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Strikes
in Yugoslavia coverage
May 10, 1999:
The Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.
on the embassy bombing.
May 10, 1999:
A panel of experts discuss the
longterm impact of the bombing.
May 8, 1999:
NATO
Secretary General conveys regret for bombing.
May 8, 1999:
China
condemns NATO bombing,
May 7, 1999:
Secretary
Albright
May 6, 1999:
Assessing
the peace proposal
May 6, 1999:
A
Kosovar's perspective
May 6, 1999:
Full
text of the foreign ministers' agreement
May 6, 1999:
Clinton
and Schroeder on the
G-8 Deal
Complete NewsHour coverage of Europe
and Asia
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SECRETARY COHEN: Good afternoon. I've just briefed President Clinton
on the series of errors that led to the unintentional attack against
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. I'd like to bring you up to date. I'll
review the steps that we're taking to prevent such mistakes in the future
and our plans to continue strikes against Yugoslavia until NATO's conditions
for stopping the Serb killing in Kosovo are fully met.
 Before
starting, I'd like to stress again that NATO and the United States deeply
regret this incident, this accident, and the loss of life that it has
caused. President Clinton has apologized to President Jiang and to the
Chinese people. As my statement will make clear, NATO had no intention
of hitting the Chinese embassy. This tragedy happened because a number
of systems designed to produce and to verify accurate
data failed.
What happened? Well, our initial investigation is still very preliminary
in nature. In simple terms, one of our planes attacked the wrong target
because the bombing instructions were based on an outdated map. The
correct target was the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement,
a key part of Yugoslavia's military machine.
There were several mistakes made in identifying and locating this target.
First, they failed to correctly locate the target on their maps. The
Procurement Directorate was near the building they had targeted. Second,
the building that they did target turned out to be the Chinese embassy,
but their maps inaccurately located the embassy in a different part
of Belgrade.
This is important, because if a map had correctly depicted the location
of the Chinese embassy, two things would have happened. We would have
known that we had improperly located the Procurement Directorate, and
NATO would have disapproved the target, because embassies are on a list
of no-strike targets.
The United States has taken several steps to prevent such a mistake
from happening again. First, the State Department will report to the
intelligence community whenever foreign embassies move or when new embassies
are built. Second, the intelligence community will strengthen the internal
mechanisms and the procedures for developing target information. This
will include new procedures for updating maps. Third, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency will establish new
rapid response procedures for updating critical data bases for no-strike
targets.
In a moment when I finish, two senior members of the intelligence community
will provide more details to you on background. But taken together,
these changes are designed to prevent similar tragic mistakes in the
future. But I have to be open and direct with you; in combat, accidents
will happen, despite our best efforts to prevent them.
It's important to focus on why NATO is fighting over Kosovo in the first
place. We want Yugoslavia to stop killing the Kosovar Albanians. We
want them to withdraw their troops and to let an international peace-keeping
force with NATO at its core into Kosovo so that more than one million
displaced Kosovars can return to their homes and villages and live in
peace and security.
The Serbian government has been very quick to publicize the NATO bombing
errors that have killed about 200 civilians, according to their statements.
But Milosevic has said nothing about the 4,600 Kosovar Albanians that
his forces have executed in the last two months. It has said nothing
about the more than one million people he has driven out of his country
and into the hills, and he has said nothing about the thousands of houses
his forces have burned. Silence cannot cover up his brutality.
NATO is going to continue its campaign until the ethnic terror stops
in the killing fields of Kosovo. NATO has conducted some 18,000 sorties,
some 4,036 strike sorties, and about a dozen incidents of unintended
casualties have been involved. We've damaged and we've disrupted key
strategic targets such as command and control and integrated air defenses.
In recent weeks NATO has also eliminated more than one third of Yugoslavia's
Army artillery, armored personnel carriers and other forces deployed
in Kosovo.
We are currently moving more planes into the region to intensify our
attacks, which will continue until NATO's goals are met. With that,
let me take your questions. Charlie.
Q: Mr. Secretary, Senator Shelby said today that a 1992 map was used
in flying this raid. If that's true, could I ask -- you said what happened
here -- why was a 1992 map used? Number two, the Chinese are demanding
that those directly responsible for this be punished. Do you think they
will be punished, fired or, in fact, resign over this?
SECRETARY COHEN: First, let me say that you will be given a more detailed
briefing at the conclusion of my presence here at the podium in terms
of which maps were used. But there was an original 1992 map that was
subsequently updated in 1997, and then again in 1998 it was again reviewed
for the possibility of conducting an operation. So it was 1992 and looked
at again in 1997 and again in '98. None of those maps indicated that
it was the Chinese embassy that was being targeted. The Chinese embassy
on all of those maps was located in what was called Old Belgrade. But,
again, you'll get more briefing on that.
