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Strikes
in Yugoslavia coverage
June 11, 1999:
Newsmaker interview with President
Clinton.
June 11, 1999:
Foreign policy experts on the Kosovo
peace agreement
June 8, 1999:
Senator Lugar and former Senator Nunn discuss Russia's
role as peace broker.
Documents
U.N.
Resolution
Military
Technical Agreement
May 12, 1999:
President
Yeltsin dismisses his government
May 12, 1999:
President
Yeltsin's statement on the firing of his cabinet
May 6, 1999:
The ministers of the G-8 map
out a plan for peace with Russia's help.
April 13, 1999:
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook
talks about diplomacy
and Russia.
April 6, 1999:
Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright discusses Kosovo and Russia.
Sept. 14, 1998:
Enter
Primakov
Sept. 2, 1998:
Clinton
and Yeltsin meet in Moscow
Complete NewsHour coverage of Europe
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MARGARET
WARNER: We get three perspectives on that issue, two Russian and one
American. Nina Krushcheva is director of communications at the East-West
Institute in New York. She is the great granddaughter of the former
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Anna Vassilieva is head of the Russian
Studies Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
She is a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation.
And Jack Matlock was ambassador to the then-Soviet Union during the
Reagan and Bush administrations. He now teaches at Princeton University's
Institute for advanced Study. Welcome all. Anna Vassilieva, why is it
so important to the Russians to have a role in Kosovo after this war?
ANNA
VASSILIEVA: Well, Margaret, I think we should look at this issue on
not being led by the rational approaches, the way the westerners used
to deal with Russia, but let's try and look at the Russian perspective.
And at the moment, it seems to me Russians are driven by emotions more
than by rational considerations. What we have seen in the past was the
pattern of Russians suppressing their negative emotions and frustrations
over the unfulfilled NATO promises, over not listening to Russian considerations
when making decisions regarding Kosovo. Now is, to my mind, the critical
moment when the West has to listen very carefully to Russian needs and
Russian demands because, to my opinion, it's a crucial moment not just
in Russian-American relations, but in the situation in the world in
general.
MARGARET WARNER: But when you say they're reacting more out of emotion
than anything else, what do you mean?
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ANNA
VASSILIEVA: What I mean is that there are lots of expectations on the
part of the Russian people, the population of Russia, a well as the
government officials that are not fulfilled by the West, the western
governments, as it was expected. We know that there is a very popular
notion in Russia that when Gorbachev came to power and when perestroika
started, the West promised that NATO is not going to expand, NATO is
not going to go against Russia in any possible way, and that it will
be a defensive mechanism, rather than anything else. And Russians believed
those promises and withdrew their troops from Eastern Europe and the
reaction was very emotional. And they were hoping, indeed, that the
West will keep their promises. I'm talking about the popular notion
among the Russians and Russian politicians. What we have been seeing
recently was the tendency to ignore Russian concerns. And here we see
real emotional feelings, you know, people in Russia feel being betrayed.
You know, they did feel betrayed before the war in Kosovo started and
they feel much more betrayed now after mass media in Russia had been
portraying the situation in Kosovo from the point of view of Serbs and
Serbian interests and Russian interests, rather than from the point
of view that was widely accepted in the United States and the western
countries.
MARGARET WARNER: Okay. Nina Khrushcheva, is that what you think is
driving, this kind of an emotional reaction?
NINA
KHRUSHCHEVA: Yes, I absolutely agree with Anna on that, that Russians
react very emotionally to that. And there are certain expectations,
which I'm not going to go into details now. What I disagree with is
that the West does not sort of disregard Russian reactions and Russian
concerns. I think they're being very understanding, and they're being
very accommodating to Russia's desire to keep its superpower position,
and I actually admire them for that. My problem with the whole situation
is that the West does not believe that Russia is a superpower anymore,
and very rightly so. And so all this admissions to G-8, I mean which
was G-7 plus one, all of a sudden it became G-8, let's communicate on
the Kosovo peace process and let's involve Russia in that as a major
player, let's consider Russian role in the sort of troop deployment
thing and so on and so forth. This is all very wonderful on the western
side. I don't believe that the West really believes -- that the West
really thinks that Russia can play a major great role in the whole situation.
But Russia buys this kind of attitude, and it does things that all these
special privileges that are given by the West, Russia deserved to have
-- and then where the problem comes because I think that the West being
dishonest in treating Russia is still a great power, at least pretending
that it would like to. And Russia is sort of emotionally would like
to believe that it is a great power and I think that's what we're facing
here because Russia thinks that, once something was promised to the
Soviet Union ten years ago, is still going to go on. Well, the world
has changed, and we really have to face the reality now.
MARGARET
WARNER: Jack Matlock, do you see it that way that the Russians making
this move on the airport was kind of an emotional reaction to not being
afforded respect and a way of saying, "we're players?" That's
what they want?
JACK MATLOCK: I think that's exactly what was behind it. It obviously
was a rash act and one that was probably more annoying than really damaging.
