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![]() | COLD WAR FACE OFFOctober 16, 1997NEWSHOUR TRANSCRIPT |
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For two weeks in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union stood at the brink of nuclear war. Thirty-five years later, the Cuban Missile Crisis is viewed as one of the "hottest" moments of the Cold War. After a background report by Kwame Holman, Jim Lehrer discusses the significance of these events with the presidential historians and Sergei Khrushchev, the son of the late Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
A RealAudio version of this segment is available.
NEWSHOUR LINKS:
October 16, 1997:
The presidential historians and Sergei Khruschev review the Cuban Missile Crisis.
January 23, 1997:
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Foreign Minister, discusses the impact of Helms-Burton.
July 11, 1996:
Canada's Trade Minister and an US congresswoman debate the legitimacy of Helms-Burton.
March 5, 1996:
Secretary of State Warren Christopher discusses the US foreign policy toward Cuba.
March 1, 1996:
Two policy experts analyze the United States' policy toward Cuba.
Browse the NewsHour's coverage of Latin America
OUTSIDE LINKS
The text of the Helms-Burton Act
KWAME HOLMAN: For nearly two weeks in October 1962, world peace and perhaps the world itself, hung in the balance as two superpowers slid toward a nuclear confrontation,but the people of the world knew nothing of the potentially disastrous drama that was unfolding.
KWAME HOLMAN: Instead, Americans were engrossed the seventh game of the World Series at Candlestick Park, and the entire U.S. west coast was inundated by the worst rainstorms in 50 years. On the other side of the world in Rome, Catholics held a nighttime ceremony in St. Peter's Square to celebrate the Church's Second Ecumenical Council in four hundred years. The near-cataclysm had its beginnings earlier in the summer of 1962. American U-2 spy planes secretly overflew Cuba. Their high-tech cameras detected possible signs Cuba's superpower benefactor-- the Soviet Union was engaged in military construction on the island just 90 miles off the coast of Florida. At the same time, Cuban refugees also were reporting an increased Soviet build up.
In Congress, Republicans seized on those reports and called on Democratic President John F. Kennedy to take tough action against Cuba. Meanwhile America grew increasingly nervous as the relationship between Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban Leader Fidel Castro became cozier and more public.
In fall of 1962--on October 14th--the spy planes uncovered more dramatic evidence of new Soviet missile sites which--once operational--would be capable of delivering nuclear warheads onto much of the continental United States. Two days later, with the aerial pictures in hand, President Kennedy convened the first of a series of crisis meetings with his most trusted advisors. Their aim: to find a way to get the Soviet weapons out of Cuba. Unbeknown to the participants, President Kennedy had the meetings taped. Transcripts of hundreds of hours of the conversations that depict the tension and drama of the time were compiled by Harvard University Historians Ernest May and Philip Zelikow in a book published this month.
According to the transcripts, on the morning of October 16th , the President's men feared the worst. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: "I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war." Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: "I don't know quite what kind of world we live in after we've struck Cuba." And the President: "We never had a case where it's been quite this--well, it's a goddamn mystery." The group, known as the Executive Committee, weighed three options laid out by Defense Secretary McNamara:
Various Options Explored.
First, the U.S. could attempt a diplomatic solution by talking directly to Khrushchev and Castro. That view, however, got little discussion in the White House meetings. A second option called for continued U-2 surveillance, coupled with a blockade to prevent more weapons and material from arriving on Cuba. And the final alternative-- a direct military assault against Cuba. Two days later, on October 18th, more aerial photos came in showing nuclear capable Soviet bombers known as BEAGLES on the ground in Cuba.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Maxwell Taylor, called for an all-out air assault be followed by an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. General Taylor asked the defense secretary: "What is your objection to taking out the missiles and the Soviet aircraft?" Mr. McNamara: "My real objection to it is that it kills several hundred Russians." Later that afternoon, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came to the White House. He bluntly accused the United States of pestering Cuba. He acknowledged the Soviet military build-up but said it was aimed at defending the island, not striking at the U.S.. President Kennedy later said he was tempted to pull the photographs of the Soviet bombers from his desk drawer and confront Gromyko. The Executive Committee met late into the night and for the next three days, debating the implications of direct military action or a Naval blockade. At a midnight meeting in the Oval Office, the President summed up the day's discussions.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY: During the course of the day, opinions had obviously switched from the advantages of a first strike on the missile sites and on Cuban aviation to a blockade.
