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a NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript
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PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC

March 25, 1999

 

The NATO bombing is aimed at changing the mind of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. After this background report, Phil Ponce speaks with three people who worked closely with the leader.

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NewsHour Links

Strikes in Yugoslavia Coverage.

A background report on Milosevic's hold on power.

March 24, 1999:
Slobodan Milosevic addresses his country prior to air strikes.

Background on Milosevic's career and political interests

March 24, 1999:
Secretary Albright discusses the air strikes
.

March 22, 1999:
The Yugoslavian ambassador to the U.N. discusses growing tension.

Feb. 23, 1999:
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger discusses the Kosovo peace talks.

Feb. 18, 1999:
Sec. Albright discusses the negotiations meant to bring a peaceful end to the Kosovo crisis.

Oct. 27, 1998:
US special envoy Richard Holbrooke on the latest troop withdrawals from Kosovo

Oct. 14, 1998:
US special envoy Richard Holbrooke discusses the Kosovo crisis.

Sept. 23, 1998:
A focus on Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
.

Aug. 5, 1998:
Charges of ethnic cleansing surface in Kosovo.

July 15, 1998:
A look at the Kosovo Liberation Army.

July 7, 1998:
US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke discusses the situation in Kosovo.

Read an Online Forum on the crisis in Kosovo.

 

Outside Links


The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

NATO

U.S. State Department

U.S. Department of Defense

 

 

JIM LEHRER: The NATO bombing is aimed mostly at changing the mind of one man -- a man named Milosevic. Who is he and what makes him tick? Phil Ponce reports.

PHIL PONCE: And, for more, we're joined by John Scanlan, who served as United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1985 to 1989; Mihailo Crnobrnja, he served closely under Mr. Milosevic in various official capacities from 1974 to 1992, most recently as Yugoslavia's Ambassador to the European Union -- he's now a Canadian citizen and a visiting scholar at the College of William and Mary; and Radmila Milentijevic, Mr. Milosevic's Former Information Minister whom we just saw in Charles Krause's report. She has American and Yugoslav citizenship and lives in New York. And, welcome to all.

 

Milosevic has a tendency ...

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Crnobrnja, you worked with Mr. Milosevic over the course of 18 years. What kind of a man is he? How would you describe him?

MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA: Well, as Madam Milentijevic said a little while ago, he, on a personal level, can be very charming; he can be very understanding. He can be a good listener. He very often listens to my advice, which pleased me, of course. And that was at a time when he was an economic liberal, spearheading economic liberal reforms in Yugoslavia until 1987 when nationalism, as we heard, became the preferred weapon and instrument of policy. And from that point on, he and I gradually and slowly parted our ways, not in an unfriendly manner, but certainly I did not have the stomach for the nationalism which was riding very high in Serbia. And he has become very convinced, I'm sure, that he is doing the right thing, even though he is not in full command of adequate facts.

PHIL PONCE: And what do you mean by that, not in full command of adequate facts?

MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA: Well, you see, Milosevic has a tendency to convince himself into a state of mind to psyche himself on relatively, how shall I say it, dubious facts. Like, for example, he used to say very often to visiting dignitaries that Serbs were the biggest, the largest population in the Balkans, which is entirely untrue. The Turks are also part of the Balkans and the Romanians are part of the Balkans. But he would look you in the eyes and unblinkingly they would say the Serbs are the biggest in the nation and yet, there were lots of injustices done to the Serbs. So it is true there were injustices done to the Serbs, but, you see, the first part of the statement kind of emphasizes this in a wrong way.

PHIL PONCE: Ms. Milentijevic, how about that, does Mr. Milosevic misinterpret facts to suit his purposes?

RADMILA MILENTIJEVIC: Well, I don't know how and what circumstances President Milosevic did say something like this, but I think he is more intelligent and smarter than to claim that the Serbs are the largest nationality in the Balkans, which is not true. The Serbs are, however, a very critical nation in the Balkans, in part because we inhabit the Balkans for such a long time. We are a nation, which created its own state in the Middle Ages and liberated ourselves in the 19th Century. We are a historic nation in a highly politically mature nation, I believe.

PHIL PONCE: But getting back to how Mr. Milosevic looks at the world is that all an essential part of his world view, the fact that perhaps Serbs have not gotten their due in certain respects?

RADMILA MILENTIJEVIC: Well, absolutely yes. What we see here is a situation in which the Serbs feel very much done a very big enormously wrong thing toward them by the United States above all because the Serbs in two world wars in this century fought together with the American people against tyranny and against Fascism and paid a very heavy price. During World War II, the Serbs hid and liberated 500 American flyers who were downed by the Germans over Serbia at a great peril to themselves. And now they see themselves in a situation where the big ally of theirs has turned its back on them and is using double standard to punish them. And they don't understand this. And because of this pressure, they are unifying. We have seen today in Serbia a much higher degree of national unity than ever before.

PHIL PONCE: Let me get the Ambassador in this. Ambassador Scanlan, how about that? Is this in fact, in Mr. Milosevic's mind, is this working to his advantage because of the unifying effect that it may be having as she just said?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: In my view, definitely. His only real interest is hanging on to political power as long as he can, and think he views the current situation as a situation which will make Serbs generally unified, not so much around him, but around the Serbian nation in defense of the Serbian nation, and that serves his interests because it helps him continue his absolute hold on political power.