But there is a real issue here, and I think that the fact is that without
Russia, we're not really going to have peace and stability in Europe
because we need their assistance diplomatically. And let's forget who's
a great power and who is not. Actually, most of these issues are not
decided by the sort of power that great powers are supposed to have.
And, as -- of course -- as a nuclear power, Russia still has at least
the second largest and maybe the largest arsenal in the world. So if
we think in those terms, I think we're likely to miss the point.
MARGARET WARNER: I'm sorry. If we think in what terms?
JACK
MATLOCK: In terms of Russia not being necessarily a great power anymore.
Obviously, in an economic sense, they're not, but they never were in
the economic sense a very great power.
MARGARET WARNER: But you mean -
JACK MATLOCK: What I mean is that without their political assistance,
without their active assistance in bringing stability, we are not going
to be able to solve these problems. And I think we found that in Kosovo.
We bombed against their advice, and actually the atrocities, most of
them occurred after the bombing started, then we had to turn to them
for assistance in getting us out of it. And I think that assistance
was essential. Now they're asked to be treated as one of the team, given
a sector or something and I'm sure they'll work something out. But I
think that what they're asking for is not that unreasonable.
MARGARET
WARNER: Anna Vassilieva, what do you think are Russia's intentions if
they are given or -- not given, but if they achieve a role in Kosovo?
I mean do you think they want to cooperate with the U.N. mandate? Do
you think they want to carve out their own area of influence? Do you
think they want to help the Serbs? What do you think really are their
intentions?
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ANNA VASSILIEVA: Well, first of all, I do believe that the intention
is the most noble. You know, we have no reason to suspect that Russians
are going to go to Kosovo to do something harmful. I definitely think
that Russians are going to try to achieve the agreements according to
the U.N. laws, international laws. And for the Russians, it is extremely
important to be there, as Ambassador Matlock has mentioned. We're not
talking here about a great or non-great power being invited to participate
in some kind of an event. The world has seen and is convinced that it
is extremely important for the Russians to assert their own role in
this particular conflict. The world has seen that Russia has been struggling
to achieve, if not the quality, at least the respect to its opinions
and the desire of the West to cooperate on the issues that are important
for the Russians. So I see Russia's involvement with the situation in
Kosovo as a necessary one because, to me, it is obvious that the Serbs
-- the situation with the Serbs is not going to be solved without Russian
participation, and the Russians are instrumental for preserving peace
in Kosovo and keeping it for the future. Let's not talk about just what's
happening now, but let's look at the situation in the future, as well.
And Russian presence there is very important for stabilizing the situation,
I think.
MARGARET WARNER: Nina Khrushcheva, what about that point? I mean, we
hear this a lot, that the Russians, the Serbs, and the Kosovars probably
won't -- there will be no stability there without the Russians?
NINA
KHRUSHCHEVA: Well, I think degree with the point that Russia has to
be involved in the peacekeeping process. What I disagree with is how
Russia tries to assert its importance there. And for example, the private
-- the separate sector for Russia and separate sector there under Russian
control, I'm not sure it's such a great idea because this was not Russia's
war. This was NATO's war. Russia was involved in it only in the peacekeeping
process because it is very important for Russia and the world to have
this place in peace, and thus Russia has to be involved. However, I
don't see why, when NATO five sectors are going to be in the region,
how Russia -- Russia has different objectives in this war. Russia has
different objectives in this particular part of the world, and what
I think would be more reasonable thing to have is to have maybe a battalion
or some sort of involvement of Russian troops in each of these sectors
so Russia would be represented, it would carry on its point of view.
And frankly, I'm afraid that if Russia is given a sector, then there
would be something else. I'm just -- my problem with the whole situation
is that they try to come to the agreement, everything is fine, and all
of a sudden Russia does something which is completely unexpected, unpredictable
and in a way makes no sense. And I don't think it's going to stop with
the given sector or not given sector. And I think Russia is much better
off being involved in each sector as sort of separate and, on the other
hand, integrated force.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Jack Matlock, where do you come down on
this point, how reliable Russia would be as a partner in Kosovo?
JACK
MATLOCK: Well, I think you have to give them an incentive to be a reliable
partner. This is something we've not been very good about in the last
few years, starting with NATO expansion and the other things which,
in effect, leaves them out of the club, so to speak. I think that if
we expect them to take a responsibility, which they need to do, we need
to treat them as a reliable partner and have them accept that responsibility.
Obviously, there needs to be a chain of command. The sectoral problem
was worked out in Bosnia. I'm sure it will be now -- this time, just
what methods, I don't know. But I'm sure that that will be worked out
because it is in Russia's interest to be there. But I can understand
the reluctance to be formally under NATO command, given the fact that
they're not in NATO. They'll find a way to finesse the issue and they
are probably waiting until Yeltsin meets with the other leaders in the
G-8 or the G-7, plus one, to make that decision.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Well, thank you all three very much.
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