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| CHANGED LANDSCAPE | |
 May 18, 1999 
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 JIM
LEHRER: Some further perspective on Israel and its neighbors. Joel Singer
helped negotiate the Oslo agreements for the Israeli government and has
served as a legal advisor to both the Israeli defense and foreign ministries.
He is now practicing law in Washington. Khalil Jahshan is the president
of the National Association of Arab Americans. He was born in Nazareth
and is an American citizen. Geoffrey Kemp served on the National Security
Council staff in the Reagan administration; he is now director of regional
strategic programs at the Nixon Center. |
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| Will Barak make a difference? | ||||||||||||||||||||
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JIM LEHRER: Geoffrey Kemp, first in general terms, could the election of Barak make a major difference in the Middle East?
JIM LEHRER: Mr. Jahshan, do you share that optimism? KHALIL JAHSHAN: Up to a certain degree. I mean, there is no doubt Barak's election brings about a new opportunity, a lease on life, if you will, a renewed lease on life for the comatose peace process; however, it brings a lot of challenges. I think the problem is beyond personalities. It's not just a matter of replacing Netanyahu with Barak. It's a problem with Israel basically coming to terms with having to take some serious decisions with regards to permanent status issues. And we get to those - it's not just -- JIM LEHRER: Permanent status, you mean a Palestinian state.
JIM LEHRER: Mr. Singer, how do you see it? JOEL SINGER: I think I agree with my former speaker. The issues are very difficult. No matter what party is in power, no matter who is the prime minister, the way we negotiated Oslo was by deferring the hardest nuts to crack at the last stage and this is the last stage. So whomever is the prime minister, he will have to face those very difficult issues. However, at the same time, Ehud Barak would come to the negotiating table with his hands not tied in the same way as Netanyahu's hands were tied to -- JIM LEHRER: Explain that.
JIM LEHRER: Because he was the furthest to the left in his own coalition? JOEL SINGER: Right. Right. Barak will be in a much better situation because he can form a leftist-centrist party that will leave him much more flexibility to negotiate and to make concessions of the kind that are required in this part of the negotiations, the end game. |
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| A better relationship with Washington. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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JIM LEHRER: Geoffrey Kemp, you see it the same way? Whatever his personality differences are, character differences, whatever, political difference, he's just in a stronger political position to do something? GEOFFREY KEMP: Certainly that's true. I mean, one of the ironies of the Netanyahu regime was that he forced the United States and the Palestinians closer together than they'd ever been before and he drove a barrier between U.S.-Israeli relationships. I think the irony is that what Mr. Barak will do, is he'll have much better relationships with Washington, and Washington will therefore be able to detach somewhat from this closeness to the Palestinians and put the negotiations back where they really should be, between the Israelis and between the Palestinians, and nobody, I think, underestimates the difficulties that lie ahead. But, my God, you've first got to get people talking to each other. And if can you do that and if you have the support of allies around you, things are going to be more easy to move forward. JIM LEHRER: Explain why the relationship automatically gets better with Barak rather than Netanyahu, the relationship with the United States.
KHALIL JAHSHAN: That's true that over the past few months and maybe even a couple or few years actually, the relationship between the United States and the Palestinian have been subtly improving but it is not totally a function of the worsening relationship with Israeli. I think as Netanyahu kind of disengaged from the peace process and assumed an obstructionist posture, if you will, the administration sought to protect its own interest, which is the peace process, not necessarily to improve relations with Yasser Arafat or to shore up Yasser Arafat but for the sake of doing so but to shore him up and strengthen the Palestinian side in order to maintain at least one party to the process, engaged and available, should things change and an opportunity would arise again to move forward. It's not a zero sum game, but I would tend to agree with Geoff that chances are with improved relationship with the new Israeli government, which I think is a given, that the warmth in the relationship with the Palestinians would probably diminish. Not that it a zero sum game, but the fact of the matter, the U.S. might resort back to it old modus operandi, which is getting Israeli ideas and shoving them down Palestinian throats. JIM LEHRER: You think that could happen? KHALIL JAHSHAN: Yes, Of course. Under a Labor government, it's very likely to happen. JIM LEHRER: Do you think that could happen, Mr. Singer? JOEL SINGER: It is likely. JIM LEHRER: It is likely to happen. Why? Why do you say that? JOEL SINGER: Well, maybe I should take back the likely. It's possible. This way I don't need to explain it. JIM LEHRER: All right. Help us explain one thing. What from your perspective and your perspective is pretty much from the inside, how bad was the relationship between the Netanyahu government and the U.S. Government?
JIM LEHRER: Because neither side really wanted to sign. JOEL SINGER: Once it was signed. I think that the sigh of relief that is now heard from coast to coast here is partially because the United States will again -- can lightly take a more laid-back attitude because I see a Barak-led government taking the initiative again, turning to the Palestinian side and initiating the resumption of the negotiations. |
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| Final status negotiations. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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KHALIL JAHSHAN: If I might add, I beg to disagree with that in the sense that should - that if the Barak election actually presents an opportunity here, I think the last thing we need to do, the United States, is sit down and kind of relax and lay back. The fact of the matter -- we have a very short window of opportunity here. We have about six to twelve months max to achieve - JIM LEHRER: Why? What happened? KHALIL JAHSHAN: -- to achieve what we've failed in the past three years, which is final status negotiations. We're talking about a deadline of approximately one year. These are tough issues. JIM LEHRER: Why does it have to be done in a year? KHALIL JAHSHAN: Because we have violated the deadlines - I mean, we've had a deadline before - we've had a deadline of three years. JIM LEHRER: But can't a deadline be extended? KHALIL JAHSHAN: Depends on who violates the deadline - JIM LEHRER: Okay.
