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 | Life After Colonialism: Part I Prospects for Developing World Pluralism in the Post Colonial Age December 30, 1996 |
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Questions asked in this forum:
Our guests answered your questions.NewsHour Backgrounders
January 3, 1997: Our second post-colonialism forum deals with the incredibly difficult economic issues facing developing countries.
December, 1996: Charlayne Hunter-Gault ran a three-part series on the origins of the Central African crisis.
November 19, 1996: A Newsmaker interview with Former President Jimmy Carter, who monitors elections in developing countries.
November 27, 1996: A NewsHour look at the Zaire crisis.
October 25, 1996: An Online NewsHour Forum with East Timorese dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta. The role of Imperialism past and present is discussed.
The killings in Burundi and Liberia are in part a result of colonial pasts.
OUTSIDE LINKS
Behind the recent hostage crisis in Peru is a smoldering indigenous discontent. Here's a look at the revolutionary group called Tupac Amaru, and an American woman sentenced to life imprisonment in Peru for aiding the rebels.
A Latin American scholarly journal dealing with vestiges of imperialism and other economic issues.
The bottom line of a democracy is that power rests with the people, but the power of the people here spans the few minutes they write on the ballot and not longer. Afterwards, the bulk of the population go back to poverty, powerlessness, helplessness. . .
-- Haydee Yorac, an election commissioner in the Philippines.
Shortly after World War Two, world politics changed radically. Centuries of European colonialism ended in Africa and India, and scores of new, independent states were born. Concurrently, the Soviet Union expanded, engulfing many Eastern European states under its tutelage. In Central and South America, with a few exceptions, military-led regimes governed with an iron fist, stagnating both economic development and human rights.
A myriad of factors are given credit for the general lack of pluralism in "Third World" - or "non-aligned" states - during the Cold War years in the second half of the Twentieth Century:
- Departing colonial powers, with a very mixed legacy of economic and social exploitation during their rule, often left a power vacuum in newly "independent" states. The leadership in these countries often found it had no economic or political muscle, even as it gained a seat in the U.N. General Assembly. Wars in Nigeria and Ethiopia, for example, claimed millions of civilian victims in the decades following the first wave of independence, and the only resource which seemed to be in abundance was munitions. It is impossible to keep track of all the military coups in Africa during the 1970s.
Foreign policies by both the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War often led to strongmen being supported if they towed the "correct" ideological line, regardless of their capacity to do good for their country. Worldwide, human rights abuses were rampant. Many of Central and South America's military strongmen who caused the most aggregious violations were trained in the United States and the Soviet Union, although both countries claimed to be concerned with the people of the involved nations.
The flood of arms into Africa has meant that there is now more than one gun per person in the continent, and land mines remain a huge problem in Asia. In addition, European colonial regimes tended to educate one ethnic group to run the civil service in a country with arbitrarily drawn boundaries, and thus a tiny elite, often an ethnic minority, has tended to hold power in places like Rwanda.
Now that the Cold War is over...
A second stage in the development of independent states is occurring now. But the emergence of a post-Colonial, post-Cold War, geographical equilibrium has been painful, often causing huge demographic migrations such as the world is currently witnessing in Zaire.
Some of the signs are encouraging, nonetheless. While still plagued by rampant corruption, less-than-open societies, narco-economies and a tenuously free press, most South and Central American nations have migrated to governments resembling democracies. Fewer people are disappearing.
In Africa, there are still massive humanitarian and environmental disasters raging, but elections have been held in places like Eritrea, Gabon and Angola. South Africa, long a destabilizing military influence in the region, has returned to majority rule, and civil wars are being brought under control in Mozambique and Somalia. For decades a horrible killing field due to a succession of clan-based dictators, Uganda is an example of an improvement in the developing world : it has a stable government with a relatively open press, and few people are being massacred for the first time since 1970. Overt criticism of the President is not tolerated, however.
In Central Asia, former Soviet Republics like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan seem firmly on the road to economic progress - although human rights remain a major concern - and Kyrgystan is looking like a fledgling democracy. Lest one get too optimistic about Central Asia, however, tiny Tajikistan is in the midst of an Afghanistan-like civil war in which 25,000 Russian troops are propping up a clan-based government which has almost no popular support. This ugly war raises major questions about just how militarily independent of Russia the rest of Central Asia really is. Complicating matters are regional players like Iran and China, which give massive support to some newly independent states, but raise the suspicion of the United States about their motives.
