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| THE FINDINGS | |
 January 27, 2003  |
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Two former weapons inspectors discuss their reaction to the report by U.N. inspectors detailing Iraq's level of compliance with the disarmament demands. (background
report) |
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Mr. Albright, what struck you most about the presentations today from Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei? DAVID ALBRIGHT: I think the first impression is that Iraq really isn't complying with its obligations. I mean, it may not rise to the level of what people would call a smoking gun, but there's numerous episodes and examples where Iraq just is not complying with its obligations under the resolution, from a faulty declaration to finding things in facilities that Iraq shouldn't have. And so I think overall it's a troubling report on Iraq's activities. |
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| Verifiable disarmament? | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GWEN IFILL: Mr. Zilinskas,
did you see the glass half full or the glass half empty?
GWEN IFILL: So much of today's arguments put forward by both men and a lot of the reactions that we saw both at the United Nations around the world came down to timing. Hans Blix said that based on his... he said that they need more time because this will lead to verifiable disarmament in a reasonable amount of time. He said that's what he needs. Do you agree with that, based on your experience, that all we need here is more time?
GWEN IFILL: And Mr. Zilinskas, weeks, months, even more? RAYMOND ZILINSKAS: It really, as David mentioned, depends on if the Iraqis cooperate. I believe that there's a lot more pressure on them now, even at this presentation by Blix and ElBaradei. Both of them stress the need for this proactive assistance or cooperation from the Iraqis. And, as I understand it, there are several of the surrounding countries are also making that message clear to the Iraqis that they have to make a proactive cooperation. Otherwise, it's not going to work. If that happens in the next three or four or five weeks, then I think that we a have a good chance to get the information as required. |
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| The areas of noncompliance | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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GWEN IFILL: Mr. Blix laid out, in particular, several of the areas of noncompliance, or at least so far noncompliance, and I want to run through some of them with you and you can explain us to exactly what the issue is. For instance, they talk about the aluminum tubes which were imported or which they found in Iraq, but they say that Iraq wasn't necessarily using them for centrifuges, which would imply nuclear development activity. Mr. Zilinskas, what is the issue there? RAYMOND ZILINSKAS: I think that is up to David. He deals with the nuclear aspects. GWEN IFILL: Okay, Mr. Albright? Yeah, fine.
GWEN IFILL: Mr. Zilinskas, of all the examples that were trotted out today by both of these gentlemen, which troubled you the most?
GWEN IFILL: When you say "culture media," tell us what you're talking about. RAYMOND ZILINSKAS: In order to grow bacteria, you need this kind of substrate that has agar and other nutrients in it, and you put this together with a pathogen in the fermenter and let it ferment for about two or three days. And then that gives you the biological weapons agent, in this case anthrax. So they have 650 kilograms of culture media that's disappeared, and that's sufficient to make 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax. And they just don't give us good explanation what happened to the culture media. |
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| The credibility of Iraqi claims | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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GWEN IFILL: Mr. Albright, what happens with that when you don't have good explanations? How do inspectors set about proving whether Iraqi claims are credible or not?
GWEN IFILL: Mr. Zilinskas, both of the inspectors today cited South Africa as a model of disarmament, yet you saw the South African ambassadors to the United Nations come out afterwards and say, "Well, yes, we disarmed, but it took two years for us and there should be more time." Is that, is South Africa a reasonable model of comparison?
GWEN IFILL: Mr. Albright, does the very presence of inspectors on the ground now and for the foreseeable future, at least for the next few weeks or months, does that freeze Iraq in a way that makes it impossible to produce more, to be a threat, in essence? DAVID ALBRIGHT: I think it does. I mean, the inspectors are a very powerful deterrent against Iraq trying to continue to reconstitute any of its weapons of mass destruction programs, or to use those weapons of mass destruction in any way. So I think that while the inspection process is working and it's intrusive, it does contain Iraq's ability to move forward with weapons of mass destruction, and that's very valuable. However, if Iraq doesn't cooperate, they can't prevent Iraq from getting weapons of mass destruction in the long run. I mean, it finally...it's a losing game for the inspectors to play if Iraq isn't going to cooperate and in essence, comply. If I can add one thing on the South African case, is that I studied that case very closely on the nuclear side, and one of the things that was very apparent early on was South Africa wanted to cooperate, and you could tell it. And there's been no such indication from Iraq. GWEN IFILL: Mr. Zilinskas, the Iraqis have been saying they believe that the United States and its allies, at least those that are allied with it on this issue, are leading a rush to war. Why or would you expect, I suppose, the Iraqi government to cooperate if they believe that war is inevitable in any case?
