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| IRAQ ASSASSINATION | |
January 4, 2005 |
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Insurgents gunned down Baghdad's governor and detonated a car bomb at a checkpoint Tuesday. Experts on the Mideast discuss the rising violence and its impact on Iraq's pending elections. |
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The attacks have been repeated and frequent, including attempts on the life of interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and last week's unsuccessful car bomb attempt to kill Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the country's most powerful Shiite parties.
GWEN IFILL: But hundreds of Iraqi civilians have been killed during the last month, and officials are now engaged in daily debate about whether the elections can proceed as scheduled. Among the most prominent voices urging delay is Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni who played a leading role in the Iraqi governing council. He, along with other Sunni leaders, is concerned that the lack of security will keep Sunnis from the polls and render them powerless in a new government.
GWEN IFILL: Pachachi renewed his call for delay on the pages of the Washington Post this past weekend. The main Sunni political party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, has vowed to boycott the elections, claiming the process is biased in favor of the majority Shiite population. Shiite leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, have said postponing the elections would create further chaos. The continuing violence has forced some international agencies to the sidelines. Last month, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the U.N. will continue to monitor the situation, but...
GWEN IFILL: Among those trying to influence the process has been Osama bin Laden. The al-Qaida leader last week called for a boycott of the elections, and, for the first time, named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as his chief emissary in Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant, has claimed responsibility for many attacks, including today's assassination of the governor. |
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| Insurgents aim to derail elections | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Fouad Ajami, it seems as we have watched these violent events occur and as the election keeps approaching and as the administration and others are standing their ground that somewhere along the way assassination has become a political weapon in Iraq. Is that what you're picking up?
GWEN IFILL: Ambassador Dobbins, is this something that, as Professor Ajami says, we should have seen coming?
And we need to fix that problem so that this population isn't underrepresented in the resultant assembly and resultant government. We might have to postpone the government to do that or we might have to do it after the election. We have to fix that problem or the election is actually going to polarize the society even more than it already is. GWEN IFILL: Before we get to discussing fully about what the risks are of postponing this election, Col. Lang, how significant are attacks like today's and the series of near misses that we've seen in the last couple weeks in the full picture?
We now get 50 manned ground attacks against our air power, against our outposts and things like that. You have people executed in the streets of Baghdad with impunity. I mean, these are very serious things. What they're seeking to do is to make the country ungovernable. They've made a good start of it so far. And I think that if you postpone the election, they will probably take that as a great encouragement. GWEN IFILL: Are we seeing an increased sophistication on the part of these attackers? COL. W. PATRICK LANG, (Ret.): I think so. There's more and more use of more complicated ground attack maneuver schemes for ambushes and attacks from different directions, and very obviously a sophisticated scheme of surveillance of targets to let you know exactly where they are so that you can hit them. I think these people are getting better at this all the time. |
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| Proceeding with the elections | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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FOUAD AJAMI: Well, I think they are shaken, Ms. Ifill. I think you could already see even in the Allawi government, itself, in this interim government, there are voices of dissent about the election. For example, the Iraqi defense minister, Hazem Shaalan, just went to Cairo. In Cairo, he raised openly the possibility of postponing the election. So I think the Iraqis know exactly what they're facing and the interim government knows the scale of the challenge. One thing I just want to point out to you, the deputy prime minister of the interim Iraqi government, Barham Salih, one of the most decent of the Iraqi leaders, has basically openly and forthrightly accused the Syrians of fomenting these new levels of insurgency. He said it's not so much the Zarqawi people, though the Zarqawi people may do one dramatic assassination or another, but that the insurgency is really fueled by Baathist elements located in Syria and using money that they stole and took out of the country with them.
JAMES DOBBINS: Well, they're certainly worried about the growing sophistication. They are concerned about support that insurgents may be receiving from neighboring countries, Iran -- and Syria is the one that's been most often spoken of in recent weeks. And the Iranians are actually supporting the elections and supporting holding the elections. So for the moment, they've receded as a problem in the administration's eyes, although I expect that will be temporary. In the last few days, the administration has acknowledged the problem that I've suggested, which is that the election is going to result in a skewed outcome in which the Sunni 25 percent of the population may only have 5 or 10 percent of the representatives in the resulting assembly, and are beginning to talk about ways of fixing that. But so far they're not suggesting that we should postpone the election in order to do so. GWEN IFILL: You suggest that maybe that's a good idea, that it ought to be postponed at least for a while. Is that a lose-lose proposition-- you postpone it, and the violence continues anyway?
But the problem needs to be addressed, and if the election would have to be postponed for a month or two in order to fix it, I think that's probably better than having an election which actually exacerbates the polarization in the society and feeds the civil war. GWEN IFILL: Col. Lang, what do you think about that? COL. W. PATRICK LANG, (Ret.):Well, if a postponement would result in an apportionment of power acceptable to enough Sunni Arabs so as to sort of isolate the insurgents that would be fine. But if it doesn't result in that, in fact, you have this profound psychological and political effect that will result from people not only in Iraq but across the Islamic world looking at this and saying, "oh, the United States and its friends have been defeated in Iraq." And a war like this is essentially a political and psychological phenomenon, and the violence is symptomatic of that. So when you start to slide, in people's minds as to whether or not you're winning or not, then you have a big problem. So this is a real trade-off here. GWEN IFILL: So do you fix it, as Ambassador Dobbins says, in advance, or do you just have the election and try to fix it afterwards?
