Sectarian Clash Leaves at Least 60 Dead in Southern Iraqi City

Juan Cole is a professor of history at the University of Michigan.

Bing West was an assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration. He's made frequent trips to Iraq since the U.S. invasion and has written two books about the Marine Corps' experience there.

Welcome to you all.

Starting with you, Laith Kubba, how significant was that battle yesterday?

LAITH KUBBA, Former Iraqi Government Spokesman: Well, it is significant in two or three perspectives. One, it's important because the state of Iraq is reasserting itself. The army, and police units, and the coalition forces moved against criminal elements, networks, and they had to do that. That is necessary to assure citizens that this state is back in business.

But it's also significant because this is the first time the state is moving on the issue of militias, irrespective of the criminal dimension. The Sadr militiamen is one of many, two or three other militias in the country. It's the least disciplined, and it's going to be a tough test case.

But the third, most important element: If that issue of al-Sadr is not handled politically, then potentially it can open a very wide front in the country. Iraq cannot afford to have an all-out war with al-Sadr at the moment.

JEFFREY BROWN: Juan Cole, how do you read what happened in Diwaniya?

JUAN COLE, University of Michigan: Well, I have a different perspective. I think this was militia-on-militia violence. The Badr Corps has infiltrated the police and security in Qadisiyah province, where the ruling party is the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

In the meantime, since the last provincial elections, the Sadr movement has spread like wildfire in the south and is offering a challenge to the local political structures. So I'm afraid I think that this is a case where the Badr Corps and the Mahdi militia maybe were under various guises basically fighting one another. The Iraqi military ultimately came in on the side of one militia rather than another.

But what we're seeing is increasingly the Sadr movement splintering into uncontrolled local factions that are extremely violent. We saw this in Karbala with Sheik Hassani. In Basra, it has happened. Muqtada al-Sadr seems not to be in control of his own militiamen.

JEFFREY BROWN: All right. Well, Bing West, why don't you come in here? You've been watching the role of the Iraqi army. How did it do yesterday? How significant was it that it was involved?

BING WEST, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense: It was a very significant fight. Any time you have 30 to 50 people killed in a fight that goes on for 12 hours, that's a major battle.

And in this particular case, the Iraqi army went after the militia. The militia didn't expect the army to do it, and the army took the battle to them. And they fought by themselves. In 2004, this Iraqi army could not have done that. And the only help that the Americans gave in this fight was to fly in helicopters to give them re-supply.

So this shows a new kind of model. It does show an Iraqi army standing up, taking on the Shiite militia, and the army is predominantly Shiite, and not asking the Americans to do the fighting for them. So I see this as a very positive development on the battlefield.

LAITH KUBBA: Well, he has an appeal amongst really the poor Shias, in particular, very popular throughout the south. But what we describe as his militia, it's actually a populist armed movement. It has many, many elements, but it's not a disciplined militia with a hierarchy.

Hence, any political deal with him does not necessarily mean that there is going to be full control over all these armed men. In fact, there are many networks that are criminal operating under him.

But he cannot be dismissed currently from the political scene in Iraq. He must be contained. I think it was the right policy of the previous government to take him on board, to encourage him to participate in the elections. The fact he has members of parliaments, members in the cabinet, it's a good thing.

But more importantly, the state must be above him. The state cannot be simply under his influence or he cannot challenge the state whenever he wants to.

JEFFREY BROWN: Well, Juan Cole, pick up on what you were saying about the spread in the south that you see happening with Sadr and his following.

JUAN COLE: Yes, in the provincial elections of January 2005, most of the nine Shiite majority provinces were carried by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which has a paramilitary called the Badr Corps.

And it really now is the establishment in those areas. It controls the government. It gives out patronage. But in the meantime, its popularity has declined. The Sadr movement's popularity has grown in most of the Shiite south, and so there's a real challenge.

And we were supposed to have in Iraq by now provincial elections. My understanding is that one reason that those have not been held is that everybody knows that, were they to be held, the Sadrs might well sweep to power in the provincial administrations of most of the southern provinces. In that case, the government would be basically allied with the Mahdi militia everywhere in the south.

BING WEST: I'll bet he has a lot of control. This militia for this particular fight in Diwaniya came from 60 miles away, so they had enough command and control all to come to that battlefield.

More clashes between the Iraqi army and the Sadr militia are inevitable until one side or the other establishes dominance on the battlefield. And that will be the pre-condition for serious political talks. So I see this as just the first round; this is going to continue.

JEFFREY BROWN: Laith Kubba, how do you define the militia here?

LAITH KUBBA: Well, the fact that they do not have a clear command structure -- yes, there is some influence, but generally speaking those people did not come from any discipline, any training.

They are people who keep Kalashnikovs and guns at their homes. They rally whenever some clergy call upon them to rally in the streets. In fact, some of them come from outside those cities, outside Diwaniya, to come and support the other local guys that are in.

In that respect, they're a little bit more dangerous because they're loose and you cannot simply control them by reaching a deal. I still believe, without containing Muqtada al-Sadr politically, this can lead to an all-out war that simply Iraq cannot afford at the moment.

JEFFREY BROWN: And politically, what does that mean?

LAITH KUBBA: Well, politically, if this happens, we already have an insurgency in the Sunni areas that are not contained at a very critical phase of trying to bring them into the negotiating table. If we have one major player like Muqtada al-Sadr out there, and his men are loose and opening fire right, left and center, then I think this will weaken the government even further. The government is fragile at the moment and cannot afford to take one more blow.