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| IS THE END NEAR? | |
 May 3, 1999 
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With the release of the three US POW's and Russian attempts at shuttle diplomacy, talk of a political end to the NATO strikes in Yugoslavia is on the rise. Jim Lehrer assesses the likelihood of peace with three regional experts. |
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JIM LEHRER: Three assessments of the situation from two former Clinton
Administration officials, Ivo Daalder, who served on the National Security
Council staff-- he's now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution--
and Toby Gati, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research; plus William Hyland, a national security official in the
Nixon and Ford administrations, and former editor of the journal Foreign
Affairs. He now teaches at the college of William and Mary in Williamsburg,
Virginia. TOBY GATI: I smell the very beginning of a negotiation, actually, of several negotiations. One is the Russians among themselves. What is their bottom line? What kind of settlement do they want? What kind of role do they want to play? I don't think that's very clear. Primakov has signaled a much tougher line than Chernomyrdin, interviewed this week. JIM LEHRER: Chernomyrdin is the former prime minister - TOBY GATI: That's right. JIM LEHRER: -- who is now the envoy. Primakov is now the prime minister. TOBY GATI: That's right. I see a negotiation between the Russians trying
to act as a shuttle diplomat JIM LEHRER: So you think things are moving. TOBY GATI: Well, they're not moving fast enough to get the bombing to stop. And they're not moving fast enough to get any kind of agreement. I think they are moving-- diplomats would see movement. But the rest of us are going to see a lot more bombing. |
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| The beginning of the end. | ||||||||||||||||||||
| JIM LEHRER: What do you see, Bill Hyland?
JIM LEHRER: It may go to Belgrade tomorrow or the day after. WILLIAM HYLAND: I think it's the beginning of Chernomyrdin playing shuttle diplomacy. I suspect from the way the President was talking today-- it sound to me like he's ready to try to negotiate something. He's talking about minimal conditions and that he was always for a UN force, which is a little surprising. And the bombing pause could happen under the right circumstances. All of that, I think, is signaling that it's going to come to an end. JIM LEHRER: And yet, Mr. Daalder, the bombing was severe today. Was it as severe today as it's been anytime before - and they put the lights out in Belgrade. There have been stories all day today about all kind of emergencies and hospitals with infants and all of that.
IVO DAALDER: Not really. He captured as part of a war-- he captured three Americans, whether they were in Macedonia or not is still uncertain. For a humanitarian gesture, he let them go. But I think the Jackson mission ought to be looked at as a purely humanitarian mission. We are very happy that everybody is back, that we have two POW's, which we might want to release if we want to make a gesture. But in the sense, strategically, nothing has changed. JIM LEHRER: What do you make of all these blind quote, that's a Washington term for these high-level Clinton administration officials who were very upset that Jackson took on this mission and now they feel that it's boxed them in and all of that? What's the reality of this, do you believe?
JIM LEHRER: Do you agree, Bill Hyland, that there is this commonality in interest of not wanting ground troops in there, that that's kind of over the shoulder driving all these things too? WILLIAM HYLAND: I don't know if I'd use that phrase. I think the Clinton administration certainly doesn't want that kind of war. The Russians don't want it in and neither does Milosevic. But they each have different interests for not wanting it. On the Jackson mission, the problem with the Jackson mission is that it's good humanitarian -- if it were my son, I'd be happy that he got a prisoner out. But it legitimizes Milosevic. I mean, here he is on TV two days with Milosevic holding hands and walking around with him and negotiating with him, thanking him, coming back with Milosevic's letter. If Milosevic is a war criminal -
WILLIAM HYLAND: And being compared to Hitler by a lot of people. Then this Jackson has badly undercut Clinton's strategy if there is a strategy. I think Toby Gati is right. I think Clinton has lost control of this war, if it is a war. |
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| Serb sovereignty. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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JIM LEHRER: Well, let's go back to where we started, possible negotiated settlement now. And you laid out, Mr. Daalder, the three-- those three demands that NATO has given from the very beginning. Can Milosevic afford to give those up?
