THIRTEEN DAYS

March 2001
		Nearly 10 years after the end of the Cold War, are nuclear weapons still a threat? What can be learned from the dramatic events of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara responds to your questions.

Forum introduction What was the makeup of President Kennedy's inner circle? How much did news reporters know and relay about the events of the crisis? Was Kenneth O'Donnell as big a part of the real events as he is in the movie? Didn't the U.S. remove missiles in Turkey in exchange for moving Soviet missiles out of Cuba? Didn't the Bay of Pigs invasion help stir Cuban resentment? How much did the government learn about the crisis after it was over? How would today's military react to a similar crisis?     Online Special Media Watch Feb. 22, 2001 Three experts discuss the new movie "Thirteen Days." Online Special: Coverage of the Missile Defense Debate Extended Interviews: Undersecretary of Defense Jacques Gansler Pentagon Official Philip Coyle Browse the NewsHour's full coverage of the Military and the media     Thirteen Days -- the movie The National Security Archive

Henry Chauncey of Shelburne, Vermont asks: Wasn’t it the U.S. agreement to take missiles out of Turkey the quid pro quo that brought the Cuban Missile Crisis to an end? Robert McNamara responds: There was a word there that’s a mistake… There was no U.S. agreement to take missiles out of Turkey. As a matter of fact, the movie, contrary to some history books, correctly portrays what I heard the president tell Bobby to convey to Ambassador Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. What Bobby said to Dobrynin was: "The agreement is if you will take the missiles out of Cuba under UN supervision," -- which they did not do – but they took them out – but not under the UN supervision – "if you will agree to take the missiles out of Cuba under UN supervision, we, the U.S., will agree not to invade Cuba." Now, that was not a difficult agreement to agree to because we had no intention of invading, although neither Castro nor Khrushchev were certain of that before the crisis came up. And I think the fear of invasion may have motivated each of them to the movement of the missiles into Cuba. But, in any event, then we had discussed in the president’s office before Bobby went to see Dobrynin, the status of the Jupiter missiles in Cuba. They were militarily obsolete. In a sense, they were a pile of junk from a military point of view. But they were of very critical political importance to Turkey and to NATO. And during the crisis, during the 13 days, we had considered making the removal of the missiles from Cuba a part of a deal with Khrushchev. And we had discussed that with both the Turks and with NATO, and both the Turks and NATO vehemently opposed any such deal. They said it will be taken by our peoples in Turkey and in Europe as a sign of U.S. weakness; it will put in doubt the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee to defend Turkey and to defend NATO if you yield under pressure from the Soviets to take those weapons out. And, therefore, the Turks and we at NATO are strongly opposed to that. And for that reason the advisers to the president had advised him not to make it part of the deal, and he himself was opposed to making it part of the deal. However, before the Cuban Missile Crisis arose, before the start of the 13 days, he had said to the State Department "We've got to get those missiles out of there; they are worthless and they will attract Soviet fire in the event of Soviet attack, in the event of crisis, so let’s get them out of there." So with the reasons I mentioned, neither the Turks nor NATO wanted them out, so action had not been taken to get them out. But in this critical meeting in the president’s office when that small group of six or seven of us were present -- we all agreed that they were a pile of junk militarily and we should get them out of there, but because of the way in which action to remove them under the threat of Soviet pressure – the way in which that would be interpreted as weakness by the Turks and by NATO, we could not make it part of the agreement. So the president agreed, and he told Bobby to tell Dobrynin that we agreed to pledge we would not invade Cuba in return for Khrushchev taking Soviet missiles out of Cuba. And, in addition, Dobrynin could tell Khrushchev that unilaterally – not part of an agreement, but unilaterally -- we were going to take the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey and replace them, in effect, by Polaris submarines off the coast of Turkey. So that was the deal. It was not an agreement; it was a statement of unilateral action.