CONTROLLING THE CANAL

December 1999
		Does handing over the Panama Canal pose national security dangers to the United States? William Ratliff of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and John J. Tierney of The Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., respond to your questions.

Forum introduction Is the Panama Canal an American territory? Do Marxist movements in Latin America threaten the security of the canal? Can handing over the canal -- in a spirit of international peace -- increase security in the canal zone? What will the hand-over's economic impact be to Panama? How will the canal be run differently by Panama? Can the U.S. strengthen ties with Panama via free trade relations?   Online Special: The Panama Canal Dec. 13, 1999: An in-depth look at the Panama Canal and U.S. interests. Browse the NewsHour's coverage of Latin America.     The Hoover Institution The Institute of World Politics The Panama Canal Commission The U.S. State Department

Jason Kaufman of Cambridge, MA, asks: How often in recent history have we moved strategic equipment through the canal? Is it strictly a political rather than a military-tactical question? And, I think we should cultivate this diplomatic opportunity by launching a NAFTA-like agreement that would strengthen US economic and cultural ties with Panama and the region. What are your responses?   William Ratliff responds: The decision to hand the canal over to Panama was largely a political one, but based at least in part on several assumptions which are questioned by the treaty's critics. Among the assumptions: (1) the canal will be less militarily and perhaps even economically critical in the future than in the past, but (2) to the degree that it is militarily and economically important, the U.S. can defend its interests without a permanent presence in the country. Indeed some argue it can do so better because the U.S. will be on better terms with the Panamanian government and people. As long as the U.S. has a navy and international interests, the canal will be militarily useful and sometimes important, though if military forces are kept at optimum levels it will not be critical. Several dozen U.S. Navy ships have gone through the canal this year, but the Pentagon told the Wall Street Journal that none did during the Kosovo war nor, so far as anyone could remember, during the Gulf war a decade ago. A supplement to the treaty guarantees U.S. ships priority in a time of emergency. If that guarantee is not honored, the U.S. would be free to intervene. But in the case of a crisis with a major adversary who knew the canal would be used, might that adversary not simply attack the waterway itself? That could be done from the air or sea and at this point U.S. forces on the ground could not prevent it. I f the U.S. tries to maintain an under-funded navy split up on two oceans, the need for quick passage through the canal would be enhanced, as would the chance that an enemy might attack the canal to prevent its use. As Southcom's Gen. Wilhelm says, the other potential security issues today include but are not limited to transnational crime -- especially rampant drug-trafficking -- and the serious instability in Colombia. Panama's border with Colombia has long been open to penetration by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla group in the country. Panama abolished its army in 1994 and its police forces are totally inadequate to dealing with the any serious military threat while the U.S. Has not maintained any military presence there, contrary to the wishes of most Panamanians as expressed in polls. The police couldn't even keep the road to Miraflores Locks open on official handover day -- though they were all over the place -- when several hundred university students carrying banners with Che Guevara and hammers and sickles on them chose to close it down. Disillusionment with market reforms in some countries could lead to a reaction against the United States that would have repercussions in the canal and elsewhere. Commercially, two-thirds of canal traffic begins or ends in the United States. The Panama Maritime Operations reports that fewer ships used the canal in 1998 (13,025) than any year since 1994, though with a 7.5 percent toll increase beginning in January 1998 the revenue was at an all-time high ($545 million). If the canal is maintained and efficiently run at reasonable prices, and free trade prospers, usage could increase substantially. As for a NAFTA type expansion in all of Latin America, President George Bush launched such a program and Clinton continued it, but with little real commitment, especially after many in Congress turned against it in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis of late 1994. It should be a high priority for the next administration. John J. Tierney responds: Your question as to "how often" the U.S. Has moved strategic equipment recently is classified. A general reply must suffice. The immediate answer is this: whenever a strategic mission requires transit between the oceans, the United States navy will not traverse the 8000 miles and two extra weeks around South America when the mission requires location "tomorrow." The Gulf War in 1991 and "Just Cause" in 1989 used the Canal in a "strategic" sense as did all other U.S. military operations of this century, from Vietnam back to World War I. In the future, the 1977 Neutrality Treaty guarantees the U.S. ability to "expeditiously" use the Canal in an emergency, generally regarded as going to the "front of the line." During the 1990s, the Canal and its facilities were regularly used for intelligence and counter-drug missions. Until it was closed last May, Howard AFB was used for about 2,000 anti-drug flight missions each year. Rodman Naval Station was employed in a variety of maritime operations, and Fort Sherman was a major jungle training compound. They are now all closed, as are all U.S. aerial and other intelligence-gathering facilities. Your second thought is easier to answer: Yes, the question has always been political and has its origins in the nationalism of Panama's ruling elite and its resentment against U.S. intrusions. Now, they are on the line, and we shall see. The United States, at their insistence, has left; the game is now in their court. Your last point offers hope for a sound and mutually-beneficial path toward the future and I commend you for a positive contribution.