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Oct. 2, 2000:
Violence
breaks out after an Israeli official's visit to a Jerusalem
shrine.
Aug. 29, 2000:
An examination of the fate of Palestinian
refugees.
Aug. 23, 2000:
Jerusalem,
center of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
July 25, 2000:
Secretary of State Albright on the breakdown
of the Camp David talks.
July 25, 2000:
Palestinian
and Israeli
perspectives on Camp David.
July 20, 2000:
An update on the Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks.
July 11, 2000:
Negotiators
arrive in Washington for the latest round of Mideast talks.
May 24, 2000:
Israeli troops pull out of Lebanon.
Jan. 10, 2000:
Recess declared in the West Virginia Syrian-Israeli talks.
Jan. 3, 2000:
Middle East journalists update the Syrian- Israeli negotiations
July 19, 1999:
Experts discuss peace under Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
May 18, 1999:
Barak tells his supporters that the "time for peace has come."
May 17, 1999:
Analysis of the Israeli elections.
May 17, 1999:
A background report on the Israeli elections.
Dec. 22, 1998:
The Knesset calls for early elections.
Dec. 15, 1998:
President Clinton visits Israel
and Gaza.
Oct. 26, 1998:
The CIA's new role in the Middle
East peace process.
Oct. 23, 1998:
National
Security Advisor Samuel Berger on the land-for-peace agreement.
Oct. 23, 1998:
Three Middle
East experts discuss the land-for-peace agreement.
Browse the NewsHour's coverage of the
Middle East.
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MARGARET
WARNER: Israeli Prime Minister Barak did convene his cabinet this evening,
and as of 6pm Eastern Time, they're still meeting.
To assess the situation, we turn to three experts on the
Middle East. Geoffrey Kemp was senior director for Near East and South
Asian affairs at the National Security Council during the Reagan administration;
he is now at the Nixon Center. Rashid Khalidi is a professor of Middle
East history and director of the Center for International Studies at
the University of Chicago. And Menachem Brinker is chair of Modern Hebrew
Studies at the University of Chicago, and a professor at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem.
Welcome, gentlemen. Geoffrey Kemp, how do you assess or
what do you make of the developments we've seen today, both on the ground
and diplomatically? Do you think we're on the brink of some resolution,
or it is moving the other way?
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GEOFFREY
KEMP: I think we may be on the brink of some breakthrough, but we have
to understand, Margaret, that what the leaders of the world and the
region are now involved in is crisis management, not the peace process.
The peace process we must put on hold. What we have to do is to prevent
an escalation of violence between Israel and the Palestinians becoming
a Middle East conflagration involving Lebanon, Syria, and then possibly
other radical elements. And don't forget, Saddam Hussein is waiting
to intervene in a crisis like this because he's still harbors revenge
against us. This is a very serious moment, and the priority has to be
to prevent escalation and violence, and we'll worry about the peace
process next week or next month.
MARGARET WARNER: Professor Khalidi, how do you see it in terms of looking
at today and what's been happening?
RASHID
KHALIDI: Well, today is a continuation of 12 days of this. If once again
the effort is to put a band-aid on a really serious problem, we're not
going to get anywhere. Sooner or later the United States, Russia, the
world is going to have to step in and make clear that the root problem
of this is a continuation of the occupation. The sad thing is that,
had the various agreements that have already been signed been implemented,
most of the flashpoints shown on your film would long since have been
ceded to the Palestinians and the friction which results from 70 percent
of the West Bank still being under occupation and 30 percent of the
Gaza Strip still being under occupation after nine years of negotiation
would hopefully be eliminated.
MARGARET WARNER: In terms of the crisis management that Geoff Kemp
talked about, do you think this crisis is being managed?
RASHID KHALIDI: I'm not sure it is. Things have spiraled to the point
that I'm afraid on both sides there is very likely no control possible
or very little control possible. Clearly the Israeli military and security
forces, clearly the Shabbat in the streets have now in a sense taking
this thing beyond the control of the commanders, beyond the control
of the politicians. And I think the United States has been almost derelict
in its duty. There were things that should have been done at the very
beginning. Sharon gave us a week's notice before he went...
MARGARET WARNER: You're talking about the right-wing politician who
went to visit Barak.
