 |
|
Strikes
in Yugoslavia coverage
April 1, 1999:
Yugoslavia's
UN Ambassador
April 1, 1999:
Defense
Secretary Cohen and General Henry Shelton
March 31, 1999:
Sen.
John Warner provides an update on the situation.
March 31, 1999:
Nato
briefing on latest military actions.
March 29, 1999:
NATO's top commander, General
Wesley Clark
March 28, 1999:
U.S.
F-117 Stealth fighter downed in Yugoslavia
March
26, 1999:
National
Security Adviser Samuel Berger
March
25, 1999:
Defense
Secretary Cohen
March 24, 1999:
Comparing
military capabilities.
March 24, 1999:
Secretary
Albright discusses the air strikes.
March 23, 1999:
What does
NATO hope to achieve through air strikes?
Read an Online Forum on the crisis
in Kosovo.
Complete NewsHour coverage of Europe
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAMIE SHEA: Ladies and gentleman, it gives me great pleasure to introduce
to you Brigadier General Dan Leaf, US Air Force. He is the commander
of the 31st Air Expeditionary Wing at Aviano Air Force Base in Italy.
I've asked him to come here today, and he has very kindly agreed, to
give you an account of the convoy incident that occurred last week and
to answer your questions. General, once again my thanks to you for coming.
The floor is yours. Please give your briefing.
GEN. LEAF: Thank you, Jamie.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. As Jamie noted, I'm Brigadier
General Dan Leaf, commander of the 31st Air Expeditionary
Wing at Aviano Air Base in Italy. I'm an experienced pilot with over
3,500 flying hours, and I have flown frequently over Kosovo since the
24th of March.
Next slide, please.
My purpose today is to clarify the events of 14 April '99 in Kosovo
Today I will tell you what I know; what we have enough information to
believe -- in other words, what we think; and I will address some unconfirmed
information that has made it very difficult to determine the details
of the events on 14 April '99.
I'm going to brief you on a series of attacks from 1110 Zulu to 1300
Zulu on that date. During that period, at two separate locations, NATO
aircraft dropped nine GBU-12, 500-pound, laser-guided bombs. The two
separate target areas included a small group of vehicles northwest of
Djakovica, and the other a very large convoy on a major road east, southeast
of Djakovica going towards Prizren.
To put the bottom line upfront, NATO Aircraft struck the first target
area with two bombs and may have hit a civilian-type vehicle, a vehicle
associated with the burning of houses. In the second target area, they
struck the lead elements of the convoy, vehicles that appeared to be
military; some of them may have been civilian-type vehicles. And it
is possible there were civilian casualties at both locations.
Now let me tell you what I have learned about these events. My involvement
in the review began very early in this process. I was scheduled to fly
that night, and while in quarters, I heard the news reports of possible
unintended casualties and damage. I called my headquarters and asked
them to ensure we reviewed our operations for any possible involvement.
I received a return call almost immediately from my operations group
commander, my supervisor responsible -- my subordinate -- responsible
for supervising our flying operations. He told me that the review had
already begun as part of our normal combat mission debriefing effort.
We review the tape from every sortie, not just to address damage to
enemy forces, but to validate our tactics and techniques and ensure
we make every effort to strike the right target the right way.
I've drawn my conclusions from exhaustive reviews of mission tapes,
from interviewing the pilots, from examining intelligence data and,
indeed, from review of the reports you and your colleagues have prepared
on this matter. This is a very complicated scenario, and we will never
be able to determine all of the exact details.
Next slide.
The key players in this scenario were as follows: Bear 21 is a flight
of two F-16s. Their mission was Airborne Forward Air Control, what we
call FAC-A. Forward air controllers have the key responsibility of finding
and identifying targets. Bear 31 and Bear 41 were similar flights of
two F-16s also performing FAC-A forward air control duties. These three
flights of Aircraft were given a responsibility over an extended period
of time -- as we label it, a "vulnerability period" -- to
cover the western half of Kosovo and engage Serb forces in the field.
Chisel 31 was also a flight of two F-16s. Their mission was not forward
air control; they were there to provide attack assets able to strike
targets that our forward air controllers discovered. Saab 51 was a flight
of two Jaguars also performing in an attack role.