As far as responsibility or culpability, we are in the -- again -- preliminary
stages of this investigation. If there is culpability to be found, then
we could consider appropriate action at that time.
Q: Secretary Cohen, under the conditions that you've pointed out, one
of them is the withdrawal of Serb troops. Yugoslavia said today that
it's ordered some withdrawal of troops. One, have you seen any evidence
that any troops are withdrawing from Kosovo; and, two, if they do begin
to withdraw, will they be allowed to withdraw, or will they be bombed
on their way out?
SECRETARY COHEN: As you indicated, only one of the five conditions that
NATO has laid out purportedly would be complied with. We've indicated
in the past that he must comply with all conditions. He must pull his
forces out; he must allow the ethnic Albanians to return -- the Kosovar
Albanians to return and live in safety and security. He must allow the
international peacekeeping force. He must allow and permit autonomy
to be granted to the Kosovars.
So, if he is committed to all of those conditions and then starts to
withdraw his forces consistent with that commitment, then, of course,
NATO could consider a bombing pause at that time, as President Clinton
has pointed out. But simply saying he's going to withdraw part of his
forces is completely insufficient. Secretary Albright has indicated
it will be a half measure and that would be to say the least --
Q: The soldiers would still be subject to attack?
SECRETARY COHEN: We intend to continue our campaign until such time
as Milosevic agrees to the conditions laid down by NATO.
Q: And to follow up, Mr. Secretary. Do you see, or have you been informed
that there is, in fact, even a partial pull-out of his troops out of
Kosovo? And, two, if there is even a partial pull-out, do you think
this is a case of him flinching, a legitimate pull-out or is it perhaps
a propaganda ploy to try and drive a wedge into NATO, which is upset
over the Chinese bombing?
SECRETARY COHEN: I am not aware of any troops being pulled out; it may
be that they have retrenched in some respect; I'm not aware of that,
and I wouldn't want to try and divine what is going on in Milosevic's
mind, whether it is tactical in nature, seeking to try and drive some
wedge between the NATO allies.
I have been on the phone talking with my allies constantly, my counterparts
constantly in the alliance, and they have all indicated that NATO must
continue. And so, there is still strong unanimity that we must continue
this effort until such time as the conditions are met.
Q: Is that with regard to all of his forces, or is that negotiable?
SECRETARY COHEN: Pardon?
Q: Does he have to withdraw all forces, or is that negotiable?
SECRETARY COHEN: We have made it clear he must pull all of his army
forces out of Kosovo.
Q: In apologizing, does the President of the United States and other
officials of the United States -- do you, sir, also express regret,
contrition or sorrow as well as an apology? And the second part of the
question is whose planes actually did the (inaudible)?
SECRETARY COHEN: First of all, the President has apologized; the Secretary
of State has apologized. I've indicated we deeply regret what has taken
place with the loss of Chinese lives. We hope that they will understand
that this was, in fact, accidental. It was not intentionally targeted
as a Chinese embassy.
The building was targeted, but it was not understood to be the Chinese
embassy, and, frankly, it defies all logic, all rationale on the part
of anyone to conclude that we would deliberately target the Chinese
embassy.
We have tried very vigorously to promote a better U.S.-Chinese relationship.
I have indicated to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
and others that I intended to continue our military-to-military contacts,
that I had intended to travel to China in the near future and had to
cancel my trip recently because of what was going on in Kosovo.
So, it runs contrary and against the grain of everything that we have
been trying to promote in terms of better relations with China for us
to have deliberately targeted the Chinese embassy.
And I understand that there is anger. I understand that the Chinese
feel this sense of frustration and rage right now, but I would hope
that cooler heads would prevail, because we have much larger interests
and long-term interests with the Chinese people and the Chinese government,
and hopefully, we can help mollify those feelings of rage and anger
and then restore a sense of calm and cordiality in our relations.
Q: Can you say who was responsible?
SECRETARY COHEN: I believe it was an American plane.
Q: Mr. Secretary, quite apart from the Chinese demanding punishment
of those who might have been responsible, isn't it in the interests
of the U.S. government that if anyone, if any members of the executive
branch made mistakes that led to this, that there be some kind of publicly
known punishment so that this kind of thing doesn't happen again?
SECRETARY COHEN: I think we have to wait for the outcome of the investigation
to find out why this was not included, why the embassy was not properly
identified, and then we'll take whatever measures are necessary at that
point.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could you expand a little bit on your answer that
NATO could consider a bombing pause? Does that mean that you want to
see completion of all five conditions or simply a promise from Milosevic?
At what point do you consider a bombing pause?
