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| EASING SANCTIONS | |
 September 17, 1999 
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MARGARET WARNER: Welcome, Mr. Secretary, thanks for joining us
MARGARET WARNER: The United States has had these sanctions on North Korea for nearly 50 years. Why lift them now? WILLIAM PERRY: Because for the last 50 years we have been not in the state of peace - in the state of armed truce. Five years ago that armed truce almost turned into a military conflict. That conflict was resolved - and the potential conflict was resolved with the agreed framework. That dealt with the nuclear weapons. But last year -- MARGARET WARNER: That's the '94 agreement. WILLIAM PERRY: That's the '94 agreement dealing with freezing their activities in nuclear weapons. Now, during the last year a new crisis has arisen over the firing of missiles, which is dramatized, I think most by the test firing of a long-range missile over Japan last August. This was a failed attempt to launch a satellite, but it did involve a long-range missile going over Japan. That has raised tensions in the area again, a new crisis. We're seeking ways of resolving that crisis as a first order of business. |
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| The threat from N. Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: How serious a threat, a security threat, is North Korea, if something doesn't change in terms of U.S. security or the security of our allies? WILLIAM PERRY: They have deployed more than a million men in their army, 2/3 of whom are very close to the border of North Korea. That is a formidable military threat. That has been deterred for decades by about half that many South Korean and American troops. We believe that deterrence is stable unless -unless nuclear weapons and missiles are introduced. And, therefore, we're trying to focus on not having the nuclear and nuclear weapons and missiles upsetting that deterrence.
WILLIAM PERRY: I should say, first of all, that this is just a small step on a larger agreement, which we can talk more about, but this particular step, which is suspension in missile testing and the easing of sanctions -- in each side, each case is reversible. I have to say that there is a high level of mistrust in the United States probably in North Korea and in North Korea relative to Americans, and, therefore, while we have in mind a comprehensive agreement of which this is just a first step, we could not negotiate. We did not want to negotiate a package deal, but we're doing it a step at a time. And each time we take a positive step and they take a positive step, maybe we build trust enough that we can start moving farther down. MARGARET WARNER: All right. Now, what happens if they don't stick to this, even this small first step? WILLIAM PERRY: If they do not stick to it, in the policy review -- which I have conducted - and given to the President and the Congress -- we lay out two alternatives. The first and preferred alternative is moving down a path towards normal relations with North Korea, of which this would be the first small step. If they're not willing to go down that path, if by their actions they demonstrate they're not willing to go down this path, then we have to take actions to protect our security interests. MARGARET WARNER: Like what? |
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| Terms of the Agreement | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: But you said this morning that in '94 the United States was within a day of - you said - increasing our forces in the region and imposing even tougher sanctions that you said would amount to an act of war. Is that the kind of thing you're talking about? WILLIAM PERRY: When we - no, what I was describing then was how we responded to the particular threat with which we were confronted at that time. So if we're confronted with a new threat, we would have a specific response tailored to that threat. And I could not spell out in detail in detail what it would be - I would not want to spell out in detail what it would be. But I should say we have many alternatives available to us - economic, political, as well as military. MARGARET WARNER: I just want to be - make clear here - have you make clear what this agreement does and doesn't do. It does not prevent them, does it, from either continuing to develop their weapons say, their missiles, or even selling missile or nuclear technology? It doesn't go to any of that. WILLIAM PERRY: This first step deals only with suspension of missile testing. But we envision, as we move down this path, we envision North Korea becoming compliant with the so-called missile technology control regime, going by the standards of that. And that would put restrictions not just on testing but on development, production, and export of missiles. We are not to that stage yet, but we envision going to it. We would like to go to that stage. |
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| Serial Blackmail? | ||||||||||||||||||||
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WILLIAM PERRY: Let me take the missile proposal in particular. We are -- I'm talking about only a small step at this time, but this small step - what our action is are easing sanctions. It's not buying off -- is simply allowing trade in consumer goods between our two countries, which is just a normal relation between two countries. What we are seeking, though, is that first step that would lead to a full normalization of relations, both diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries but it's not buying off. It's just a small step towards normal relations. MARGARET WARNER: But we wouldn't be doing this, would we, if they hadn't essentially taken a provocative step? WILLIAM PERRY: I think we would have normal relations with the country if they were not taking these steps. It is the other way around. It is the presence of the threat, which holds us back from normalization of relations. And we've told them if you remove this threat, we can proceed and you can proceed towards more normal relations, and both countries will be safe, and both countries will benefit. And I say both countries - all countries in the region. Obviously, the South Koreans and the Japanese are as much interested in this as we - if not more interested. And they have been full partners of ours as we've proceeded forward on this study and on this proposal. MARGARET WARNER: Now, in your proposal, in your conclusions and recommendations, as you said, you were proposing a rather comprehensive approach. What do you really envision? Do you envision totally normal relations between the U.S. and North Korea, and what would that entail on each side? |