Cub was a flight of two OA-10s who were assigned FAC-A mission duties
over in the eastern half of Kosovo They flew into the western area later
in the scenario. ABCCC is an EC-130 -- an airborne command, control
and communications Aircraft providing the critical link to our command
and control agency at the combined air operations Center in Vicenza,
Italy.
The CAOC is the operational headquarters for this air campaign.
Now to give you a full understanding of these events, I want to describe
the environment that our pilots are operating in as they fly missions
over Kosovo
Next slide.
The F-16 cockpit, shown here, is quite small and incorporates a multitude
of sensors to acquire and attack targets. The pilot looks at three principal
displays.
One is a heads-up display, a large piece of glass upon which tactical
data is displayed in front of him.
He also has two multi-function displays, or MFDs, located on panels
just above the pilot's knees. Here in front of me we have an example
of a multifunction display to illustrate its actual size. In one of
his two multifunction displays, the pilot will display attack data from
his targeting infrared targeting pod. The cockpit videotapes we will
show -- we will show you are from the video recording of these displays.
Note the size of the MFD. It is approximately 4-1/2 inches by 4-1/2
inches. And as you can see, the display is monochrome, in shades of
green.
A typical mission over Kosovo will last approximately six hours. The
pilots take off from our base at Aviano, in-flight refuel, and then
proceed into the target area for their vulnerability period. Often they
will exit the area, in-flight refuel again, and then go back into their
area of responsibility and repeat the cycle. The mission is very demanding,
both physically and mentally.
Next slide.
Here you see the Kosovo area of responsibility, or AOR. As I mentioned,
the missions in question were flown in the western half of the AOR of
Kosovo, looking for fielded forces. Because of weather this day, most
of our activity was confined to the southwestern quarter of Kosovo The
specific area addressed in this briefing was in the vicinity of Djakovica,
shown here.
Next slide.
I will discuss two target areas, as I said. The first is an area
northwest of Djakovica, where houses were being burned and the first
attacks occurred.
The second area was east-southeast of Djakovica, where NATO attacked
lead elements of a large convoy. I will lay out the full chronology
and geography of the events throughout this briefing for you, as we
know them now, and hopefully, this will eliminate some of the confusion
surrounding this incident in a very dynamic battlefield Environment
Next slide.
At approximately 10:30 Zulu, Bear 21, one of our airborne forward air
controllers, came on station in Kosovo This is the pilot whose voice
tape you heard at a briefing several days ago. Bear 21 worked northwest
of Djakovica and witnessed a series of villages and homes burning. He
watched the series of fires progress to the southeast. This progression
was very clear. It was very graphic, and it was horrifying to Bear 21
as he witnessed the houses being destroyed.
Next slide.
He watched a vehicle leave one house that was burning and then proceed
to another house further down the road. That house then erupted in flames.
Individuals ran from the burning house, got in the vehicle and drove
to yet another house. At this point, as he stated on the tape many of
you have head, he concluded that the occupants of this vehicle were
perpetrating the house burnings. It was only then that he elected to
attack the vehicle. He struck the vehicle with a single GVU-12 laser-guided
bomb. As a side note, all of the NATO bombs expended in the scenario
we're describing, both at the house burning and at the large convoy,
were the same GVU-12 laser-guided bombs I've explained earlier. Additionally,
none of our Aircraft descended to low altitude during their attacks.
Next slide.
The vehicle Bear 21 witnessed burning houses was joined by additional
vehicles heading in a southeasterly direction. Bear 21 attacked the
same vehicle he was watching as the lead vehicle in this group of three.
From the altitudes he was operating at, they appeared to be military-style
vehicles and -- it appeared to be a vehicle and matched the size and
shape of the other vehicles in this small group.
I want to reiterate, however, it was the association of the vehicle
with the house burnings that made it a legitimate target. Prior to reviewing
the video presentation of his attack, let me explain the infrared imagery
-- if you would run the tape, please?
(Videotape segment is shown.)
In the center of the imagery, you see the targeting cursor. That is
the intended end-point. This is infrared imagery -- stop the tape --
and is shown in the cockpit in shades of green. (End of video segment.)
