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| SUPREME COURT WATCH | |
June 16, 2003 |
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Among Monday's rulings, the Supreme Court limited the government's right to forcibly medicate mentally ill defendants in preparation for a court appearance. Jan Crawford Greenburg of The Chicago Tribune outlines the court's decision. |
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RAY SUAREZ: The justices severely limited the government's authority to forcibly medicate mentally ill defendants to make them well enough to stand trial. They also ruled in two First Amendment cases. Here to walk us through those decisions is NewsHour regular Jan Crawford Greenburg of the Chicago Tribune. Well, Jan, the first involved Dr. Charles Sell, a dentist from St. Louis. What was at issue in the case? |
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| The constitutionality of forcible medication | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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RAY SUAREZ: And the decision? JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: Well, the court today set aside a lower court ruling that had ordered Dr. Sell to be forcibly medicated and it told the lower court to rethink that issue in light of a series of new guidelines that the court handed out today. The court's decision, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, said that government can in some situations forcibly medicate mentally ill criminal defendants to make them fit for trial. But only in certain circumstances where it was medically appropriate, where the drugs were necessary to ensure a fair trial, where it was important to further the government interest, only in several sets of circumstances could the government do so. And the court cautioned that those instances may be rare. RAY SUAREZ: So let me make sure I understand you. The court ruled today that you can still do this. It is possible for governments to forcibly medicate defendants, but that they just couldn't do it in this case with Dr. Sell? JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: Or not at least at this point. The lower courts may come back and say, okay, we've looked at what the Supreme Court said, we've analyzed these guidelines and based on that we still believe Dr. Sell could be forcibly medicated. Now keep in mind that the Supreme Court has long held that the government could forcibly medicate a criminal defendant who is mentally ill if that person posed a danger to himself or others. But that wasn't the issue in this case. Dr. Sell, the federal courts found, was not a danger. The government wanted to medicate him solely to make him competent to stand trial. So that was really the issue today. And the new guidelines that the court issued today on the one hand certainly enabled the government to forcibly medicate mentally ill criminal defendants to make them competent for trial. But it made it difficult. I mean, they have to follow these strict guidelines. And the court did set aside the lower court opinion and said to the lower court, rethink it, because we want to make sure that you followed all these steps and properly balanced the very important constitutional rights of this criminal defendant, with the government's also important right to put this person on trial. It's a difficult issue because you have those two key concerns at stake.
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: That's right, he did. There were three justices in dissent. They didn't take issue with the fact that he should be medicated, they said yes the government should be able to medicate Dr. Sell, but that the federal courts had no business getting involved in this case in the first place, they should wait and resolve this issue at the end of the trial and that by jumping in here now, criminal defendants across the country were going to be encouraged to raise all of these constitutional arguments on the eve of their trial solely to delay proceedings. He gave an example of a criminal defendant who wanted to wear a certain T-shirt before the jury and argued that the judge's orders saying no would violate his constitutional rights, that he could make that argument and try to delay his trial. But Justice Breyer addressed the dissent and he said, look, this is a different case, this is an intrusion, this is a serious constitutional concern, and he flatly discounted Justice Scalia's argument and dissent. |
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| An infringement on freedom of speech? | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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RAY SUAREZ: Another of the rulings today involved a public housing development in Richmond, Virginia, and one Kevin Hicks. What was at issue there?
So that was the issue before the court today: Whether or not this housing authority policy which enabled the housing authority to keep out people who had no legitimate purpose, as the policy says, whether that violated the Constitution. And the court today said no, not right now, not on these grounds. But Mr. Hicks, you may have some other arguments to raise again in the lower courts. So what they did was they shut the door to Mr. Hicks' first argument, which was a pretty technical First Amendment doctrine argument. RAY SUAREZ: Made it a free speech matter? JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: He did. He said this policy was overbroad, that it would suppress speech and expression, for example someone who might want to pass out leaflets in the Housing Authority project, would not be able to do so. So because the law was so overbroad, it should not apply to him and should not apply to anyone else. Now, the courts rejected that, they said that's a pretty novel application of that kind of technical First Amendment doctrine, but it did leave open the door, and suggested certainly the oral argument that Hicks had several other legal avenues that he could pursue below in challenging this policy, and in challenging his exclusion from this Housing Authority development.
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: Sure, and that's I think an interesting aspect of this case because the Richmond City Council in an effort to combat crime and drugs that have gripped this housing authority development, like many areas across the country, decided what it was going to do was convey the streets and sidewalks in the Public Housing Authority developments to the Public Housing Authority. And make them private. So then therefore the Public Housing Authority could pass this policy that says these streets are private, if you don't live here and you don't work here and you don't have a legitimate reason for being here, then you can't be here. And if you come here, say like Mr. Hicks did, and we don't want you here or you shouldn't be here, then we're going to arrest you for trespassing. So because the streets had been privatized, yes, then the Housing Authority was able to pass that no trespassing ordinance that Mr. Hicks got swept up in. |
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| Implications for campaign finance reform | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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RAY SUAREZ: Let's take the briefest look at another case argued on free speech grounds, this had to do with private not-for-profits and their political donations. What did the justices rule?
This was a closely watched case, it's a pretty narrow issue but a closely watched case because many people were looking for clues to see if they could discern any hints of how the court might look at the mammoth overhaul of campaign finance reform that's headed this way on Sept. 8; that's the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation. And the court on Sept. 8 has set a special argument date just to consider that case. So today, supporters of McCain-Feingold said they were heartened that the court had upheld this restriction and said they thought it might bode well for some of the soft money effort, soft money loophole to close the soft money loop hole, I'm sorry, that McCain-Feingold does. RAY SUAREZ: And this was a seven-two decision. Jan Crawford Greenburg, the Chicago Tribune, thanks a lot. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG: You're welcome, Ray. |
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