RICHARD HOLBROOKE

September 16, 1999
		The United States has pledged to provide communications, transportation, and intelligence gathering for the U.N. multinational force poised to enter East Timor. In a Newsmaker interview, U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke discusses this role with Jim Lehrer.

Online NewsHour Special Report: East Timor Independence Sept. 15, 1999: A background report on readying the peacekeeping force. Online Backgrounder: A look at East Timor's stormy history. Sept. 14, 1999: An newsmaker interview with Madeleine Albright. Sept. 14, 1999: An interview with a journalist detained in East Timor. Sept. 13, 1999: Two United Nations representatives discuss the creation of an East Timor peacekeeping force. Sept. 13, 1999: Indonesian President B.J. Habibie says he will allow international forces into East Timor. Sept. 10, 1999: Three experts discuss the international reaction to the militia violence in East Timor. Sept. 9, 1999: Samuel Berger on the East Timor crisis. Sept. 8, 1999: An interview with 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta. Sept. 7, 1999: Two experts discuss the militia activities in East Timor and how Indonesia and the U.N. can end them. Sept. 7, 1999: Indonesia institutes martial law in East Timor. Sept. 6, 1999: The Carter Center's lead vote monitor discusses the post-election violence. Sept. 3, 1999: East Timor chooses independence. Sept. 2, 1999: U.N. workers are killed as militia attacks continue. Sept. 1, 1999: Militias lead an uprising outside the U.N. compound. Oct. 25, 1996: Online Forum: Nobel Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta responds to viewer questions. July 8, 1999: A discussion on Indonesia's election process. Nov. 13, 1996: A discussion with Jose Ramos-Horta. Oct. 11, 1996: Two East Timorese dissidents win the Nobel Peace Prize. Browse the NewsHour's coverage of Asia.     United Nations Mission in East Timor Indonesian Embassy in Washington National Council of Timorese Resistance U.S. Embassy in Jakarta Carter Center	JIM LEHRER: Now a Newsmaker interview with the new United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke. The former Assistant Secretary of State and special envoy to the Balkans was chosen by President Clinton for the U.N. job in June of '98 but was not confirmed by the Senate until last month. This is his first interview with us since he took up his new job. Mr. Ambassador, welcome and congratulations. RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Thanks, Jim. It's great to be back. I gave my last interview in the State Department with you, so it's a good way to get going again, I think. JIM LEHRER: Okay. Well, terrific. On the news of the day, the President's announcement on East Timor sending 200 U.S. non-combat troops, why non-combat, why no U.S. combat troops? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: I think that there are a lot of reasons for this. Everyone believes it's appropriate for the Asian nations and the Australians as part of the region to take the lead. Secondly, we are carrying a very substantial part of the burden in Kosovo and Bosnia. This is the appropriate division. Prime Minister Howard of Australia has said he feels it's correct, and I think it's - and I spent yesterday in Washington telling the members of Congress, and they felt it was correct. So I think it expresses the degree of American involvement at this time in an appropriate manner.
	Is the U.N. prepared to fight?
	JIM LEHRER: What if there is armed resistance from the militias? What if this international force has to fight? Is the U.N. prepared to fight? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Let me make two points on that. One, most of the people I talked to, including members of Congress, had not yet focused on a key distinction. This is not a U.N. peacekeeping force. This is a multinational force wearing national uniforms, not the U.N.'s famous blue helmets, which is under national command. It's like our NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Australians are in the position that we and the British are in, in Bosnia and Kosovo. And in that regard, it will have what is called Chapter 7 authority. That means that they can shoot first and ask questions later. In Bosnia, this approach replaced a tragically misbegotten U.N. force with a NATO-led force. The result is that whereas in Bosnia there were a thousand U.N. casualties, there have been no NATO casualties in hostile action in over three and a half years. So let anyone in East Timor on any side understand that the Australians and their Asian colleagues in this force will shoot first and ask questions later. Now, I don't want to second guess the Australians, who are a wonderful fighting force and have been an ally of the United States in every military engagement of consequence we've engaged in, in this century. They are a very good army. They will do what's necessary to protect themselves and carry out their mission, but, again, for the benefit of your viewers, please be clear, this force was authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but it's not a U.N. force, with all the complexities that carries. JIM LEHRER: Are you satisfied, Mr. Ambassador, that 7500 troops can do the trick? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: I don't know. This is the force sizing that the Australians in consultation with us and others have decided is the sufficient number at this point. It's a legitimate question. I've discussed it with representatives of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. They feel confident in the Australian judgments. If the Indonesian military aid and abet the so-called militia, which in my view, are really an extension of the military of Indonesia and an outrageous group of thugs doing outrageous things - they remind me a lot of the - of Arkans paramilitary forces in Bosnia and Kosovo - if they get involved in some nasty stuff and do not cooperate, they are (a) betraying the commitment of President Habibie and Foreign Minister Alatas, a commitment that's been reaffirmed at every level of the Indonesian government, including General Wiranto, and (b) they are certainly asking for major problems. JIM LEHRER: What is your reading of why President Habibie and his leadership group, including the military, finally agreed to an international force?
