Iraqi Official Arrested for Recording Saddam's Execution

JOHN BURNS: Well, we learned more almost by the hour. I learned tonight, for example, from the national security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, who was there, who told us that there were people with cell phone cameras, although he was not, that the rush to carry this execution out, which resulted in Maliki signing the execution order sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on Saturday morning, was because they wanted to close the Saddam chapter in the year 2006.

They wanted to start the new year -- it was kind of a talismanic thing. They wanted to start the new year with the page turned.

As a result of that, everything was done in a tumble-down fashion. The Americans had what they called an exola program, that is to say, they had told the Iraqis that they needed 10 hours' notice to get Saddam ready and to deliver him into Iraqi physical custody for the execution.

But all of this really collapsed after the Americans did what they had to do and delivered Saddam with some decorum aboard a helicopter to the execution block, handed him over, signed the papers. At that point, they lost control. And, indeed, they physically withdrew, as General Caldwell, the command spokesman told us today. And after that, bedlam ensued.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, that national security adviser, Rubaie, was also quoted today as saying that there had been infiltration of the execution party in some fashion. Does that sound plausible to you, that people got in there who weren't meant to be there?

JOHN BURNS: This whole event had the most terrible, ghastly -- I'm sorry to use the phrase -- beauty about it, in the sense that it told us so much, almost in a Shakespearean way, about all else that is happening in Iraq.

We know that the interior ministry, which controls the prison, including the block where Saddam was executed, has been infiltrated -- and severely infiltrated -- by Shiite militiamen, particularly the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose name was chanted by some of those interior ministry guards in the execution chamber.

It's one of the taunts to which Saddam was subjected. So the fact that they got in there was not so surprising. What it tells us is just how pervasive that infiltration of the interior ministry is.

How vigorous were those efforts? And you mentioned one reason now that has been given to you for why Maliki said no. But what's the understanding of that, why he wouldn't delay?

JOHN BURNS: When General Caldwell and other senior American officials I've spoken to in the last 48-72 hours speak about this, the timber in their voice changes, a shadow falls across their face. They are terribly upset by this.

They had committed themselves to carrying this out in a graceful manner. They've always wanted to make this government stand up on its own, to distance themselves from it. The problem is that they remain accountable before international opinion for what this government does, and the government really will not stand up, up until now.

This is only the latest in a chapter of incidents -- probably the worst -- which have shown that this government really is not capable of creating the kind of civil society that the United States wants to see created here, which would be the basis for an American troop withdrawal.

So there was the problem, that the United States pushed this thing as far as they could with Maliki, but had taken a prior decision -- I would guess by Mr. Bush himself and the White House -- that, at a certain point, if he continued to insist on a rapid, on a hasty execution, that they would simply fold their cards and say, "It's your country. You do what you like."

My guess is lessons will be learned from this. And if, indeed, the president sends more troops here, I think you're going to see a new mood and a tougher mood amongst American military commanders and American officials here.

And they're going to be, metaphorically, at least, banging their fists on the table and saying, "Listen up. As long as we have our boys here dying to defend and sustain your government, there are things we expect. And what we do not expect is the kind of thing we saw on Saturday morning."

JOHN BURNS: No, it's not too early. It's given a new resurgence to the Baath Party. The Baath Party today named its new leader to succeed Saddam Hussein, who was one of the nastiest people of the old regime, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, a real natural-born killer. He's still at large, leading the Sunni insurgency.

Thousands upon thousands of people have flocked to Saddam's grave. You've seen the images of this. The Baath Party emblem is being displayed again. Thirty-foot-high mosaics are being erected in Sunni towns to him. It's back to the future, if you will.

That's a really serious problem for the United States and for the Maliki government, who had hoped for the last year, year-and-a-half, that the Sunni insurgency could be persuaded to lay down arms and to sue for peace, to negotiate for a place at the table, if you will.

The other part of it, of course, the political puzzle is that we've seen very clearly into the dark soul of this government. And it's very hard to believe that, if they could botch something like this, this badly, and allow it to descend into a sectarian debacle that they did, that this government is capable now of restoring itself and, if you will, taking the high road.

Looking into the faces of American officials and to General Caldwell today, my sense is that they're really in a state of despair about that.