JIM LEHRER: Excuse me. And that also is what's keeping him-- it's helping his own political power at home because so many Serbs feel strongly about Kosovo being a part of Serbia. IVO DAALDER: Absolutely. Absolutely. And it's something he cannot negotiate away. He might well be able to lose Kosovo in a war. JIM LEHRER: He might get it bombed away. He could give it away - IVO DAALDER: Exactly. You can't negotiate it away, which means he wants to have Serb troops in the part that is recognized by the international community to be Serbs. So, he won't accept having all forces moved out. He might accept a lowering of the number, as he did in October when we were down to about 25,000 total troops. But he won't accept a complete withdrawal. At the same time, he won't accept an international force that is more capable of the residual Serb force that is there. And that's our dilemma, because if we cannot overpower the Serb forces who are there, then refugees won't return. JIM LEHRER: Bill Hyland, then on the other side of the table, how does NATO and the United States back off of any of these demands?
JIM LEHRER: Isn't that kind of the most difficult point of all -- bringing 800,000 people back into this country? WILLIAM HYLAND: How would you transport them back, under whose protection, and when they got there, who would be in charge? It would have to be a force of some size to protect them. I think Milosevic can agree to a lot of that because the basic thing he's achieved is not only as he cleansed the whole place which is a horrible catastrophe, but he also has achieved that Kosovo will remain in the Yugoslav Federation because NATO is not saying independence or partition. They are saying the opposite: Self-government, autonomy and all of that which is very vague stuff.
WILLIAM HYLAND: If a million refugees have left, the question in my mind would be how many would actually return? All of them? Doubtful. Half of them? The ethnic balance inside Kosovo has changed radically because of this Holocaust he's perpetuated. JIM LEHRER: So when you look at a potential deal here, knowing these firm positions that have gone into this, where do you see it making it? TOBY GATI: The first thing I would say is never underestimate the ability of a group of diplomats of coming up with a way of making this look like - JIM LEHRER: Everybody wins?
JIM LEHRER: Well, what about Milosevic? How in the world does he claim victory in this kind of thing? Can NATO allow him to claim victory? TOBY GATI: Well, of course, he will claim victory. He's still in power, which I imagine is the main point of victory for Milosevic. He will keep the Serb places that mean a lot in Kosovo to the Serbs. And if Russians are involved, and Ukrainians, the orthodox brethren, then those places will be kept under Serb control. And I can't imagine that there too many Kosovars who want to live there. And I don't think that too many NATO troops would want to turn their back to people who have returned to an area under Serb control.
IVO DAALDER: We're getting close to it. I think at the NATO summit, we had a basic decision. Were we going to put in ground forces and win this war in order to achieve our minimum objectives, or were we going to negotiate a compromise? We clearly decided we were going to negotiate. That's why we had the long telephone conversation that Bill Hyland talked about with Yeltsin and the Talbott mission and now the question is really what is the deal that we're going to have at the end of the road? Because Mr. Milosevic is in the driver's seat and we are not, he's going to get a better deal than we would other wise get. JIM LEHRER: And the Russians come out of this - WILLIAM HYLAND: The winners. JIM LEHRER: The winners? WILLIAM HYLAND: Well, almost the winners. About four weeks ago, five weeks ago, they were totally out. Primakov turned his airplane around. They were sulking; they cut off relations with NATO. He turned around many in mid-air. Now Chernomyrdin is in the White House talking with the President. The President is saying we have a lot to talk about. I suspect the Russians are back in the game, which is -- I don't see anything wrong with that. I think Clinton has lost this war.
JIM LEHRER: There's a familiar phrase from prior events. TOBY GATI: That's right. And can he deliver Milosevic? Milosevic has, on several occasions, agreed to something which when you come back and say it to him, he says let's renegotiate. JIM LEHRER: Thank you all very much for sorting through this for us tonight. |
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Ms.
Gati, so adding all of this up, do you smell a serious negotiation about
to begin? 
WILLIAM
HYLAND: I agree with Toby. I think this is the beginning of the end.