At issue in this forum - and a related one on economic issues to follow at the end of the week: Is there true independence for developing nations, rather than independence in name only? Can Western models of democracy and pluralism take root in places unaccustomed to having a central national authority? And will it take generations for true democracy to flourish?
How will developing nations forge identities, governments, and modern societies? Are the recent elections in places like Gabon and Algeria merely shams -- nods to world pressure, or are most of the elections in developing countries actually fair?
Our participants in this forum are Graham E. Fuller, a former CIA Analyst and currently a senior analyst with the RAND Corporation, author of "The Democracy Trap," and Dr. Francis Mading Deng of the Brookings Institution, former Foreign Minister of the Sudan, Human Rights Officer in the United Nations Secretariat, and author or editor of more than 20 books including "Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa."
Scroll down to read our participants' answers to your questions.
- Can Western-style democracy develop and flourish in places not used to such pluralistic models?
- Aren't more people suffering from political repression than ever?
- How does the developing world go about stamping out rampant and endemic corruption?
- What can be done about military strongmen and lawless warlords?
- Can U.S. foreign policy be based upon peaceful, contructive engagement to help poorer nations develop?
- More of your questions and comments.
A question from John Ortiz of Dayton, Ohio:
Is it reasonable to expect democracy to flourish everywhere, when centuries of cultural and historic developments make it seem unreasonable to expect western democratic ideals will be accepted and implemented in such a short period of time worldwide?
Graham E. Fuller responds:
It is reasonable to expect the gradual but constant growth of democracy around the world over time. Given the nature of the modern world, increased education, travel, communications, rising standards of expectation, people are simply going to demand a greater voice in the determination of their fate and in decisions taken that affect their welfare directly. It is getting harder to justify naked authoritarianism.
But the form of democracy does not have to be Western style. There are many ways in which participation can be increased without adopting purely Western models. The rate of spread of democracy will always be uneven, and there will be setbacks from time to time and place to place. But the overall trend would seem to be inevitable. Democracy, of course, creates challenges of its own, and new problems, but it is a step forward from all but the most enlightened form of authoritarianism -- that scarcely exists.
Dr. Francis Mading Deng responds:
There are two aspects to this question: one is the extent to which democracy is a universal concept. The other concerns difficulties in realizing its ideals, especially when viewed as culturally alien. The first aspect of the question also raises two sets of considerations: one relates to democratic values and principles; the other concerns institutional structures and processes or procedures for pursuing them. With respect to the issue of universality, it is hard to believe that anyone can argue that democracy as a set of ideals is peculiar to one culture or society. The gist of democracy, the representative consent or consensus by the governed cannot be anything but universal. All would also agree that any system which can claim to be democratic must respect certain minimum standards of human rights and fundamental liberties. No where have people ever been heard crying out to be tortured or otherwise subjected to inhumane treatment on the ground that it is in accordance with dictates of their culture or religion. It is always the violators who plead cultural relativism against the cry of the victim for universal protection.
On the other hand, pursuing the ideals of democracy can take different forms in accordance with the historical and cultural context of a given society. There are likely to be procedural details rather than fundamentally substantive issues. Whether consent or consensus is sought through the vote or through other processes of consultation, whether the winner in the elections takes all or seeks to involve the losers in sharing power, or whether party politics is the appropriate institution or some other organizational structures are appropriate for pursuing democracy can be debatable. But ultimately, the real test is the outcome in terms of consent and consensus.
What also complicates the picture is that the experience of the West has evolved and has been postulated as the universally desired model. The voices that currently oppose that model appear to be those of the suspects, regimes or rulers who are essentially bent on imposing a system of rule or unpopular rulers on their populace. They therefore lack the credibility to raise and debate cross-cultural issues that can genuinely be posed.
Although these issues can be debated forever, the practical approach that suggests itself in view of the global currents now underway is the acceptance of the universal models of democracy and associated human rights standards as developed in the West and adopted by the international community in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments, while at the same time generating a genuine debate on how these models can be reinforced and enriched through cross-cultural fertilization. If the issue is approached positively and creatively, rather than defensively, both democracy as a concept and the beneficiaries of that concept stand to gain.
A second question from John Ortiz of Dayton, Ohio:
Assuming this is quantifiable, is there actually more suffering from political repression in the present post Cold War era or is that just a matter of perception? Since we were not able to have as much information on life within the former Communist states prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am particularly interested in this area, but feel free to address any region.
Graham E. Fuller responds:
It is possible that the nuclear balance of terror of the Cold War produced a certain discipline in the world order that prevented much of the current chaos we witness. But that is not a way to run the world. Communist dictatorships furthermore were responsible for truly massive death tolls -- far more even than Hitler -- twenty million or so under Stalin, maybe as many as forty million under Mao. So there is definitely more chaos in today's world, but I doubt if the number of deaths is anywhere near as many as in the last sixty years.