RASHID KHALIDI: Precisely. One of the few people who will probably
benefit from these events will be Ariel Sharon. Someone should have
stepped and said, if Barak can't tell him not to go there, perhaps the
United States should suggest it would be unwise and take the lightning
that would have resulted. Similarly, I think that way back before Jerusalem
was put on the table at Camp David, it would have been wise for people
to understand how sensitive an issue it was and to understand that this
is one of the many permanent status issues that should have been discussed
years ago instead of deferred as it has been until now.
MARGARET WARNER: Professor Brinker, let's try to stay on today, if
we could, just for another minute, which is today was the day this ultimatum
was due to expire. One, do you think that ultimatum was a good idea
on what Barak's part, and two, now that the deadline's come and gone,
what are Israel's options?
MENACHEM
BRINKER: Well, I think it is not wholly symmetrical -- the extent of
control that Barak has over the IDF and the extent of control that Arafat
has over the Palestinian street. But I think Barak meant to dramatize
the situation, and at least to bring it to happen that the leaders will
clearly and unambiguously say that they don't want this violence. Then
there would be perhaps some settlers on the Israeli side and perhaps
some youth on the Palestinian side. But then the crisis would be manageable.
As long as there is not such unambiguous declaration of Arafat, just
the opposite -- he declares that we should go on fighting if necessary
even from Tunisia, as long as there is no unambiguous declaration like
this, of course the crisis will grow and grow and grow.
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MARGARET WARNER: Geoff Kemp, do you think the ultimatum was a good
idea?
GEOFFREY
KEMP: I think some sort of strong message had to be delivered if only
to console the Israeli passions. Don't forget, we talk a lot about the
Arab street, and I think that's very real now. There is anger on the
Arab street. But there's also growing anger and passion on the Israeli
street. So, Barak had to do something. Now, whether he should have given
a deadline with a specific time frame I'm not so sure because clearly
we've gone beyond that time frame. And he will look weak if nothing
happens, and yet if he then acts tough, things could get even worse.
So it's always good to up the rhetoric, but you need to have fudge factor.
You need to have wiggle room so that if there is some progress in the
next two or three days, Barak does not look weak.
MARGARET WARNER: When you say act tough, what do you mean?
GEOFFREY KEMP: Well, he's got to act tough to his own people, because
if he does not, he's going to end up either without a government, he'll
be out of office, or he'll have to form a government with Erik Sharon.
And if that happens, we really can kiss good-bye to the peace process
certainly for this administration. And when you kiss good-bye to the
peace process, more trouble will erupt in the region.
MARGARET WARNER: Professor Khalidi, some of the options that were floated
and leaked and who knows from whom about what Barak could do included
attacking Arafat's headquarters, they included some sort of attack on
Lebanon in retaliation for the taking of these three Israeli soldiers.
What impact would that have?
RASHID
KHALIDI: Well, I think we should reflect on what Daniel Rubenstein,
who's an Arab affairs correspondent for Ha'aretz, said this morning
on American radio. What would Israelis do on the morning after? Let's
say they reoccupied the West Bank or used their air force against the
Gaza Strip. What is the solution then? Israel has to come to terms with
the fact that the Palestinian people want to live in an independent
state in what is left of Palestine, the 23 percent of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. Israel, sooner or later, has to end the occupation.
Barak can do anything he wants. And I think he can kill as many Palestinians
as the Israeli public has the stomach for. That is, I think, not the
point. I think the question is: How do you come to an equitable arrangement
between these two people for sharing this land, which is the homeland
of both?
MARGARET WARNER: Okay. If we go back to the crisis management we started
talking about, Professor Brinker said, you know, obviously what Barak
wants Arafat to do is at least come out publicly and say, stop the demonstrating,
stop the shooting, stop the rock-throwing. Why has Arafat not done that,
do you think?
