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| LAW & ORDER | |
| July 5, 1999 |
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What are the challenges KFOR troops are facing in keeping the peace in Kosovo? Margaret Warner discusses the situation with a panel of experts. |
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To date, more than 70,000 Serb civilians have fled Kosovo, illustrating
the problem the United Nations is having maintaining security. According
to the peace agreement, all Serb troops and police had to leave Kosovo,
But the U.N. Says KFOR isn't enough, and has asked for 3,100 police to keep order. The United States plans to send 450 officers by the end of the month. U.N. Special Representative Sergio de Mello has been serving as the acting administrator in Kosovo. Last week, he swore in a multi-ethnic nine-member panel of judges, who will hear the cases of the more than 150 people arrested by KFOR troops.
TOM BEARDEN: On Friday, France's Health Minister, Bernard Kouchner, was tapped to replace de Mello and run the civilian operation to rebuild Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians cheered his appointment, but violence erupted soon after. In Pristina, British troops killed two people who were firing guns in the air. And a Serb bank was attacked and Serb flags were burned. JIM LEHRER: Margaret Warner takes the story from there with a discussion that was taped on Friday. |
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| Bringing law and order to Kosovo. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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SHASHI THAROOR: It's an enormously complicated challenge, first of all, because we're speaking about law and order in a place where there really isn't any existing system of laws, and there is, therefore, a great deal of disorder. We're not talking about a situation where there is an existing functioning police. Most of the police were Serb, and they've left. We're not talking about a situation in which there is an existing functioning legal system. Most of the people of Kosovo have been uprooted and displaced in the tragic events of the last few months. We're talking about starting from scratch, but amidst destruction, amidst lawlessness, and in a situation in which the international community is scrambling to put in the people, the expertise, and the resources to deal with this. MARGARET WARNER: And so for now, does the responsibility rest with NATO-- the NATO-led KFOR force, I should say?
MARGARET WARNER: Mr. Daalder, in the meantime, do you think NATO is doing all it could? IVO DAALDER: Well, given it has 23,000 the troops deployed in this much- dispersed environment as it can, it is trying through its presence, and actually a muscular presence, to try the best job that it's doing. It would be nice to have 50,000 troops in order to be in more villages and to be there with more people, but as we stand, NATO is doing more or less what it can do. In some sectors, it is acting slightly more robustly, particularly in the British, the German, and the American sectors. In the Italian and French sectors, where there are less troops so far, there is a standoffishness, primarily because there is a fear that if things go wrong, there may be nobody to back up. But in general, NATO is doing as much as it can, given the very, very difficult circumstances that it's facing. MARGARET WARNER: Lieutenant Gorman, General Wesley Clark was on this show a few nights ago, and he said, as Mr. Daalder did, "We're doing the best we can, but we are not police." From your experience, what is it police can do that a military force can't do? |
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| Sending in the police. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: But landlord-tenant problems with a lot of underlying ethnic hatred and other - LT. JOHN GORMAN: Absolutely. But it's not something you want to be mired down with -- with tanks and armored personnel carriers. You need people on the round who can handle these small day- to-day problems. MARGARET WARNER: All right. Now, you heard Mr. Tharoor say they're trying to get an international police force in there. Take us through the steps, what it takes, then, to get from that to create a sort of functioning civilian law-and-order operation. LT. JOHN GORMAN: Well, the first step is to identify the nations that will bring monitors over, and most countries send their best and their brightest. It's difficult for the United States in that we do not have a national police force, so it's up to the individual police chiefs to make the commitment to allow their people to go over for a year. Then you need to train them; make sure you have the right people. Carefully select them; make sure that they are going to operate under the U.N. command. They have to be willing to go with the U.N. mandate, not their own agenda, and operate as any other police force, naturally with the help of interpreters and with substantial backup from the NATO forces. MARGARET WARNER: And then, Mr. Daalder, the next step is, what, to train local people to become a police force?
MARGARET WARNER: It's true, is it not, Mr. Tharoor, that if you just have police and then you don't have prosecutors or courts or jails, you don't have too much? SHASHI THAROOR: Right. We're very aware of that. In fact, we've already moved to appoint nine judges from all the communities-- Serbs, Albanians, and even a single Turk from Kosovo. The idea is indeed to try and get the judges functioning, get a system of justice, because after all, policing is all about trying to ensure justice. I do want to say that, of course, what Ivo Daalder said is absolutely right. The society has to be able to police itself. Initially the internationals will have do the policing for them, but the idea very much is to recruit and train policemen from the Kosovo community, people who reflect their communities, including the ethnic diversity of their communities, and people who can then go ahead and actually do the policing with our police monitors sort of supervising them. Policing the police will be our function at that point. And then eventually, we do hope that we would be able to have a Kosovo police reflecting the Kosovo people in charge of their own affairs, and that will of course be the way in which the international community would like to leave the problem at the end.
LT. JOHN GORMAN: Well, the U.N. makes a decision, a wise decision. Naturally there was a reluctance on all of our parts not to be armed in Bosnia. As it turned out, the wiser heads prevailed. We didn't need to be armed. It was not a chaotic situation; it was a tense situation. In Haiti, for instance, the U.N. police are armed, because the situation there is somewhat chaotic. To me, from what I've read, it certainly makes sense to be armed, and I think that will be the prevailing philosophy. And I think wiser heads will prevail again, and the proper police decision will be made, to have an armed police force. SHASHI THAROOR: That's right. It is being made in precisely that sense. We are going to arm the police, and we are also going to have to have special units, sort of like formed constabularies, armed police with more than just side arms, which is what most of the police will carry, who can do things like crowd control and riot management, people who can function in formed units, almost in the paramilitary sense. So we'll have special police units like that. We'll have individual U.N. and international police wearing side arms. And, in effect, the unarmed police that some governments insist on providing will have to do desk work at police headquarters. The people out on the beat will all have to be armed. MARGARET WARNER: Mr. Daalder, from the Bosnia experience, and I know it may be hard to extrapolate, but it's more of the police function -- or is it more of the crime problem? Is it political and sort of ethnically driven, or is it just good, old-fashioned crime, people taking advantage of a chaotic situation, as Mr. Tharoor called it?
MARGARET WARNER: Mr. Tharoor, would you agree with that assessment? And also, given the rapidity with which Serbs are leaving Kosovo-- I think they're down to fewer than 100,000 now-- does the revenge killings or revenge crime necessarily sort of abate as more and more Serbs leave?
MARGARET WARNER: Lieutenant Gorman, how would you compare the task ahead in Kosovo versus Bosnia? |
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| Lessons of Bosnia. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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MARGARET WARNER: What do you think, Mr. Daalder, are the lessons from Bosnia, or what can be taken out of the Bosnia experience? IVO DAALDER: Well, I think we're learning them as we go along. The first and most important lesson that we learned in Bosnia is that there is a gap between the international police force that was in Bosnia unable to have executive functions to do the arresting and the policing, and the military that was unwilling to take that place. Here we have made very clear from the beginning that NATO will in the first instance do civilian law and order until such time that there is an international U.N. police force capable of taking over. And then you have this seamless web between the NATO force and then the civilian force, and as the local forces get trained, a backup in that sense so that the gap, the security gap that was present in Bosnia is not going to be present in Kosovo, even though we still see lawlessness, as we do indeed in societies that have normal policing. MARGARET WARNER: Mr. Tharoor, lessons of Bosnia?
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Well, thank you all three, gentlemen, very much. SHASHI THAROOR: Thank you. |
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