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| Normalizing relations with N. Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: You said this morning something - I want to get the exact quote - you said we should not assume that this North Korean regime is going to collapse just because we put pressure on it. WILLIAM PERRY: Yes. MARGARET WARNER: What makes you conclude that? WILLIAM PERRY: People who have studied North Korea understand that it is going through a serious economic crisis right now. Hundreds of thousands people have died from starvation - maybe more than a million - so it's a very serious problem, and therefore, observers have said this regime is going to collapse; we don't have to deal with them; let's wait for them to collapse. Now, I don't believe that we can count on that. I don't believe we should depend on that. It is a regime that has a very strong control, and I do not condone or admire the regime, but I do recognize that it's very much in control in that country. And I think it would be imprudent on our part to assume that this regime is going to collapse. We have to deal with the North Korean government not as we wish they'd be but as, in fact, they are. MARGARET WARNER: So how did you find them - negotiating with them - I mean, you're one of the highest-ranking officials or former officials to ever go to North Korea and deal with this level. WILLIAM PERRY: I have read several books about negotiating with the North Koreans. I have been advised by people who have negotiated. I've expected polemics and fireworks in this -- but we had had none of that. With my principal interlocutor, First Vice Minister Kahn, I had four meetings - three or four hours each - so we had long discussions in-depth. They were straightforward; they were in-depth; they were non-polemic and they were constructive. We disagreed on many, many issues. But the discussions were serious and straightforward. |
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| Long term objectives | ||||||||||||||||||||
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WILLIAM PERRY: I was there primarily to see whether they were truly interested in having a normal relationship with the United States. And while I believe there still are a good bit of tensions in their country on that, and disagreements and differences in the country, I think that the answer to that is, yes, and the question is whether they were willing to give up their missile program to achieve that, because they understand that that is an impediment to a normal relationship with the United States. MARGARET WARNER: Now, how important do you think the missile and weapons programs are? As you know, some people suggested one reason they've just developed this is just to have a bargaining chip. WILLIAM PERRY: No. I do not believe that. It is quite clear to me - first of all, this is a real missile program, a serious missile program. It's not a Potemkin village. Secondly, I believe that while they have many reasons for wanting this missile program, I believe their primary reason is security, is deterrence. Whom would they be deterring? They would be deterring the United States. And we do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea. But I fully believe that they consider us a threat to them. And, therefore, they see this missile as a deterrence. I'd also - they also sell the missiles to other countries, and they get hard currency for that. And I'm sure that's not an unimportant factor, but I don't think it's the primary factor. MARGARET WARNER: As you said, there's a lot of distrust on both sides, but the image of the North Koreans that many in the U.S. have is that they're erratic, suspicious, paranoid, untrustworthy. How -- did you find any of that, or do you think they're people we can do business with? WILLIAM PERRY: All of the discussions that I had with them, as I said, they were straightforward and constructive - hard-nosed and disagreed on many issues but straightforward and constructive. My own judgment is I would not call them erratic or irrational at all. I think they have a very clear logic and a very clear rationale for what they're doing. We don't always understand that rationale; we don't always understand that logic; and therefore we consider it illogical. |
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| An easing of tensions | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: Do you think just on the basis of that first step that we will see a lessening, for instance, of some of the provocative steps, both words and deeds, that they take vis-à-vis South Korea … on and off as they have?
MARGARET WARNER: But no promises? I mean, you're not, you wouldn't be surprised to see further kind of hostilities of that nature? WILLIAM PERRY: I think that we have a long path ahead of us, and I think there will be many bumps in the road, many bumps indeed. But I also believe that for the last more than 40 years we have lived with the threat of a war on the Korean Peninsula hanging over our head like a dark cloud. That cloud has not gone away yet, but it is starting to drift away. We are seeing the first stage of it drift away, and that is devoutly to be hoped and to be wished. MARGARET WARNER: All right. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. WILLIAM PERRY: Thank you, Margaret. It's good to talk to you. |
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WILLIAM
PERRY: Thank you, Margaret. It's good to be here.
MARGARET
WARNER: Now, the North Koreans, in return for the easing of these sanctions,
have agreed to freeze or not to test fire any long-range missiles. What
makes you think they plan to stick to this?
WILLIAM
PERRY: I could not - would not spell out in detail what those actions
were, but I would suggest to you that it would take us back to the situation
we were in, in June of '94, which was a dangerous military crisis but
obviously we want to avoid being in that position. 
MARGARET
WARNER: And, Mr. Secretary, as you know, there a lot of critics of both
the '94 agreement and this one and they -- who say that essentially
the United States has fallen into this pattern of sort of what, serial
blackmail. I mean, the North Koreans come up with a threat, we buy them
off not to follow through; then after a while they come up with a new
threat, we buy them off. What do you say to that? I mean, should we
reward, should the U.S. reward that behavior?
WILLIAM
PERRY: Yes, we do envision normal relations. Let me give you an analogy
of what it would be as we have now with Vietnam. Ten years ago, twenty
years ago it might have been unthinkable we would have had a normal
relationship with Vietnam, but today we do. And that includes not only
normal diplomatic relations, including an embassy, but an ambassador.
But it also includes normal trade relations. We would certainly hope
that that's where this would lead with North Korea as well.
MARGARET
WARNER: Could you discern what really their long-range objective is,
what they really want vis-à-vis the US?