	Indonesia agrees to the force
	RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Well, you know, I've been a longtime observer of this remarkable nation, Indonesia, for over 25 years. It has always been, in my view, the least understood and least thought about major country in the world for Americans. After all, it's the fourth largest country in the world, it's the largest Moslem country, and it's one of the most ethnically diverse if not the most ethnically diverse country on earth. And they -it's a very difficult country to fully understand. Everyone always talks about the culture as defined by the Javanese Shadow Players. So I don't know what happened inside the leadership to reach the decision you're talking about. But I do want to say this: after a terrible period the Indonesian leadership did come to realize -- unlike Milosevic in Belgrade -- that international peacekeeping forces were essential for the good of their own country. They did it at the 11th hour, and now if they behave, and they have promised they will in reference to your earlier question, we will have moved forward. But what happened, I would defer to your correspondents on the ground in Jakarta. JIM LEHRER: Now, much has been made also, Mr. Ambassador, about the unusual step of the Asian nations agreeing to put together - in other words to go with the Australians into another Asian country. And you know Asia. Explain that. RICHARD HOLBROOKE: You know, we stayed up most of the night, the night before last, in the Security Council at American insistence. We said we were not going to close down the Security Council until we had a decision. The delays were caused by countries consulting their governments: Bahrain, a Moslem country in the Gulf, but one that's concerned about it; Malaysia, the near neighbor which was greatly concerned; and China and Russia, which needed to consult. In every case they voted unanimously. I think it was the realization that the Indonesian leadership wanted it themselves. And in that sense what happened at the Security Council in the last few days was a remarkable demonstration of the United Nations working the way it should. A Security Council mission to Indonesia led by the Namibian ambassador, including the British, the Slovenes, the Dutch, and the Malaysians, made a dramatic impact. A public, internationally-televised meeting of the Security Council showed what world opinion was like. The IMF and the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn and Michel Camdessus, warning the Indonesians they faced incredible disarray; General Shelton, our superb chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling General Wiranto and really laying it on the line to him. All of these things combined and the Malaysians, the Chinese, the Bahrainis, and all the other Asians, in the end, came across very rapidly considering, as you correctly pointed out in your question, that this was unprecedented.
	A call for U.N. assistance
	JIM LEHRER: Jose Ramos-Horta, who the - the Nobel Prize winning pro-independence man from East Timor - was on this program several days ago before the decision was made to send the international force, and he said if the United Nations did not step in, that the prestige and the very existence of the United Nations, the effectiveness of the United Nations, would be hurt beyond repair. I paraphrased, but do you agree there was that much at stake? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: I'm not sure I would say the very existence of the United Nations. JIM LEHRER: Well, I overstated that I think probably -- RICHARD HOLBROOKE: But other than that, Jim, I do agree with Jose Ramos-Horta - I was the first American official to meet regularly with him at a senior level. He's a friend of mine, I greatly respect and admire him, and I share his view in general on the importance of this issue. JIM LEHRER: Something had to be done. In other words, the international community had to move? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Well, you know, the international community had to move, but I want to make a very key point here. We had to get - we, the international community, had to get an invitation from the Indonesians. The option of invading the fourth largest country in the world, if they didn't want us to come in, we, again, the international community, was not viable. This was not Kosovo in the sense that when Milosevic did these terrible things, NATO bombed Serbia, and then he agreed to let the forces in. Here, the Indonesians wisely at the 11th hour made the same decision which Belgrade could not make; they invited them in. It was the correct decision in pursuit of two goals: a peaceful settlement of Timor in accordance with the referendum issue, which will give them their independence soon, and that's the critical issue that the people have to focus on; and secondly, the long-term interest of the Archipelago of Indonesia, this vast area that's as far as from New York deep into the Pacific Coast, with all that diversity which is fragile and needs to be held together, other than Timor, which doesn't belong inside the republic - East Timor - which doesn't belong inside the Republic of Indonesia. JIM LEHRER: All right. Finally - RICHARD HOLBROOKE: I'm sorry for interrupting, Jim, but I want to add one point. JIM LEHRER: Sure. RICHARD HOLBROOKE: My greatest personal concern tonight is in West Timor, where some 200,000 refugees were driven by the Indonesian military and these so-called militia thugs in the last few days. The international peacekeeping force is not going into West Timor; it's going into East Timor. The international community and the world press has got very limited information on what's happening there, as well as some tens of thousands of people who are trapped or surrounded in a Catholic seminary in Darai, in Central West Timor - East Timor. So I just want to express on behalf of the United States Government what Kofi Annan and I and the Indonesian foreign minister, Alatas, have talked about at length - President Clinton is so personally concerned about this that he has met with leading Americans about it, and the President asked me personally to convey his concern and we are very worried about these issues. JIM LEHRER: All right. Before we go, Mr. Ambassador, a more general, personal question, Mr. Ambassador: Was it worth the 15-month wait? RICHARD HOLBROOKE: (laughing) Ask me15 months from now, Jim. But, more seriously, of course it was. It's an honor to serve the President and work for Secretary Albright. She and I have been in contact every day since I was confirmed, without exception, and of course it's a great honor and privilege to serve in such an extraordinary job and follow two people - or three people like Tom Pickering, Madeleine Albright, and Bill Richardson. But to land from a trip to Kosovo and go right into the Timor crisis was quite an unexpected dose of high intensity work. JIM LEHRER: I wanted to talk to you about Kosovo but we'll do that some other time. And, again, congratulations, and thanks for being with us. RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Thanks, Jim.