As you can see, he targeted a single vehicle at 11:10 and struck it
directly with a 500-pound laser-guided bomb. After the attack, he had
departed the area to refuel and passed the coordinates of his attack
to another flight entering the area. That flight was Bear 41.
Next slide.
In the interim, an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV, transitioned through
this area and imaged the site of Bear 21's attack. We'll now view the
videotape of that imagery. (Video segment is shown.) And you can see
the vehicle that has been damaged with other vehicles gathered around
it, and a very distinct C-shaped building complex in this area, that
was also shown in some Serbian TV video released on the day of the this
attack. (End of video segment.) Please roll the video. (Video segment
is shown.)
In the center of the screen, you may be able to see the crater from
his initial attack. The camera will pan over to this C-shaped vehicle
(sic), and you will see large vehicles in the courtyard of the -- building
complex. There they are now coming to the left center of the screen.
Stop the take please. (End of video segment.)
Next slide.
Bear 41, as I said, entered the area and visually assessed the target
area for over 10 minutes. He saw these large vehicles in the courtyard
of the C-shaped complex, as I pointed out earlier, and he made the determination
that they were likely to be military vehicles. He designated them as
a target, and Bear 42 attacked them with a single GBU-12.
As you watch the next video, note the area at the top of the screen.
There is a large secondary explosion that in the assessment of our analysts,
is indicative of an accelerant such as gasoline, being present in the
structure. We have reports of Serbs hiding gasoline inside of homes,
which they use to refuel their vehicles or to burn Kosovar Albanian
houses. Additionally, we have seen the Serbs place military vehicles,
including tanks, up against and even inside residential structures to
deter NATO air attack. In this case, of course, there is no way of knowing
with certainty what was inside the tape.
Please roll the Bear 42 video. You see the cursors on the targets inside
the courtyard -- the two large vehicles.
Stop the tape. And I would like to give them a minute to change the
tape, and then we will run the Serbian TV video, released that day,
that shows the same area. In that tape you will note that distinctive
C-shaped building complex. That's the building complex, and the crater
that we believe was from Bear 21's initial bomb.
Next slide.
You can see the distinctive C-shaped house and the destroyed trucks,
and what appear to be tractor-type vehicles, that were hit. 11:48 Zulu
ends the attack at the target area northwest of Djakovica. We'll display
the geography and chronology of the attacks later in the briefing.
As these attacks were coming to an end, another forward air controller,
Bear 31, discovered a very large, more than 100-vehicle convoy on a
major road running east, southeast of Djakovica. He began communicating
with the ABCCC Aircraft about the target. There was an extensive discussion
of the convoy with the forward air controller striving to determine
whether or not the convoy was a military target. There was an extensive
discussion as well about the need to avoid striking anything that may
have civilian personnel or refugees.
Several factors played in his decision to attack. First, approximately
20 vehicles at the front -- in other words, east, southeast end of the
convoy -- were uniform in shape and color as seen from the air; they
were maintaining a set spacing and pace -- characteristics of military
movement. At about the same time, the forward air controller saw an
unmanned aerial vehicle in the vicinity of the convoy and he was then
told by ABCCC that, quote, "We just received word that this is
a VJ convoy." They specifically discussed the possibilities of
Refugees., Kosovar Albanians, within the convoy, and took additional
precautions to validate their targets. ABCCC has access to a variety
of Intelligence and operational sources, which for security reasons
I will not discuss.
This conversation between ABCCC and Bear 31, immediately prior to the
attacks, is shown on the next slide. ABCCC says, "Bear, ABCCC,
go ahead." "Roger, we just received word that this is a VJ
convoy. How copy?" "Great. Give me all your players."
"Saab, are you still airborne?" "ABCCC, I want as many
fighters as I can get, now." He wants to commence the attack on
this VJ convoy.
At that point, 12:16 Zulu -- next slide.
At that point, 12:16 Zulu, Bear 31 commenced attacking the lead elements
of the convoy. His first -- his bomb impacted at 12:19 Zulu. This is
video of Bear 31's attack. He missed his target vehicle, but a trailing
vehicle ran off the road -- ran off the road behind it. As Bear 31 coordinated
for more fighter support to attack the convoy, his wingman, Bear 32,
attacked and destroyed one of the vehicles. Upcoming is video of that
attack. Note that a direct hit from a GVU- 12 does not leave much evidence.
