internal investigation? BILL RICHARDSON: Well, I want to find out why this happened, why this individual kept a classification of extreme security, why he was not moved, how long was he in a position where it would have caused damage? Now, the FBI, I think, has been very effective in saying you don't want to tip somebody off when you're investigating, but it seems within the lab, within the Department of Energy there were some communications breakdowns as to why this individual was still pursuing security work of a sensitive nature at a time when there were suspicions about him. My objective here is not to point fingers, but I want to know if there are officials at D.O.E. or the lab, that we have accountability, that we find out what happened, that there be a necessary disciplining, that we ensure that this kind of mentality or lack of oversight never happens again. And my point, Elizabeth, is now with the reforms we've instituted, I can virtually assure you that this would not happen again. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Okay. I'm going to get into those reforms. I promise I’ll give you time. But we need to gets things clarified. Senator Shelby, the chair of the senate intelligence committee, that it's inconceivable to the aver person that Wen Ho Lee would not be watched closely after being suspected of espionage. I know that is what you're saying you want to find out. Can you give us some sense of why he wasn't watched closely? BILL RICHARDSON: Well, I don't agree with that statement. He was watched. The FBI is very skillful in conducting these investigations, but there are legal sides. There are law enforcement rights. The individual has rights. You don't want to tip them off. What we seem to have had is a communications breakdown, perhaps between the lab, the Department of Energy, and the FBI as to who was doing what. It does appear that there was a breakdown. Mistakes were made. But at the same time, we cannot definitively conclude that he was not being watched. He was being watched. He was being followed. His computers at the lab were looked at. But at the same time, again, you don't want to tip him off. We're into an area that involves knowledge, potential espionage investigations. And if you look, Elizabeth, at all our cases, the Nicholson case, the Ames case, the Edward Lee Howard case, you have to be very careful how you approach this. Nonetheless, mistakes were made. I am not condoning anything. There were some screwups there, and I'm trying to pick up the pieces and make sure that that this doesn't happen again. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Tell us what you're doing.
	Cybersecurity initiatives.
	BILL RICHARDSON: Well, what I'm doing is massive cybersecurity initiatives that involve -- I shut down the labs for two weeks to make sure that you could not ever again transfer from classified to unclassified. Number two, detection devices that would ensure that you can't move any files from unclassified to classified or vice versa. And thirdly, what is called a two-person rule. In other words, you cannot have a transfer between classified and unclassified until two people agree to it. There are a lot of physical and technical measures that we have taken that literally coupled with polygraph exams for any employees that dealing with these issues, coupled with literally a tripling of the counterintelligence budget, background checks on foreign scientists that visit the laboratories from sensitive countries, China, Russia. Coupled with a number of other cybersecurity measures that we have pushed forward to ensure that e-mail and outgoing computer scientific information that it doesn't happen again. But remember, we have a lot of programs at these labs that are very valuable. And the Congress is overreacting. They are now saying that we should shut down foreign scientist programs. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Yeah. Senator Shelby has introduced legislation to do that, scientists from 22 sensitive countries, is that right? BILL RICHARDSON: That's right. And I think that... ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: What do you think of that? BILL RICHARDSON: I think that's not a good idea. Senator Shelby has been very serious and he's been responsible, but that would hurt our national security. I want to have Russian scientists at our labs so that we can ensure that Russian nuclear scientists don't defect to Iran or Iraq or North Korea. I want to make sure that the Soviet nuclear weapons complex is safe and we can only do that with scientific exchanges programs and programs the Department of Energy has. If we're going to talk India and Pakistan into signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we have to talk to them about arms control and nonproliferation. Let's also remember one fact, Elizabeth, this violation was caused by an American citizen, not by a foreign scientist. So we're going after scapegoats here. Let's tighten up security. We've done that. Let's ensure that America's national security and cybersecurity in these labs are safe. Mistakes were made. In the 80's, in the 90's. Let's blame both administrations. Let's attack this problem in a bipartisan way. Let's not look for scapegoats. I need the support from the Congress now to get the counterintelligence budget, to support me in this very controversial initiative to have polygraphs of employees. Only two other agencies, C.I.A. have it. I need support from the Congress to ensure that this never happens again, but for them to disarm me, for them to politicize this issue is not going to help. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: All right. Well, Mr. Secretary, thanks for being with us. That's all the time we have.