KWAME HOLMAN: Kennedy and his advisors were especially worried that a move against Cuba would trigger Soviet action against the divided city of Berlin. Cuba would trigger Soviet action against the divided city of Berlin, which was the flashpoint of the Cold War. General Maxwell Taylor: "Our strength in Berlin, our strength any place in the world, is the credibility of our response." President Kennedy: "That's why we've got to respond. Now, the question is: what is our response?". Air Force General Curtis LeMay objected to a Cuban blockade, saying it "would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. You're in a pretty bad fix, Mr, President."
By the weekend news of the mounting crisis reached reporters, then the public. On Monday night, October 22nd, President Kennedy went on national television. He told the nation of the presence of the Soviet missiles and announced his decision: to impose what he called a naval quarantine of the Island of Cuba.
President Kennedy addresses the nation.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will be found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons be turned back. It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination.
KWAME HOLMAN: The blockade was a first step and did not rule out a U.S. attack later. American armed forces were put on high alert. Bombers and troops were mobilized to the southern states in preparation for a possible air campaign and invasion of Cuba.
MAN: I'd hate like heck to see us go to war, but if it's necessary to prevent a nuclear war, I think the action has to be taken at this time.
WOMAN: Well, I think it's high time we stopped Russia from having things their own way.
SPOKESMAN: I have a few more months to go--I just hope they don't grab me, that's all.
KWAME HOLMAN: The morning after the President's national address, a message arrived at the White House from Soviet Premier Khrushchev. He called the blockade "a serious threat to peace" and reiterated the missiles "are intended solely for defensive purposes." In Cuba, Fidel Castro put his armed forces on alert and told his people: "We don't have to give an account to the imperialists." In America, the Cuban Missile crisis sparked renewed public interest in fallout shelters. People flocked to grocery stores, emptying shelves to stock up on one food in the event of a crisis. A the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson challenged the Soviet representatives.
Amb. Stevenson: "...until hell freezes over."
AMB. ADLAI STEVENSON: Do you, Amb. Zoren, deny that the USSR is placing missiles in Cuba? Yes or No.
AMB. ZOREN: You will have your answer in due course.
AMB. ADLAI STEVENSON: I'm prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over if that's your decision.
KWAME HOLMAN: In Washington and throughout the United States, Americans watched and waited. On the morning of October 24th, the day the blockade officially went into effect, 16 Soviet ships bound for Cuba reversed course. After many exchanges by diplomatic cables and through official and unofficial negotiators, on October 26th, Khrushchev offered to withdraw his missiles from Cuba. The next day he coupled his offer with a demand the U.S. remove NATO missiles from Turkey, across the Black Sea from the Soviet Union. Defense Sec. McNamara wasn't pleased. At Saturday afternoon's meeting in the cabinet room of the White House, he said: "Hell, that's no offer. There's not a damn thing in it that's an offer. You read that message carefully. He didn't propose to take the missiles out. I don't think attack is the only answer. I think we ought to be prepared for attack, an all-out attack.
KWAME HOLMAN: Finally, on October 28th, Khrushchev gave in. He agreed to stop construction of missile sites and bring the weapons back to the Soviet Union. In exchange, President Kennedy conditionally promised not to invade Cuba and, secretly, agreed to remove the missiles from Turkey. One month after the crisis began, President Kennedy announced the lifting of the blockade. In a speech to the nation on November 20th, he tempered his decision with a warning.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY: There is much for which we can be grateful as we look back to where we stood only four weeks ago. The unity of this hemisphere, the support of our allies and the calm determination of the American people--these qualities may be tested many more times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident that those qualities will continue to serve the cause of freedom with distinction in the years to come.
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