SECRETARY COHEN: I was trying to reiterate what President Clinton has
already stated, that he could envision some circumstances under which
there could be a pause. Those circumstances would require Milosevic
to have to agree to the conditions that NATO has set forth, the five
key principles.
If he were to agree and say he would abide by them and then take demonstrable
evidence to comply with them, then there could be a halt in the bombing
as such so that we would not target the soldiers who were in fact retreating
and going out of Kosovo. Those are the only conditions under which you
could have a halt to the bombing or a pause, under those conditions.
But absent an agreement on his part with demonstrable evidence that
the forces were being pulled out and that the Kosovar Albanians were
allowed to go back in and that there would be an agreement that there
would be an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core,
absent any of that, then the bombing will continue.
Q: What would be the actual mechanism for getting some sort of an agreement?
Do you envision talks between NATO and Milosevic? How would that even
happen?
SECRETARY COHEN: I think Milosevic understands what he has to do. We've
made it very clear to him. There have been a number of emissaries that
have traveled to Belgrade and back. I think he understands what these
five conditions are, and he will simply have to accept then.
How he communicates that is to be determined and through what vehicle
or what person or persons, but he has every opportunity to comply with
it, and he can stop the bombing now by complying with NATO's conditions.
Q: Has there been any pause in the bombing of Belgrade itself because
of --
SECRETARY COHEN: Pardon?
Q: Has there been any pause in the bombing of Belgrade itself because
of this strategy --
SECRETARY COHEN: No.
Q: -- while you reevaluate the targeting procedures or anything?
SECRETARY COHEN: No. We're going to continue the bombing campaign wherever
the SACEUR and our military authorities believe targets should be hit
throughout Serbia.
Q: (Inaudible) for 45 days (inaudible) air power. I wonder if you please
explain (inaudible) objectives on this and declare war.
SECRETARY COHEN: Well, first of all, we have indicated that although
it's been 45 days, there have been only a very few, a handful of days
that have been unrestricted by weather. Given that limitation, we have
been quite successful in eliminating his petroleum refining capacity,
100 percent; we have cut in half his ammunition-production capability;
we have eliminated nearly one-half or perhaps even two-thirds of his
front-line aircraft, MiG-29s and others, and we are now systematically
going after forces in the field. We think that the air campaign has
been successful (and) will continue to be more successful as we intensify
the operation.
Q: If you are not going to pause bombing, I presume you're using the
same maps that had the mistake on it. Are you concerned about any other
mistakes? And, also, you were scheduled for a trip to China, I believe,
in June. Is that still on?
SECRETARY COHEN: Well, with respect to the mistakes, as I've indicated,
out of the 4,036 combat strikes that have been conducted, roughly 12
or about a dozen have involved unintended casualties.
I would say that we have an outstanding record of achievement here in
terms of trying to minimize harm to innocent people. In this particular
case, it was not a human error or mechanical error. It was an institutional
error, and that's what we have to make sure that we can correct in the
future, to the best that we can.
Once again, I would point out that because we are engaged in combat,
that errors are likely to take place in the future, but I think given
the record that we've established, we have brought them to a very substantial
minimum in terms of the overall campaign.
As far as my travel plans, they remain open. Much will depend upon whether
the Chinese government wishes to have me travel there. I've been there
many times before. I consider my relationship with their government
to be certainly as receptive and as good and cordial as one can be.
I would like to continue that relationship, but that depends upon the
Chinese government.
Q: Mr. Secretary, since a map was used to target this building in the
belief that it was the Supply Ministry, presumably the map has been
used to select other targets. Don't you have to go back and re-examine
that map and update your intelligence?
SECRETARY COHEN: They are looking at the reviewing of the maps, but
they are satisfied, given the rate of accuracy that we've had during
the past 45 days, that the record has been pretty outstanding.
So if you have only 12 incidents where you've had unintended casualties
from either malfunction or misfire or errant missile, in this case,
the wrong building, they still are very highly confident of the imagery
that they have and the maps that they have.
Q: Mr. Secretary, excuse me. Do you think that this should directly
-- does this directly come from deep cuts in the intelligence budget,
or is this just a mistake that happened, just happened to occur?
SECRETARY COHEN: I really can't answer as to the cause of, or the failure
to put the Chinese Embassy in the right location. The maps that they
have show the Chinese embassy in old Belgrade, that show this building,
unidentified as the Chinese embassy, where it is today, but the maps
that they were working from had it in the part of -- the old part of
Belgrade.
Q: Okay. Thank you.
SECRETARY COHEN: Okay.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY BACON: In five minutes, we'll continue the briefing
of the background, so we'll shut the lights off, take thecameras down,
and be back in five minutes.
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