The Pirates of Somalia

There is no indication that any states or countries are involved in or profiting from the piracy. Rather, the pirates appear to be a self-organized, clan-based militia, probably operating with the support of some more senior and well-connected militia commanders on land. Understanding these "on shore" networks could be the key to finding a lasting solution.

In Somalia, we have long talked about "warlords" who control militia-factions. Around seven or eight years ago, attention turned to major businessmen who controlled large militia forces; they became known as "moneylords." Maybe we can now talk about "sealords" or "pirate bosses"?

The United Nations Panel of Experts on the Somalia arms embargo should be coming out with its most recent report in a couple of weeks or months. That information enters the public domain - it is posted on the U.N. Web site - and should offer a wealth of information on the current situation.

There is no evidence that foreign states are directly profiting from the activities of Somali pirates. Nor is there evidence that the "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG), the internationally-recognized but otherwise weak and ineffective authority in Somalia, is either. However, that is not to say that some TFG officials, as well as those in Puntland (the semi-autonomous region of Somalia that is home for many of the pirates hail from and where they tend to take their hijacked ships), are not receiving payoffs to turn a blind eye to what is going on; they may even be more directly involved.

Puntland, after all, is the traditional stronghold of the TFG's unpopular president, Abdullahi Yusuf, and it is hard to imagine how the region would turn into a modern-day pirate haven without his being complicit.

For now, the pirate crews seem to be criminal bands seeking to enrich themselves. Of course, given the success that they have had, it is quite possible that other groups with clearer ideological or political agendas might enter the fray.