Ask Questions on Tibetan Protests

The Chinese rift with the Dalai Lama became overt in 1959 when he fled Lhasa for India. At the time, the United States did not recognize the People's Republic of China, and indeed the CIA provided funding and small arms for pro-independence Tibetans. This was part of a broader U.S. effort to oppose and destabilize the PRC at the height of the Cold War, before President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972. The Chinese leaders remember this history well and became accustomed over the years to thinking of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan independence movement interchangeably as instruments of forces seeking the overthrow of their government.

In the years since then, Chinese suspicion of the Dalai Lama has remained high. Despite his frequent statements renouncing independence, Chinese propagandists assert that his true intent remains separation of Tibet from China. They claim that his call for a "greater Tibet," which includes portions of neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, where large concentrations of Tibetans live, is really a covert demand for independence, cloaked in the guise of a call for "genuine autonomy."

Chinese fear about the Dalai Lama's return seems to revolve around two conflicting scenarios: one that he absolutely controls the loyalty of Tibetans and one that he does not. Under the former scenario, they fear that he will return and lead his people into revolt against China. Under the latter scenario, they fear that even if he returns home he lacks the influence to persuade most Tibetans to accept the current political arrangements in Tibet.

Finally, Tibet is a historic buffer between China and India. Before 1950, it played that role. Since then, with a Chinese government in Lhasa and the People's Liberation Army deployed throughout the region, China's preeminence in Tibet is unchallenged. With the Dalai Lama having lived in India for 49 years and having developed cooperative relations with the Indians during that time, Chinese leaders see the Dalai Lama's return as risking handing over their own dominant position to someone who in their eyes may tilt more toward New Delhi.

Tibet is China's greatest public relations problem and the Chinese government has clearly struggled over the years with how best to deal with it. They fear that were they to negotiate directly with the Dalai Lama, this would increase the aspirations for independence among ethnic Tibetans, both in the TAR and in neighboring provinces. If the Dalai Lama was to return to Tibet, even in a purely religious capacity, the Chinese fear that they would not be able to control the situation. Over the past decade, it appears that the Chinese government has decided to ignore appeals from the Dalai Lama, while vilifying him personally (as has occurred in the past week) and threatening sanctions against foreign governments that meet with him. Their strategy seems to be to simply wait until his death (he will be 73 this summer) and take advantage of the interregnum created while the next Dalai Lama comes of age to consolidate their position. This is one reason why there has been so much discussion of who selects and identifies the Dalai Lama (and other lamas) by China in the past year. This is also why the Dalai Lama has suggested alternatives to the traditional process of selecting the next Dalai Lama.