PHIL PONCE: So Mr. Ambassador, just to make sure you understand you, you're saying he thinks the bombing is worth it because of the unifying effect it will have on the Serbian nation and ultimately what, benefit him?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: He has never hesitated to make -- have his people make sacrifices if it will prolong his hold on power. For instance, he stood by and watched 350,000 Serbs be forced out of the area of Krajina and Croatia without lifting a finger, and that was necessary at that time in terms of the international politics.

How is Milosevic doing?

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Crnobrnja, how would you describe how he is doing, why he is bringing this bombing about or at least tolerating it?

MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA: Well, I don't think he is bringing the bombing about. I must say I have grave reservations about the bombings and the expected effects of the bombings but I agree with Ambassador Scanlan that it is actually benefiting him and that we will be seeing a stronger rather than a weaker Milosevic. Also Milosevic is a master tactician seeking a weakness in the NATO alliance. And I think he will pretty soon find one because we just heard Secretary Cohen say that the bombing will go on until Milosevic decides differently. I'm afraid that's not going to be the case because Milosevic can withstand a lot of bombing and I'm not sure that all countries of NATO can withstand the two- or three-week prolonged bombing. So I think his not blinking here and he is quite determined to stay put. He is not listening to very much to Brussels or to Washington. What he is listening to is to what his army has to say and what the people of Serbia have to say. So far and in the foreseeable future, I don't see a provocative reaction either by the opposition in Serbia or by the army. And he's only concerned whether there will be something from within which will dislodge him, rather than the bombs from the outside.

PHIL PONCE: Ms. Milentijevic do you agree with that, that he has - that he is in it for the long haul and that the only threat he perceives could be from within?

RADMILA MILENTIJEVIC: I believe that he will find -- or you will find today in Serbia far less opposition to President Milosevic than you did several months ago because the Serbian nation feels attacked by the Western powers, particularly by the United States. And President Milosevic is acting now, right now, in behalf of the Serbian nation. There was this referendum several months ago which Serbia had, which clearly stated our position, vis-à-vis Kosovo, and so the determination of the people as well as the government to save Serbia's borders, to preserve Kosovo as part of Serbia, giving the full autonomy to the Albanians not a dictate but something we should work out at a table in a reasonable way that will be acceptable to both Albanians and the Serbian people.

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Ambassador, what, in your opinion, do you think it will take to get Mr. Milosevic to blink, to come to the table?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: First of all, let me comment. I think that referendum was rigged just like every other election that Milosevic has participated in, including the December 1992 one when Ms. Milentijevic, the only American citizen on Mr. Panic's government - the American who was prime minister at the time -- resigned publicly and noisily in order to support Milosevic and to attack me on television as the darkest force in Mr. Panic's office.

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Ambassador, if I can interrupt -- looking at the situation now, what do you think it would take for Mr. Milosevic now to accede to what NATO is requesting?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: I think it would take his own calculation that it would serve his interests to accede. And until he gets to that point, he will tough it out.

 

  What is the end game?
 

PHIL PONCE: And what are his interests? I mean, what kind of an end game to you see for him?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: The end game for him is always extending his hold on absolute political power in Serbia.

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Mihailo Crnobrnja, do you agree with that, that the ultimate end game and the ultimate goal for Mr. Milosevic is continuing his hold on power?

MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA: Yes. I would agree with that. And I think that he is expecting a bigger carrot now that the stick -- he hopes that the stick will prove to be ineffective, and he is hoping that in future negotiations he can gain more access to the international community, financial community, and so on, and therefore make Serbia viable again in an economic sense.

PHIL PONCE: So, Mr. Crnobrnja, you think he is holding out for, what, greater economic incentives to bring this to an end? Would he be willing to sacrifice Kosovo?

MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA: No. No, he can't because he has rallied the Serb population around the Kosovo issue, and there is no way that he can do that, that he can sell Kosovo or give Kosovo away without serious political damage from within. So that's not the issue. The issue is, as Ms. Milentijevic said a little while ago, how to return to the table and to negotiate a settlement. What would it be that would induce him to return to a settlement not to sell Kosovo? I mean, he is not asking $10 billion and say okay, Kosovo can become independent or anything of that nature.

PHIL PONCE: Ms. Milentijevic, the importance of Kosovo -- what would happen to Mr. Milosevic if somehow Kosovo was lost, if it did achieve independence? What would it mean to him?

RADMILA MILENTIJEVIC: I don't think that President Milosevic or any other government in Serbia could survive the loss of Kosovo. This is that simple as far as the Serbian people are concerned. So it's not the issue here only of President Milosevic. The issue is the integrity of Serbia and the Serbian borders.

PHIL PONCE: Do you agree with that, Mr. Ambassador, that one way or another, Mr. Milosevic will be intent on somehow keeping Kosovo within the fold?

JOHN D. SCANLAN: This certainly is his intention at this point. If it comes to a juncture where he feels that he can somehow or other work out a deal where he is giving up part of Kosovo or giving up some of the control over Kosovo in order to hold on to power, then he would be willing to make that kind of a compromise, but yes, I agree historically it is a tough thing. And it is particularly tough because of the emotions that have developed over the last year. I would think a year ago it would have been easier to work out some sort of a settlement on Kosovo than it is today.

PHIL PONCE: Mr. Ambassador, my other guests. I thank you all very much.


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