GWEN IFILL: What do you think about that, Professor Ajami? FOUAD AJAMI: Well, I think it's very interesting because I agree with Ambassador Dobbins. In fact, Abdul Aziz Hakim, who was featured in the lead piece, Abdul Aziz Hakim himself, the head of the most important Shiite Party, has held out an olive branch to the Sunni Arabs and said, in fact, we want to make sure they're fully represented. So even though Adnan Pachachi himself is urging postponement to the election, he has a list that's competing in the election. And the interim Iraqi president, a Sunni Arab of tremendous authority and standing, xxxx has his own list. Nobody really has a scheme for dispossessing the Sunni Arabs. I think everyone is holding the door open for them in the hope that they will turn away from violence and turn in these insurgents and turn back to the political process. |
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| Handing over the reins to the Iraqis | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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GWEN IFILL: But does anyone have a scheme, Professor Ajami, for making sure whatever happens on Jan. 30 or some date beyond that it's legitimate in the end?
You have someone like Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, by common consent the most powerful man in the country, who has already given a fatwa, urging and standing behind this election. So we have to go through these elections; we have to train these Iraqi forces, because it's their country. This really is our exit out, the elections plus the training of these Iraqi forces; it's an attempt to accommodate the Sunni Arabs, which everyone is really eager to do so. GWEN IFILL: Well, that's an interesting point. I wonder, Ambassador, if you agree with that, that the elections is essentially... they're essentially important for the U.S. exit strategy. They're necessary; that one of the reasons why the U.S. is sticking to this date is because it's the only way out. JAMES DOBBINS: I think it's seen as a necessary benchmark to an ultimate exit strategy. I don't think that the administration sees it as a near-term point at which it can begin withdrawing. Personally, I believe it's important that this war has to be converted from an American-led war to an Iraqi-led war, and an election is an important step toward creating a legitimate authority in Iraq that has some greater credibility. GWEN IFILL: But at a time when it's proved to be so difficult to get Iraqi military and Iraqi police officers trained, and when so many of these attacks are directed at those very people, how do you go about doing that, taking the American handprint off of this enterprise?
COL. W. PATRICK LANG, (Ret.): Well, the key word here is "gradually." And I don't think anybody with any real grasp of this situation believes that the Iraqi forces will be in a position to handle these insurgents for another year or so, which means that we have to have a result from this election which is acceptable to a large number or large percentage of Sunni Arabs, or else we'll be under increasing pressure throughout the year while we're trying to create these forces. |
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| Peaceful resolution to the conflict | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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FOUAD AJAMI: Well, Gwen, I think you've chronicled our heartbreak. We expected, as you exactly said... we've always looked for deliverance. We've always seen every turning point as the next turning point. And then after that turning point, we only met greater sorrow. And I think we have to be ready for this. And I think even our own president recently with this election behind him acknowledged that the results have been mixed in terms of training this Iraqi forces, because in the end, in the end, our way out is really the training of these Iraqi forces, is making this, if you will, a fight for the Iraqis themselves. GWEN IFILL: Ambassador Dobbins, can you even turn that corner at a time when there are daily, at least weekly attacks happening against people who are trying to put the peace in place without fearing you're turning into another blind spot?
GWEN IFILL: It's not going to get better Patrick? COL. W. PATRICK LANG, (Ret.): Hope is not a planning system that I'm familiar with, and so I think you have to expect that there's going to be a predominantly Shia government, which will be unacceptable to many Sunni Arabs, and that the insurgency will continue for several years. And that will require the presence of significant American forces. This is going to go on quite a while. GWEN IFILL: Sounds like you've sketched out a plan which is going to turn on itself, which is that American forces, they have to remove themselves from this debate in order for there to be a real, legitimate government, and yet you're saying that there will be American forces there.
JAMES DOBBINS: You're going to have to take a risk. The presence of American forces is exacerbating the situation and further feeding the insurgency. Removing the forces could destabilize the situation entirely. So you have risks on both sides. And you have to weigh those risks. Staying is a risk as well, given the fact that the situation is deteriorating. GWEN IFILL: And, Professor Ajami, what do Iraqi officials do, beckon with one hand while holding back U.S. help with the other?
And I think if you take a look at the interim government, the elements of the interim government, the people who are represented and at the heart of it -- the Sunni president, the Kurdish deputy prime minister, Iyad Allawi himself -- there is a political class in Iraq which takes in Sunnis and Shias and Kurds. We shouldn't overdo the separation of the country. We shouldn't see the country through the eyes of the insurgents. GWEN IFILL: Fouad Ajami, James Dobbins, Pat Lang, thank you all very much. |
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