Please roll Bear 32's video.
Stop the tape.
As we watch these videos in the comfort of this room and on a large
display it appears possible the vehicles are tractors -- or tractor-type
vehicles. As I reviewed the tapes with the pilots, they agreed. However,
they were emphatic that from the attack altitude, to the naked eye,
they appeared to be military vehicles. And again, the physical characteristics
of the vehicles were only one factor in the forward air controllers'
target identification matrix.
The lead elements of the convoy had several characteristics of military
movement -- uniform size, shape and color as seen from the air, consistent
spacing between vehicles, and a relatively high rate of speed even prior
to the attacks. Furthermore, there have been reports of Serb forces
using civilian vehicles for military and paramilitary operations.
By this time, Bear 31 had assisted two Jaguar Aircraft, Saab flight,
in locating the target area, and cleared them to attack. Both Jaguars
reported unsuccessful deliveries.
Now low on fuel, Bear 31 and 32 departed, passing off target forward
incident information to the next forward air controller on scene, Bear
41. This is the same Bear 41 that had dropped one bomb in the last attack
on the target northwest of Djakovica.
A series of attacks on this convoy occurred from 12:38 Zulu to 12:58
Zulu. Remember that the convoy east-southeast of Djakovica was very
large and covered several kilometers, and it was moving east- southeast.
The attacks on the forward elements of the convoy moved further east.
The next series of video clips show this series of attacks, first with
Bear 31 -- or Bear 41 attacking with a single GBU-12 at 12:38.
Next is a simultaneous attack with two bombs, one a hit and one a miss,
in a field adjacent to the read. You'll note that in the lower right-hand
corner of the screen. (To staff.) And continue to run the video through
the remainder of the attacks please. There's the miss off to the right.
There are attacks against moving and stationary vehicles during this
period.
Next slide.
In the recovery from Bear 41's attack on the convoy, he took fire from
Serb antiaircraft artillery, or AAA, near the convoy. The AAA fire was
large in caliber and had a burst height of approximately 13,000 feet.
Next slide.
As the last fighters completed their attacks, ABCCC suggested that the
forward air controller, Bear 41, verify the target identification. They
suggested this based upon communications with the combined air operations
center in Italy., the combined force air component commanders war-fighting
headquarters.
While discussing the ongoing attacks at the CAOC, Intelligence specialists
noted that Serbian forces do not often travel in convoys as large as
this. Therefore, ABCCC suggested reverification of the hostile identification.
To better facilitate identification, Bear 41 called for Cub flight,
OA-10 Aircraft, to come view the convoy with binoculars. The OA-10 is
slower and more stable than the F-16, and its pilots can utilize nine-power,
space-stabilized binoculars to view targets.
Next slide.
As the reverification was discussed, Bear 31, who controlled and initiated
the original attacks on the convoys, was returning to the scene from
refueling. He overheard the discussion and suggested holding all fighters
high and dry. In other words, that attacks be suspended until reverification.
Bear 31 also insisted that Cub proceed to the area.
Next slide.
When Cub arrived in the area, the OA-10 forward air controller carefully
analyzed the convoy through his binoculars and stated that there were
definitely military vehicles in there, but that multi-colored and possibly
civilian vehicles were also present. Bear 31, resuming his role as on-scene
forward air controller, terminated all attacks of the convoy and ordered
fighters out of the area.
Next slide.
This is how the attacks occurred in time and space. At 11:10 Zulu came
the first attacks -- first attack northwest of Djakovica.
Next slide.
At 11:48, Bear 42 attacked the same area.
Next slide, please.
The first attack on the large convoy occurred at 12:19 Zulu.
Next slide.
Attacks continued on the convoy, moving east, until 12:58 Zulu. Attacks
were suspended at 13:00 and terminated completely at 13:20 following
Cub's visual assessment.
The chronology of Serbian reports is also important. The first reports
on 14 April were in the form of Serbian television footage showing the
target area northwest of Djakovica. We played that tape earlier.
Then, a full day later, the Serbian government sponsored a media tour
to the convoy area to the east southeast of Djakovica. Additional Serbian
press reports alleged attacks of convoys at these other locations.