JIM LEHRER: So you don't think it should be left to the Barak government? KHALIL JAHSHAN: I think the administration right now needs to really, really work very, very hard. This is the hardest part. JIM LEHRER: Geoff Kemp, what's your view of that? GEOFFREY KEMP: Well, I sort of agree with both of the speakers. I think that the Clinton administration cannot take a backstage. It's got to be up front, it's got to be involved, if only that I think Clinton wants this debate something positive on his otherwise rather gloomy foreign policy legacy at this point in time. So the United States has to remain deeply involved. And there's another reason, too. The Persian Gulf remains volatile. Saddam Hussein is still there. We have a very prickly relationship with Iran that may or may not get better. But there's no doubt that if we can move this peace process forward and if there is ultimately a deal between Syria and Israel, that brings in Lebanon, then America's strategic posture throughout the region will be greatly enhanced to everyone's benefit except the radicals. JIM LEHRER: So it is -- we haven't talked about the Syria/Lebanon situation, but it's not just the Palestinian situation.
JIM LEHRER: All right. Well, gentlemen, we have to leave it there. Thank you all three very much. |
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GEOFFREY
KEMP: Oh, yes. I think the most clear legacy of Mr. Netanyahu was divisiveness
and mistrust. That, of course, poisoned any hope for good relations
with moderate Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan with Arafat and
the Palestinian Authority and eventually it weakened relations with
the United States. Now while it's true that Barak and Netanyahu do not
differ that much on a lot of the foreign policy issues, Barak will bring
more confidence to the table. He will restore the trust. And without
confidence and without trust, you cannot have progress. Of course there
are going to be major risks down the way. It's going to be tough. The
issues that divide Israel and the Palestinians are still extremely wide.
But if you get the moderate Arabs back into the game, if you have a
better relationship with Washington, then you are beginning on a road
that hopefully could lead to success. 
KHALIL
JAHSHAN: We're not talking just about a state, about settling the refugee
issues, settling the Jerusalem issue, the settlements issue and the
permanent boundaries, if you will, between the Palestinian state or
entity and the state of Israel. These are issues, it seems to me, that
a majority of Israelis have not come to terms with or have not decided
as to which way to go on settling these issues. So once we get to these,
yes, trust would help -- having confidence to a leader that is committed
to at least negotiate - I mean, moving from a non-negotiator to a tough
negotiator is progress probably from a Palestinian perspective. However,
when we get to these issues, I think we are going to face some serious
difficulties, because it's not just a personality issue.
JOEL
SINGER: Netanyahu's government was based on the Likud party, the rightist
party that was tied into a coalition of smaller parties that were all
or mostly all on the right of the Likud. And therefore, even if you
wanted, he not always wanted but even when he wanted to be flexible,
he couldn't get his coalition partners to agree to him being more flexible.
GEOFFREY
KEMP: Well, I think it's true historically that American administrations
have found it much easier to get on with the Labor Party, left of center
parties in Israel because they by and large have shared most of the
same objectives of the United States in bringing about a peace settlement,
namely a deal, land for peace. Now what Netanyahu did to his credit,
he for the first time moved the right party, the Likud, off the dime
of no concessions on the land for Israel and has now made this pretty
much a consensus issue in Israel politics. But he had so much baggage
-- he carried so much baggage with him that I don't think anyone trusted
him at the end, not even his own party. Barak starts picking up from
what Netanyahu had done with much more trust and much more confidence.
JIM
LEHRER: Mr. Jahshan, how do you see this relationship? You heard what
Geoff Kemp just said, that in some ways this helped the Palestinians
develop a better relationship. In other words, having Netanyahu there
helped the Palestinians have a better relationship with the U.S.
JOEL
SINGER: Well, I want to correct. My inside picture ended when the Labor
government fell during the Likud government I was out of the government.
But I have been there during the Labor government and the relationship
between the government of Israel and the government of the United States
were just excellent -- just excellent. In a way, on the peace process
we did all the work. The United States government, the peace negotiators
of the United States only had to allocate the White House lawn from
time to time for us to sign the, you know, the various treaties of piece
that we were constantly producing. And they took all the glory and we
did all the work. Once the Likud government replaced the Labor government,
they had to work hard just to bring the two parties together, to almost
twist their arms to sign the document, only to see later - 
KHALIL
JAHSHAN: I mean, Mr. Netanyahu has made an art of saying deadlines were
meant to be violated but whenever the other side violated it, he raised
all hell. The fact of the matter, things have deteriorated to the point
where the peace process, whatever is left of it, is so vulnerable. It's
basically comatose to the point of probably no return. And if it's left
for an extended period of time without a clear-cut dead line, I think
chances are it will kill the process completely.
GEOFFREY
KEMP: Absolutely not. In fact, Barak was very clear in his election
campaign that pulling Israelis out of Southern Lebanon is one of his
objectives. You cannot pull them out of Southern Lebanon unless the
Syrians are involved. Or, if you do, you take huge risks. And I don't
think he's a risk taker when it comes to Israeli security.