The world is also in a gradual transition from highly controlled regimes to the weakening of authoritarianism. Such a situation guarantees more chaos, more natural independence or separatist movements, more political shaking down as old dictatorial orders give way to new forms. This is a messy process -- painful for all. But these changes must come if the world is to advance in any meaningful sense. Maintenance order by dictatorship and blocking change leads only to a greater explosion later.
Dr. Francis Mading Deng responds:
Although the question poses the possibility that the world is better informed today about conflicts than was previously the case, both because of more openness of the regimes in power and because of better communication system, it would seem that a strong case can be made that human suffering in the post Cold War era has increased. Several arguments can be made in favor of this assumption.
First, the break up of the Soviet Empire and of the Socialist bloc in general has unleashed the self-assertiveness of identity groups that were previously repressed. Second, the world at large was managed by a polar control mechanism through which the superpowers reinforced the authority of their allies to maintain law and order, however unjust or repressive. The end of the Cold War has removed this superpower support, leaving governments and regimes relatively weak and unable to assert their undesired authority. Third, the supply of weapons made by the super powers to their allies at low, if any, cost means that these arms are available for grabs by warring factions who in the past would have been inhibited by lack of means to turn to violence.
Once these sources of outbreak of violence are identified, the consequential increase in human suffering becomes understandable. The immense increase in the numbers of those displaced internally by civil wars and other forms of domestic violence, from 24 million in 1992 to an estimated 30 million over the last several years is a testimony to this tragic development.
A question from Dennis Gerson of Colleyville, Texas:
Given the fact that representative democracy can only really function if elections are not corrupted and those elected are not corruptible, how can the leaders of traditionally unstable developing countries be compelled to address corruption?
Graham E. Fuller responds:
Corruption is a very complex issue. It is present in most societies. But it is most prevalent in societies where standard of living is low, temptations are high (especially when the almost unavoidable temptation of drug trafficking is involved), where public awareness may be low, in transition from communist to free market societies, and above all, where there are few means of recourse to do anything about it.
The only real antidote to corruption is the rule of law -- rather than systems dominated by arbitrary extra-legal decisions, or the fickle actions of a ruling elite. Authoritarian regimes in principle might be best equipped to limit corruption, but don't seem to have done a great job in the USSR or in today's China. Rule of law is of course easy to say, but it only comes into being when all, or nearly all, people feel that the legal system is fair and applied to all equally.
Another way to think about corruption is to examine whether it is a given society's single biggest ill. In many places it is offensive and damaging, but not as bad as say, a Saddam Hussein who was effective for years in limiting corruption -- at the cost of vastly more severe problems. The road under any circumstances is long, and differs in different political cultures. Corruption will always be around as long as there are human beings: what price in freedoms do we pay to limit it?
Dr. Francis Mading Deng responds:
It should be recognized at the outset that the corruption of elections and the corruptibility of the elected are universal weaknesses, even in systems where democratic ideals are supposedly entrenched. But of course they are more extreme in developing democracies. If there is a correlation between the degree of corruption and the stage of democracy, then corruption in developing countries can be expected to wane with the progress in establishing democratic institutions. The speed correlatively depends on the overall rate of developing democracy.
An aspect of the process is the articulation of the standards required, disseminating those standards through widely accessible means of communication and public education, and providing positive and negative incentives for adherence and deviation, both nationally and internationally.
A question from Walter Clarke of Carlisle, Pennsylvania:
Is there anything that can be done to assert some kind of moral authority over presidents and warlords in lawless states who hold their own and other people as hostages in order to advance personal interests or wealth?
Graham E. Fuller responds:
This has been one of the grand questions of politics over the Millennia. Democracy was basically conceived as a way to set limits to the arbitrary and selfish personal use of power. Again, rule of law is the only real antidote -- popular expectation that the law will be impartially applied to all, and hence getting no one special privileges. Unfortunately, as long as existing law is seen to be used by ruling groups and elites to promote their narrow interests, there will be no respect for those laws. So the road to establishing genuine rule of law is long and painful. It can come only as the public observes that existing conditions are intolerable and are willing to do something about it.
External pressures can help a lot: when people perceive that better standards exist outside their country that could be adopted in their own, or when pressure is placed by outside states on illegitimate or authoritarian regimes, such as via human rights reports, etc.