Next slide.
Now, a summary of our attacks: two bombs, target area of northwest of
Djakovica, and the remainder on the large convoy east southeast of Djakovica.
The first target area was selected due to its association with the burning
of Kosovar Albanian homes. We cannot determine the exact nature of the
vehicle struck in the large convoy. To the pilots, they definitely appeared
to be military. Serb media reports show civilian vehicles only. And
without having been able to visit the scene, we cannot determine the
exact status of the vehicles or the casualties.
In discussing the convoy, I'd like to address the different type of
vehicles. When I refer to "military vehicles," I mean a "vehicle
painted and marked for official military use." A civilian-type
vehicle is exactly that, a civilian vehicle.
In the chaos that is Kosovo, we know that Serb forces are using both
types of vehicles for military and paramilitary operations. Our pilots
saw military vehicles within the convoy east southeast of Djakovica.
And the OA-10 confirmed that with binoculars.
The 24-hour delay in showing the large convoy to the press would have
allowed sufficient time for Serb forces to remove any military vehicles
or personnel from the area, and we simply cannot verify exactly what
type of vehicles were struck by whom. In fact, some reporters have also
indicated that the victims in the convoy -- attack appeared to have
been machine-gunned, not bombed.
It is our assessment that NATO forces may have inadvertently struck
civilian-type vehicles, and perhaps civilian personnel, in the attack
on the large convoy. At the first indication that this might be the
case, the forward air controller terminated the attacks.
Next slide.
There are some other significant reports following the 14 April NATO
attack that we must address. And they will help explain why it is difficult
to verify the facts of operations in Kosovo
First, following the NATO attack, there were numerous reports from
the area of the large convoy east southeast of Djakovica, showing Refugees.
died from machine-gun and mortar wounds.
The second area was east-southeast of Djakovica, where NATO attacked
lead elements of a large convoy. I will lay out the full chronology
and geography of the events throughout this briefing for you, as we
know them now, and hopefully, this will eliminate some of the confusion
surrounding this incident in a very dynamic battlefield Environment
Next slide.
At approximately 10:30 Zulu, Bear 21, one of our airborne forward air
controllers, came on station in Kosovo This is the pilot whose voice
tape you heard at a briefing several days ago. Bear 21 worked northwest
of Djakovica and witnessed a series of villages and homes burning. He
watched the series of fires progress to the southeast. This progression
was very clear. It was very graphic, and it was horrifying to Bear 21
as he witnessed the houses being destroyed.
Next slide.
He watched a vehicle leave one house that was burning and then proceed
to another house further down the road. That house then erupted in flames.
Individuals ran from the burning house, got in the vehicle and drove
to yet another house. At this point, as he stated on the tape many of
you have head, he concluded that the occupants of this vehicle were
perpetrating the house burnings. It was only then that he elected to
attack the vehicle. He struck the vehicle with a single GBU-12 laser-guided
bomb. As a side note, all of the NATO bombs expended in the scenario
we're describing, both at the house burning and at the large convoy,
were the same GBU-12 laser-guided bombs I've explained earlier. Additionally,
none of our Aircraft descended to low altitude during their attacks.
Next slide.
The vehicle Bear 21 witnessed burning houses was joined by additional
vehicles heading in a southeasterly direction. Bear 21 attacked the
same vehicle he was watching as the lead vehicle in this group of three.
From the altitudes he was operating at, they appeared to be military-style
vehicles and -- it appeared to be a vehicle and matched the size and
shape of the other vehicles in this small group. However, NATO Aircraft
employed only precision bombs, not machine guns or mortars.
Second, refugee interviews conducted by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, ESC, revealed Serbian forces attacked a Refugee
convoy in the vicinity of Djakovica. The Refugees. reported attacks
by low-flying MiG-type Aircraft expending cluster munitions, and they
also reported grenades thrown from helicopters. In this incident, NATO
Aircraft did not fly at low altitude, expended no cluster munitions,
and did not include helicopters.
