A VIABLE DEFENSE?

February 8, 1999
		The Clinton administration wants to spend $6.6 billion over the next six years to build a national missile defense system, but the Russians adamantly oppose it. Will the system increase or decrease national security? Return to this forum's introduction.

What are the chances of developing some kind of trade-off with Russia that would minimize or eliminate that problem? Wouldn't it be more plausible to have lasers on the ground, in the air and in space to break up incoming projectiles? Do Americans have a similar ABM type treaty with China? How do European countries feel about a missile threat directed against them? Why don't we attack the ICBM from space platforms during the ascent phase? Should the $6.6 billion be spent on R&D of better technologies?     January 28, 1999: The national missile defense index page. July 15, 1998: A discussion of the development of ballistic missile technology in Third World nations. June 4, 1996: A report on the Strategic Defense Initiative. September 25, 1996: An online forum on the future of the armed forces. Browse the NewsHour's coverage of military issues.

Jim Marvin of Wyncote, PA asks : With respect to the 1972 treaty, what are the chances of developing some kind of trade-off with Russia that would minimize or eliminate that problem? Frank Gaffney, Jr. responds: My experience negotiating with the Russians suggests that there is very little likelihood that they will agree to terms that will permit the United States to pursue and deploy effective anti-ballistic missile defenses. They may eventually agree to some modifications of the Treaty, but only at a very high price (perhaps in terms of increased latitude in the quantity and quality of offensive nuclear forces they can retain, substantial financial assistance, etc.) and only if the U.S. agrees to deployments that will be of minimal use in protecting the American people and extremely costly. Unfortunately, these are characteristics of the ground-based anti-missile system the Clinton administration purports to favor. More to the point, since the ABM Treaty no longer exists and since first the Soviets and now the Russians have systematically violated its terms, it is absurd and reckless for the United States to subordinate to a Russian veto the need Secretary of Defense Cohen has acknowledged for missile defense deployments. John Pike responds: It may take some time to answer this question. In principle, proponents of missile defense deployment are correct that the currently proposed system would have only limited capabilities against existing Russian nuclear forces, and that there should not be too much difference between the current Russian anti-missile system which "protects" Moscow with 100 interceptors and a new American system which "protects" the entire country with 200 interceptors. But the Russians may calculate that the actual American defense would also include well over a thousand anti-missile interceptors that the Navy plans to deploy on surface ships. Indeed, some missile defense proponents advocate relying on these Navy interceptors for national missile defense, rather than the land-based interceptors the Clinton Administration plans to deploy. And if the Russians added up the number of their nuclear weapons that might survive an American attack, a possibility that a conservative planner must take into account, then the nuclear balance sheet might not look very reassuring. This sort of worst-case calculation would result in perhaps only a few hundred Russian warheads being launched against a much larger number of American anti-missile interceptors. If the proponents of anti-missile deployment are to be believed, few if any of these Russian warheads would penetrate the American defense. This would create a situation in which the United States could destroy Russia, and Russia could not threaten to do the same in return. Canada has lived with such a situation for many years now, but Russia has not, and it may be some time before the Russians would be comfortable living with such a situation. Consequently, those Russians who are mistrustful of American intentions, as well as those Russians who simply think that Russia is a large country that should not be vastly inferior to the United States, would all agree that Russia should retain more nuclear warheads than could be intercepted by the American anti-missile system, even in the unlikely event that the United States attacked first. This number of warheads certainly numbers in the thousands. So it might be rather difficult to get the Russians to go along with the START-2 agreement that would limit them to a few thousand nuclear weapons, and it might be very difficult to persuade the Russian to join a START-3 agreement that could cut the number of Russian [and American] nuclear warhead to fewer than a thousand. As for completely eliminating nuclear weapons, that goal could be put off indefinitely.