Dr. Francis Mading Deng responds:
Presidents and warlords who serve their own interests against those of the people quite often are themselves entrepreneurs of a crisis of national identity involving severe cleavages in which they identify themselves with a narrow faction, based on family, ethnicity, race, religion or language, and not with the larger national community. Indeed, they rarely recognize members of this larger community as their own people.
The vacuum of moral responsibility created by these identity crises necessitate intervention from the international community. Herein lies a moral dilemma: the international community insists that the responsibility for these victims of internal mis-rule is the national governments; and yet those governments do not adequately identify themselves with those victims, far less take adequate care of them.
To help remedy this dilemma, the international community should develop minimum standards of responsible sovereignty to be promoted as a basis for claiming and gaining legitimate sovereignty. Gross violation of such a code would be expected to involve risks of forfeiting sovereignty, while conformity might be rewarded with positive incentives.
A question from William J M Lockard of Somerset, Pennsylvania:
Is it likely that the United States' foreign policy approach will start to focus not on constructing military power structures in developing countries, but rather on allowing (or even fostering) the growth of countries' natural political configurations, and then investing in their infrastructure (like roads and schools)?
Graham E. Fuller responds:
U.S. foreign policy is composed of many different goals. Ideals, such as democracy and human rights, national interests; which themselves can be a subject of internal debate, economic interests of the nation like trade and energy needs, stability of the international scene, the weakening of enemies, protection of friends; all of these play a role.
It is not so much correct to say that U.S. policy is cynical or two-faced, as it is to say that there is always a question of priorities. The grand question is which of these priorities should take precedence when hard choices must be made.
For example, taking a friendly state to task because of human rights violations, or sacrificing economic interests with a certain regime in the interest of exerting democratization pressures upon it.
The worst dilemma is choosing between short and long-term goals. Will Washington think about the fact that a sinking or unpopular friendly regime will eventually collapse, and hence decide that maybe it should be abandoned now in the interests of the future? Suppose oil is involved?
Difficult trade-offs are always involved. Governments, including Washington, will often choose the short-term solution now and worry about longer-range implications later. Over the long run, enlightened governments will see that efforts to improve governance around the world is in everybody's interest; that is really what is called enlightened self-interest.
In the final analysis, the U.S. does discourage the emergence of military regimes -- but always gauged against the trade-off costs. The choices are never black and white, and are always complicated. This is why they are the subject of national political debate.
Dr. Francis Mading Deng responds:
There clearly are opposing trends in the United States between those who realize the global responsibilities of leadership, with the self-sacrifice which leadership often demands, and those who see U.S. national interest more in domestic focus and less on international concerns whose potential threats to the U.S. are deemed to have diminished with the end of the Cold War.
Where the two trends tend to converge are in those extreme cases where the magnitude of human suffering dictates on the popular consciousness a more assertive humanitarian involvement. These humanitarian crises and requisite interventions mean that U.S. interests become eventually involved with a significant degree of material and human costs. Clearly, it would be in the long-term interest of the United States to invest more in constructive developments than in constructing military power structures.
The only proviso in this regard is that in those countries or regions where the growth of natural political configuration is impeded by gross inequities in the balance of military power with severely destructive consequences for the people, well-targeted security assistance aimed at fostering constructive balance of power that would encourage peaceful resolution of conflicts may be a necessary contribution to the cause of regional peace, security and stability.
Additional Comments...Tom Sutberry of Bellingham, Washingrton
When I traveled in East Africa in 1976, I was told (Tanzanian President) Nyerere deported the East Indians who comprised much of the merchant middle class and were blamed as a major influence on the economic difficulties experienced in that country. I was also amazed that we in the U.S. called Kenya the jewel of "democracy", when in fact there was minority rule by the Kikuyu tribe left in place by the abdication of British rule, and a seemingly life-long dictatorial president. I also remember that upon returning home after my lengthy stay in Africa, I was very disappointed to hear our media focus on the racism of South Africa over the Central African problems. Now that it can no longer be blamed for the problems of Africa, we have the vestiges of colonial rule to fall back upon. The developed world's burden, rightly ot wrongly, will always be to face requests for an explanation for the problems of Africa.
John Franklin in Beijing, China
I am an U.S. citizen who has been working as an English teacher in China for the past four years. Many Chinese people tell me that despite the political and economic hardships in China they don't need a Western-style democracy. They typically cite the following reasons: 1) There are too many people so China needs a strong central government to control the masses; 2) 80%of the population is rural and uneducated and must rely on an all knowing central government; and 3) A Western style democracy would create chaos as too many people would have their own freedom to do what they want.
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