GWEN IFILL: Raymond Zilinskas and David Albright, thank you very much for joining us. |
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GWEN
IFILL: Now, to help us digest the case laid out by the two U.N. Chief
weapons inspectors about the situation in Iraq, we turn to former inspectors
who have been there. Raymond Zilinskas was a United Nations biological
weapons inspector in 1994. He's now director of the chemical and biological
weapons nonproliferation program at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies; and David Albright, a former analyst and inspector who monitored
Iraq's nuclear program from 1992 to 1997; he's now president of the
Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. 
RAYMOND
ZILINSKAS: More half full, I guess. It is true that the filed complete
disclosures turned over to UNMOVIC in December were full of holes, but
the inspectors have been working very hard since that time, and they
are starting to fill some of the information gaps. But, as David mentioned,
there is this aspect that even though they cooperate in the passive
type of activities, in other words they open the doors to laboratories
and even homes, they don't take a proactive approach. They don't come
up with the information that's required to fill the holes, and that
is definitely troubling. 
DAVID
ALBRIGHT: No, I don't. I think if Iraq doesn't cooperate actively, then
it doesn't matter how much more time the inspectors get if they're very
unlikely to succeed in disarmament. They're very likely to succeed in
continuing to show that Iraq is not cooperating, so, no, I would say
let the inspections go on in the future. I mean, it may be for weeks.
I wouldn't want to commit to months. But there's nothing lost by letting
the inspectors continue their job. Perhaps Iraq will change its mind
and cooperate fully and reveal its programs to the extent that it has
them, but unfortunately so far, I'm not that optimistic that they're
going to do it and, therefore, I don't think this should be an inspection
process that's given a blank check to continue for two or three months.
DAVID
ALBRIGHT: The issue of the aluminum tubes really goes back several months
to some statements by the administration that said that these aluminum
tubes were specific to a uranium-enrichment program, namely a program
that uses gas centrifuges. I think the claim by the administration was
weak when it was stated, and that was identified. But the inspectors
have gone out and actually shown that these... or these aluminum tubes
are not suitable for centrifuges. And I think that while the investigation
continues, I do think that the inspectors have pretty much spent enough
time on this and probably will not be spending much more time. And unfortunately
this is a case where intelligence information turns out not to be useful.
There was a hope that this information would show that Iraq has a nuclear
weapons program, but in actual fact it hasn't. Now, one hopes that the
administration has better information on the nuclear weapons program
and that information will be turned over to the inspectors and they
can act upon it. But the case of the aluminum tubes, unfortunately,
has undermined the credibility of the administration's case that it
has compelling intelligence information. 
RAYMOND
ZILINSKAS: It is both in the chemical and biological area, there are
big gaps. On the chemical, the issue is of VX. VX is a very, very poisonous
nerve agent. And we know that the Iraqis manufactured at least 3.9 tons
of it. And the question is, what happened to it? The Iraqis say that
they've destroyed...well, first they said that they only manufactured
very impure VX that didn't work and they never weaponized it. But we
know for sure that that's not the case, that they actually manufactured
very pure VX, and then the question is what happened to it? In the biological
area, there's an issue of the missing culture media. In other words,
you need this culture media to grow bacteria. 
DAVID
ALBRIGHT: Well, part of it's a subjective judgment. I mean, you can
look somebody in the face and just feel that they're not telling you
the truth. And also the burden is on Iraq to provide the evidence that
they have destroyed agents or whatever. Basically it's not up to the
inspectors to prove that this happened. I mean, it's very clear in the
resolutions if Iraq says something, it needs to document or otherwise
prove that assertion. And I think unfortunately in the last couple months
Iraq has not been willing to provide the evidence to show that it's
destroyed things or it did certain things that would show that it was
in compliance with the resolutions. 
RAYMOND
ZILINSKAS: Well, sure, but the key word is "cooperation."
The South Africans were completely cooperative, and, true, it took about
two years to clear up, and that's mostly having to do with the nuclear
weapons. It does not include the chemical and biological. Especially
the biological area in South Africa is still pretty murky. But, yes,
the issue still is the proactive cooperation by the Iraqis are absolutely
required. And after that it's going to take six to nine or even a year
to clear all the information gaps in the full, final, complete disclosures.
RAYMOND
ZILINSKAS: Well, that's a very good question. I think if I was, in fact,
the Iraqis and I was fatalistic about it, it doesn't matter what we
do, the United States is going to attack, "so why do we need them
to cooperate?" And there's something to that. But on the other
hand, the... they have to come to the recognition that if they actually
started proactive cooperation to really cough up the information as
needed, it would make it very difficult for the United States to attack,
so I hope that they eventually come to that resolution and actually
start cooperating.