| | HANS BLIX: Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, for nearly three years, I've been coming to the Security Council
presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our many preparations
for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the first
that describes three months of inspection. They come after four years without
inspections. The report was finalized 10 days ago, and a number of relevant events
have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated
report on these points to bring the council up to date.
Inspections in
Iraq resumed on the 27th of November, 2002. In matters relating to process --
notably, prompt access to sites -- we have faced relatively few difficulties,
and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991
to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.
Some practical
matters which were not settled by the talks Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi
side in Vienna prior to inspections or in Resolution 1441 had been resolved at
meetings which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi
side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly
zones were overcome.
This is not to say that the operation of inspections
is free from frictions, but at this juncture, we are able to perform professional
no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.
American
U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery,
supplementing satellite pictures, and we would expect soon to be able to add night-vision
capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also
expect to all low-level, close-area surveillance through drones provided by Germany.
We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable tools
at our disposal, but also to the states -- most recently Cyprus -- which has agreed
to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.
Mr. President, Iraq,
with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more
documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programs. Only a few new such
documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections.
It was a disappointment that Iraq's declaration of 7th of December did
not
bring new documentary evidence. I hope their efforts in this respect, including
the appointment of a government commission, will give significant results.
When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted-for, it is above all credible
accounts that is needed or the proscribed items, if they exist. Where authentic
documents do not become available, interviews with persons who may have relevant
knowledge and experience may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has
names of such persons in its records, and they are among the people whom we seek
to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with names of many persons
who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part
in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons
and proscribed missiles in 1991.
This provision of names prompts two
reflections. The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding
those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain
records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.
The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available, it becomes
even more important to be able to conduct interview in modes and locations which
allow us to be confident that the testimony given is given without outside influence.
While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request
the presence of Iraqi officials, so-called minders, or the taping of the interviews,
conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside
Iraq.
Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It
is our intention to request such interviews shortly.
Nevertheless, despite
remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews,
38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our
terms, seven of these during the last week.
As I noted on the 14th of
February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction
are moved around Iraq by trucks; in particular, that there are mobile production
units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not
exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in
relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and
mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed-processing
equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found.
Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random
checks of ground transportation.
Inspectors are also engaged in examining
Iraq's programs for remotely piloted vehicles. A number of sites have been inspected,
with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various
models found, and inspections are continuing in this area.
There have
been reports, denied from the Iraq side, that proscribed activities are conducted
underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable
for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. During inspections
of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building
structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating
radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities
for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.
I
should add that both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection
of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I'm not
talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of
high-quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert
inspectors to send.
On 14th February, I reported to the council that
the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps which potentially
might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues.
Even a week
ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively
little tangible progress to note; hence, the cautious formations in the report
before you. As of today, there is more.
While during our meetings in
Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the al-Samoud 2 missiles they
have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the
calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion.
Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed
and has started the process of destruction under our supervision.
The
destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament, indeed
the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks.
Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that the report I have
today tells me that no destruction work has continued today. I hope this is a
temporary break.
Until today, 34 al-Samoud 2 missiles, including four
training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines, have been
destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory
the parts and equipment associated with the al- Samoud 2 program. Two reconstituted
casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been
destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.
The legality
of the Al-Fatah missiles is still under review pending further investigation and
measurement of various parameters of that missile. More papers on anthrax,
VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what
Iraq already has declared, and some will require further study and discussion.
There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of
uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons which were
unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site
which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being
reexcavated. Today, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs, comprising
two liquid-fueled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Some fragments
were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction
site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed
at that site. It should be followed by serious and credible effort to determine
the separate issue of how many R-400-type bombs were produced. In this as in other
matters, the inspection work is moving on and may yield results.
Iraq
proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of
unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at the site. However, even if the use of
advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax said to be dumped at
the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity
of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what
quantity was actually produced.
With respect to VX, Iraq has recently
suggested a similar method to quantify VX precursor, stated to have been unilaterally
destroyed in the summer of 1991.
Iraq has also recently informed us that
following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals
and mixed companies from engaging in work relating to weapons of mass destruction,
further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response
to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.
Mr. President,
what are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that
after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration
of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome.
But the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks
they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.
Against
this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated, quote,
"immediately, unconditionally and actively," unquote, with UNMOVIC,
as is required under Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441. The answers can be seen from
the factual descriptions that I have provided.
However, if more direct
answers are desired, I would say the following. The Iraqi side has tried on occasion
to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not,
however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any
of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.
It is obvious
that while the numerous initiatives which are now taken by the Iraqi side, with
a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as
active or even proactive, these initiatives, three to four months into the new
resolution, cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation, nor do they necessarily
cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome, and UNMOVIC is responding
to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.
Mr. President, members of the council may relate most of what I have said to Resolution
1441, but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security
Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with Resolution
1284, which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much of our work.
Under the time line set by that resolution, the results of some of this work is
reported to the council before the end of this month.
Let me [be] more
specific. Resolution 1284 instructs UNMOVIC to, I quote, "address unresolved
disarmament issues," unquote, and to identify, quote, "key remaining
disarmament tasks," unquote. And the latter are to be submitted for approval
by the council in the context of the work program. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit
the draft work program this month, as required.
UNMOVIC, UNSCOM and the
Amorim panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues which were still
open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but
analyzed the data behind it and data and documents post-1998 up to the present
time, to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues or, rather, clustered
issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection
activities, and it's also from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC
will identify the key remaining disarmament tasks. As noted in the report before
you, this list of clustered issues is ready.
UNMOVIC is only required
to submit the work program with the key remaining disarmament [tasks] to the council.
As I understand, several members -- council members are interested in the working
document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, and we have declassified
it and are ready to make it available to members of the council on request.
In this working document, which may still be adjusted in light of new information,
members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the
documents of 1999, which they usually -- members usually refer to. Each cluster
in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could
do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the
successful resolution of issues.
I should note that the working document
contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the
end of 1998, including information which has come to light after '98. It contains
much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because
of paucity of information.
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have
expressed the view the proscribed programs have continued or restarted in this
period. It is further contended that proscribed programs and items are located
in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being
moved around Iraq. The working document does contain suggestions on how these
concerns may be tackled.
Mr. President, let me conclude by telling you
that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work program which Resolution 1284 requires
us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining
disarmament tasks, it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring
and verification that the council has asked us to implement. It will also describe
the various subsystems which constitute the program. For instance, for aerial
surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for
the checking of road traffic, et cetera.
How much time would it take
to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to
be immediate, disarmament, and at any rate verification of it, cannot be instant.
Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it
will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, interview
relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, but
months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to
go on forever.
However, it must be remembered that in accordance with
the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to
remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an
alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programs.
Thank you, Mr. President.
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