Third, witnesses in the region relayed that they observed a
Refugee column being attacked by Serb mortars at the same time as the
14 April NATO attack in the east-southeast of Djakovica. Further, the
witnesses believed that the Serbs used the convoy as a human shield,
positioning some of their military vehicles and police vehicles at the
front of the column. In essence, this report claimed that after NATO
attacked the front military vehicles, Serb Aircraft attacked the Kosovar
Albanian Refugees. in the rear.
Reviewing the sequence of events reveals that in two separate attacks,
Bear 21 and Bear 42 attacked targets associated with the burning of
homes northwest of Djakovica prior to 1200 Zulu on 14 April '98.
Next slide, please. '99, sorry.
Beginning at 12:19 Zulu, Bear 31 initiated and controlled an
attack on lead elements of a large convoy east-southeast of Djakovica.
Those attacks, by various Aircraft, lasted until 12:58. I submit that
there is a possibility that civilian-type vehicles and possibly civilians
themselves were hit in this attack. However, we cannot determine the
extent of loss of life or verify the nature of the victims.
Serb reports claimed 80-plus dead, but reporters saw only approximately
20 victims, many of whom did not appear to be victims of bombing.
We also conclude that as soon as the target identification came into
question, Bear 31 terminated the attacks.
Next slide.
In conclusion, I have told you what I know of our attacks on 14 April
'99. I cannot explain the bodies seen on Serb TV We did not have observers
on the ground or at the site. This is unlike a peacetime Environment
and an accident situation where we have access to the accident scene.
We can only speculate on their association with our attacks. There may
have been unforeseen casualties or unintended damage; however, the nature
of our exhaustive process to positively identify targets and their association
with military or repressive acts remained a key factor that led our
pilots to conclude that the targets were, in fact, contributing to Serb
military or paramilitary operations. NATO continuously reviews its tactics,
techniques, and procedures to
ensure that we minimize the potential for unintended damage or
unnecessary loss of life. We will continue to do so.
So at the end of my presentation, I think the conclusions are clear.
First, there were two separate incidents, separated geographically and
in time. Second, we are now convinced that in the first incident we
struck a valid military target; it was a vehicle in -- directly involved
in the burning of homes. In the second incident, the one we have been
referring to all along, there was a confused picture. We engaged a large
convoy with a mixture of Serb military and civilian vehicles. Fourth,
in that second incident, we may well have caused damage to a civilian
vehicle and unintentional harm to civilian lives. And finally, it has
taken us five days to put all of these facts together. But I'd submit
that that is a very short time for a review of this detail and depth,
especially as we conduct round-the-clock combat operations.
Thank you for the opportunity to brief you. I invite your
questions.
MR. SHEA: So, General Leaf, I'm grateful to you, again, for coming and
for presenting that very detailed account of the incident last week.
Thank you again.
Now, as the general says, he is conducting a real-life operation, and
he has to go back to Aviano. He will take some questions, but you will
excuse us if we can't have everybody here, because he does have to get
back. So let's at least take some for the time being.
Mark, will you --
Q General, on the first incident, you've said that you're now certain
that that was a valid military target. The Serb video showed tractors
and this kind of thing there. What do you think that was?
And you mentioned this secondary explosion from the gas. Do you think
that was a cause of something? I mean, was there something more to that
gas explosion? Did it cause civilian casualties? So can you explain
a little bit more about that first incident?
GEN. LEAF: Certainly. I'd -- the assessment that this was a valid military
target was based on the association of that vehicle with the burning
homes. I cannot comment, as I stated in the briefing, on the damage
shown by Serb-controlled TV We didn't have access to the site. We don't
know the veracity of the video. We simply don't know.
And finally, on the secondary explosion, I don't want to speculate on
the secondary explosion, perhaps causing additional damage, because
the time and clarity of that targeting pod video simply is not sufficient
to go into that forensic detail, if you will.
Thank you.
MR. SHEA: Okay. Michael? Michael Goodam (ph).
Q A question from the New York Times. General, two
questions. One, there have been some British media reports that perhaps
some Harriers saw that Refugee column, may have passed this information
on, and that it wasn't heeded. Is there anything to that?
And secondly, given that there are so many Refugees. on the road, so
many displaced people, what steps are you taking to prevent a repetition
of this sort of thing in the future, and will it impact or curtail your
attacks on convoys?
