| 1. Full and effective disarmament
in accordance with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions remains
the imperative objective of the international community. Our priority
should be to achieve this peacefully through the inspection regime. The
military option should only be a last resort. So far, the conditions for
using force against Iraq are not fulfilled:
--While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still
possesses weapons of mass destruction or capabilities in this field;
--Inspections have just reached their full pace; they are functioning
without hindrance; they have already produced results;
--While not yet fully satisfactory, Iraqi cooperation is improving,
as mentioned by the chief inspectors in their last report.
2. The Security Council must step up its efforts to give a real chance
to the peaceful settlement of the crisis. In this context, the following
conditions are of paramount importance:
-- the unity of the Security Council must be preserved;
-- the pressure that is put on Iraq must be increased.
3. These conditions can be met, and our common objective - the verifiable
disarmament of Iraq -- can be reached through the implementation of
the following proposals:
A) Clear program of action for the inspections:
According to resolution 1284, UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission) and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
have to submit their program of work for approval of the Council. The
presentation of this program of work should be speeded up, in particular
the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant
to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution
687 (1991) and other related resolutions.
The key remaining tasks shall be defined according to their degree
of priority. What is required of Iraq for implementation of each task
shall be clearly defined and precise.
Such a clear identification of tasks to be completed will oblige Iraq
to cooperate more actively. It will also provide a clear means for the
Council to assess the co-operation of Iraq.
B) Reinforced inspections:
Resolution 1441 established an intrusive and reinforced system of inspections.
In this regard, all possibilities have not yet been explored.
Further measures to strengthen inspections could include, as exemplified
in the French non-
paper previously communicated to the chief inspectors, the following:
increase and diversification of staff an expertise; establishment of
mobile units designed in particular to check on trucks; completion of
the new system of aerial surveillance; systematic processing of data
provided by the newly established system of aerial surveillance.
C) Timelines for inspections and assessment:
Within the framework of resolution 1284 and 1441, the implementation
of the program of work shall be sequenced according to a realistic and
-- the inspectors should be asked to submit the program of work outlining
the key substantive tasks for Iraq to accomplish, including missiles
/ delivery systems, chemical weapons / precursors, biological weapons
/ material and nuclear weapons in the context of the report due March
-- the chief inspectors shall report to the Council on implementation
of the program of work on a regular basis (every 3 weeks);
-- a report of UNMOVIC and IAEA assessing the progress made in completing
the tasks shall be submitted by the inspectors 120 days after the
adoption of the program of work according to resolution 1284;
-- at any time, according to paragraph 11 of resolution 1441, the
executive chairman of UNMOVIC and the director general of the IAEA
shall report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with
inspections activities as well as failure by Iraq to comply with its
-- at any time, additional meetings of the Security Council could
be decided, including at high level. To render possible a peaceful
solution inspections should be given the necessary time and resources.
However, they can not continue indefinitely.
Iraq must disarm. Its full and active cooperation is necessary. This
must include the provision of all the additional and specific information
on issues raised by the inspectors as well as compliance with their
requests, as expressed in particular in Mr. Blix' letter of February
21st 2003. The combination of a clear program of action, reinforced
inspections, a clear timeline and the military build-up provide a realistic
means to reunite the Security Council and to exert maximum pressure