There will be a settlement of some kind. I don't know if it will take
two weeks, three weeks, a month. But I think everything is now moving
away from the military options towards political diplomacy. With Chernomyrdin,
it's been about ten days or a week since Yeltsin talked to Clinton on
the phone. Yeltsin has appointed Chernomyrdin, who apparently has his
confidence and then Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary, went to Moscow.
And then Chernomyrdin went to Belgrade. Milosevic published a peace
plan of some kind which is vague but still-- and then the Jackson mission,
I think, is all part of this. And Chernomyrdin's here at the White House
today. 
IVO
DAALDER: Clearly, if you want to negotiate, you need to have leverage.
You need to have something to give up as you compromise as part of the
negotiation. If our conditions that we have now are, indeed, the minimal
conditions, that is, we want all the Serb forces out, we want an international
peace force that has a NATO role, for NATO, if not NATO at its core,
not a NATO lead, if we want all the refugees to come back, if those
are our minimum conditions, how are we going to get Mr. Milosevic to
sign up to those when he has consistently over the last six weeks rejected
those conditions? So bombing in the intensification thereof, is part
of this negotiation move, this move that we see how much damage we can
do. You're really better off to talk to Mr. Chernomyrdin and to come
closer to where we are. 
JIM
LEHRER: The Jackson mission specifically, the successful mission, the
release of the three Americans-- does Milosevic deserve anything in
return for that? 
TOBY
GATI: I think the reality is that the policy, in some way, is getting
away from the Clinton administration and the arguments are being framed
elsewhere. Milosevic lets the US POW's go. It looks like a humanitarian
mission. But he can counterpose that to a bus that burns on a bridge
and civilians are killed. The Russians look like the messengers of peace.
They are the ones who can end war. And what's happening is the atmosphere
is being created where the momentum and perhaps even our own allies
may say a bombing pause may make sense. And at that point, we would
either have to say we're not going to have a pause, and indeed, if we
have to, we will take the next step. And the next step everybody knows
is a step that nobody wants taken. The Russians don't want American
troops or NATO troops in the area. And I think the administration also
doesn't want to commit US troops. So there's a commonality of interest
between some of the negotiators. But there's also a lot of tension.
I can imagine that in Belgrade Milosevic is wondering what Chernomyrdin
is actually saying because there is not a lot of love loss between those
people either.
JIM
LEHRER: And he's being compared to Hitler. 
IVO
DAALDER: Not really. I mean, the three demands that we have, which is
all Serb forces out and international, real international force with
NATO at its core in and the refugees back, at least the first two of
those are very difficult for Mr. Milosevic to accept. He wants to maintain
Serb sovereignty over Kosovo. That's the number one reason that we're
in this mess. 
WILLIAM
HYLAND: Well, I think it's begun to back off a little bit. We want Serb
forces out. It's not clear we want all Serb forces completely out, whether
there be some border guards. I suspect if their bargaining starts, if
bargaining starts, that NATO will turn out to have a softer position
than it put forward as the recent NATO summit. All refugees back, but
under whose control? Are we going to escort them back? 
JIM
LEHRER: If he's cleansed it, but if he has to agree to allow the Kosovars
back in, he's-he's not back to zero because a lot of people have died
but -
TOBY
GATI: Well, everybody semi-wins. I think it is possible that they will
go back, but to where, which part of Kosovo? I think it's possible for
the UN to get involved so that you're not exactly sure who is what on
what side. Some of the proposals the Russians have put forward actually
put the Hungarians next to Russian commanders, which is kind of ironic
considering that Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic just joined
NATO. The UN mandate is there, which gives the Russians a veto, not
a voice, which is exactly the opposite of what was said under NATO.
But I think NATO could claim a victory if it was able to establish the
conditions in part of the Kosovo. I don't think it will ever establish
them in all of Kosovo, for some of those refugees to go back. But I
would remind you that in Bosnia, which is claimed as a great diplomatic
success by many people, including the President today, the refugees
have still not gone back. 
JIM
LEHRER: It's always said by professional diplomats that you can only
make a deal when it's in everybody's interest to make the deal. Has
that moment arrived? 
TOBY
GATI: I think not so fast. The Russians still have to deliver. After
all, they came here saying "we can help end this war." The
question is where is the beef basically? And what can you deliver?