GEN. LEAF: Okay. In the first instance or first question, there have
been reports of British Harrier pilots seeing a convoy and identifying
it as having Refugees. This occurred at approximately the same time,
but they were not in communication with the Aircraft in question. Remember
that as I discussed the period from 12:10 Zulu to 12:19 Zulu, there
were extensive discussions of the potential for Refugees. to be in the
area, and the targets that were selected were the ones that to the airborne
observers were most clearly military in nature.
In the second -- I don't want to go into operational details of how
we're conducting our air missions over Kosovo That wouldn't be prudent.
I'll tell you that they're always under review. They're not just under
review after a mission that has this kind of media attention, we review
every tape and we look for the best way to hit the right target at the
right time in the right manner with minimal opportunity for unintended
consequences.
MR. SHEA: Okay, Ma'am, would you like to go ahead?
Q General, from NBC News, a follow-up question. Still, given the difficulty
in discerning military vehicles versus civilian vehicles on that very,
very small display, how can you reassure people that these attacks will
not happen again and again? I mean, you simply are limited by the technology.
GEN. LEAF: Well, it is a very small display. It's also very good technology,
and it's also just a part of the matrix, the identification matrix.
They have the Intelligence and operational data in communication with
ABCCC and other Aircraft, they have their eyeballs, they have the nature
of movement. And again, we take every effort to minimize this opportunity,
and we'll continue to do so.
Q But a follow-up. It seemed that after the second attack began you
had your coordinator say that it did not appear that Serbs traveled
in such large convoys. Why didn't you have that information before you
commenced the attack? Isn't that something you should have known?
GEN. LEAF: Let me address that. That's a very important
question and sort of a developing story on 14 April '99.
In the missions that I flew over Kosovo and in the days prior to this
event, nobody I have spoken to -- and certainly I did not -- see any
very large convoys. This was a new occurrence, and it is moving east
southeast towards Prizren, not shortest direction towards the border.
And as this story broke, they dealt with the tactical situation.
They sought additional information and clarification. They took time
to look at the target, analyze the nature of it and pick that -- again,
those military characteristics and strike those.
As soon as there was any doubt, they stopped attacking. And clearly,
we have a great appreciation for the potential for unintended consequences
and will continue to work to avoid them.
MR. SHEA: Okay. Bettina (sp), please, over there?
Q And, General, could you tell us at which height the airplanes flew,
the lowest of them perhaps? And secondly, do you have any information
of your own on whether there were Serbs airplanes in the area?
GEN. LEAF: To the first question, I have to decline to answer that.
Nothing could be more critical for a Serb AAA gunner than to know our
operating altitudes, and so I ought not address that. I am sorry.
MR. SHEA: Okay.
GEN. LEAF: (Inaudible.)
MR. SHEA: So sorry. Excuse me, General.
GEN. LEAF: On the second question, we do have reports of Serb Aircraft,
both fixed-wing and helicopter. I do not have any verification of that,
other than the reports.
MR. SHEA: Okay. The gentleman from Aftenposten there.
Q Yes, Aftenposten, Oslo.
Are you still seeing patterns, like these convoys you saw last
Wednesday? And what do you think are their intent? What are they used
for?
GEN. LEAF: I have to tell you that, since last Wednesday, I have been
completely and totally involved in clarification -- in addressing this
issue. So I can't give a good current answer to that.
MR. SHEA: Okay. Now, Richard?
Q General, can you just simply say, for those watching around the world
who may not be able to get through all the military-speak in the conclusions,
what went wrong here on the attack on this convoy?
GEN. LEAF: I don't think that my conclusion said that something clearly
went wrong. I said that there is the possibility that civilian-type
vehicles were struck and there may have been civilian personnel harmed.
Given the Serb control of the scene, the video that they presented,
we can't determine that clearly.
Q Don't you think there is a possibility they were military using that
tractor or other -- the vehicles that you say? From the comfort of these
rooms and with the pilots looking at the tapes themselves, you still
can't say for sure?
GEN. LEAF: Absolutely. That is precisely my conclusion.
Remember that the OA-10 forward air controller with nine-power, Space.
stabilized binoculars came into the target area and still confirmed
the presence of military vehicles. The Serb media tour one day later
did not show those vehicles. I don't have the explanation and I won't
speculate.