RASHID KHALIDI: Because the numbers of dead and wounded would indicate
that the shooting that has to be stopped is not coming from the few
Palestinians who killed two or three Israelis soldiers and wounded a
dozen. It's from the Israeli forces that have killed 90 or 100 Palestinians
and wounded 1,500, including 200 children. Arafat is a politician, like
Barak. His public opinion is looking at the 2,000 or so Palestinians
who have been killed, wounded and maimed and saying, the restraint has
to come from the Israeli side. Obviously, both are going to have to
show restraint. That's not the point. The point is that if we weigh
in the balance, 2,000 Arab casualties and a dozen or two dozen Israeli
casualties, clearly the person not showing restraint is not just Yasser
Arafat. Whatever ability he has to control his own population or forces
or the people with guns, or the Shabbat in the street, it is I think
also first and foremost in fact Ehud Barak.
MARGARET WARNER: Okay. Let me turn to Professor Brinker. Professor
Brinker, now, what Arafat is saying he wants is for, I think, no live
ammunition to be used by the Israeli defense forces and also to have
Israeli troops pull out of these predominantly Palestinian-controlled
areas. Why can Barak... Can Barak do that? If not, why not?
MENACHEM
BRINKER: Well, there were several places at which the IDF, according
to strict command of Barak, pulled and went back. For example, there
was an agreement on the tomb of Joseph, and the IDF went -- and a promise
of the Palestinian police that they will keep their sacred place. And
then the Shabbat came and destroyed the tomb. So Barak... I don't think
that the number of casualties will show you who is opening fire. The
whole movement of protest, which I can understand, but I cannot agree
to, started by the Palestinians after the visit of Ariel Sharon. That's
true. But throwing rocks at people that pray at the Wailing Wall is
not the answer to the provocation that was in Sharon's visit. The only
answer to this provocation was to go on and negotiate the last two square
miles that remained to be negotiated. Barak had made it very clear that
Israel doesn't want to continue the occupation, that it is ready to
concede to the Palestinian state or Palestinian Authority, later the
Palestinian state, 92 percent or 94percent of the territory and compensate
them for the rest percentage that would be an annexed to Israel with
Israeli territory. He agreed to the division of Jerusalem. No political
leader agreed so far of Israel to the division of Jerusalem. He surprised
even the doves in his party by his willingness to turn every stone to
get into a respectable peace for the Palestinians. He showed readiness
to accept something like Mubarak's compromise on the old city.
MARGARET WARNER: Let me just get back the Geoff Kemp on a couple points.
Geoff Kemp, what will it take now to end this, to manage this crisis
and to keep it from expanding into what you warned about, something
even wider?
GEOFFREY
KEMP: Well, I think on the one hand, you have got to try to work with
the Syrians and the Lebanese through the Europeans and the various Arab
leaders to get some agreement on the three Israeli soldiers, because
that is a burning humiliation for Israel and following their withdrawal
unilaterally in May, there is an eager desire on the part of some people
to punish Hezbollah. And that could get out of hand. And secondly, you
do need some statement from Arafat that his people are going to cool
the violence to give Barak the opportunity then to order a stand down
or a standoff. Of course, Arafat cannot completely control the violence
because it is now in the hands of some people who want to continue it.
But he can make enough steps and enough noises to convince, I think,
the Israelis that he at least means business. He needs to do that. And
Barak then needs to lower the rhetoric.
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MARGARET
WARNER: But, I mean, everything you're prescribing is what President
Clinton and Madeleine Albright and the Europeans and everybody else
has been telling the parties for the last ten days, and it appears,
judging from the other two guests on this segment and what we're hearing
out of the region, that neither side sees an incentive or else has the
ability to do what needs to be done.
GEOFFREY KEMP: No. Well, what may need to be done is for President
Clinton to literally go to the region and sit down with Arafat, sit
down with Barak, sit down with the Arab League and the United Nations
or some other group and talk it through, because let's face it, it's
not just Barak and Arafat and Clinton who have a lot at stake here.
So does Mubarak, so does King Abdullah, so do the Saudis. All the moderate
regimes that we call and like in the region are threatened if this gets
out of hand. Clinton has a lot to play with if he's prepared to take
a bold risk for crisis management.
MARGARET WARNER: So you would suggest he go over there even if or particularly
if the violence hasn't ended?
GEOFFREY KEMP: Yes, I do. Because I think if the violence doesn't end,
it will get out of hand. If it gets out of hand, it will spread, if
it spreads, it will undermine the very security structure that Clinton
and other American presidents have nurtured and built up for the last
20 years in the region.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Well, thank you. Geoffrey Kemp and professors
both.
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