MR. SHEA: Okay, the gentleman there, please.
Q Eric Shawn (SP) from Fox News. General, is it unrealistic for the
world to expect that these mistakes cannot be made? And are the Serbs
using the most of that for their propaganda?
GEN. LEAF: The world, I'm certain, knows that battle of any type is
a complex, dynamic, demanding Environment And for all of our efforts,
we will never be perfect. We don't pretend to be perfect. What we claim
to be and, in fact, are is dedicated to doing the best job possible
to avoid unintended consequences.
MR. SHEA: Karen (SP), please, you'd like to ask a question?
Q Yes, please. The bits of debris which were found at the sites, and
some serial numbers which were recognizable, do they fit with your numbers
by NATO bombs?
GEN. LEAF: Yes. I think you're referring, ma'am, to the debris labeled
Mark 82, MK-82. A Mark-82 general purpose bomb is in essence the center
of a GBU-12. It's the explosive component in that bomb. It has a guidance
unit, some fins and fuses at either end. But yes, that does match the
ordnance that we used.
MR. SHEA: Okay. I'm going to take just one final question.
Christopher? Chris, you want that?
Q Thank you.
MR. SHEA: There's a microphone coming.
Q Thank you very much. General, if there's one critical error here in
what you've laid out, it seems to be when the ABCCC identified the convoy
southeast of Djakovica as a VJ convoy. Can we know anything more about
how that identification was made by the ABCCC, and is that aspect still
under investigation?
GEN. LEAF: We have looked extensively at that. And as I noted, they
have access to a broad variety of Intelligence and operational data,
and I'm not going to go into any of that. And I am not certain that
I can agree with your assessment that they made an error.
Remember, we saw military vehicles in this convoy that the pilots saw
and remain convinced that what they were witnessing was a military-
type movement in uniformly-shaped and colored vehicles, at a pace and
spacing that's consistent with how military units operate. We can't
prove or disprove any error in the initial attack. What we know from
the debris that the Serbs showed, that some civilians died there and
that there is the possibility that NATO Aircraft were the cause.
Q I was wondering, actually, if there could be misleading Intelligence
fed to them; that is, if they were basing some of their judgment on
signals Intelligence, on other kind of Intelligence that could be intentionally
misleading on the part of the Serbs
GEN. LEAF: I have to tell you, from my personal experience -- and
I've flown on ABCCC as well as in the F-16 -- we don't jump to hasty
conclusions in these life-and-death matters. We know the gravity of
the decisions, and we're very, very careful.
MR. SHEA: Okay. We've got one final piece of material, if I can describe
it as that, for you today. Sometimes it takes us a while to clear up
confusion. But as I've said earlier in my briefing, sometimes we're
able to do it quickly. And today we have an instance where we can fortunately
clear up the confusion quickly.
As you had your breakfast this morning, like me you probably heard of
a record produced by Belgrade of a conversation between NATO pilots
during this alleged incident last week. And we have the tape of this
conversation, as we've managed to get it, and we'd like to play it for
you. And afterwards I'm going to ask General Leaf, as he happens to
be here today, to share with us his expertise on the authenticity of
this particular tape.
(To staff.) Could we play the tape, please?
(Cockpit audio recording is played.)
I think that's gone on long enough. We downloaded that from the Serb
media this morning.
General, your professional comments on the authenticity of that tape,
please?
GEN. LEAF: Well, first of all, I've listened to all of the
mission tapes from the time in question covered by my briefing. That
does not match any of them. My assessment would be that the first segment
of the briefing is a composite of actual recordings of mission communications,
probably pieced together.
My second assessment would be that the second part -- the alleged ejection
of a pilot -- is probably a script for a low-grade movie.
MR. SHEA: Okay, General, thanks for that. I'm grateful again. You've
got to remember that General Leaf has come here today from a live operation
of which he is an extremely important part. So again, I extend him my
heartfelt thanks for making the effort to come up from Aviano today.
I wish you a safe return. Good luck with the mission.
And as you know, I hope that following today's briefing you will agree
with the motto of the New York Times that we have tried to make our
own in these briefings -- "All the news that's fit to print."
Thank you.
GEN. LEAF: Thank you.
|
|
