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ENGAGING CHINA
Is the Clinton administration's China policy the right policy? July 2, 1998 |
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Questions asked
in this forum:
How significant were President Clinton's comments on human rights? How much of an influence do you feel our president can have on Chinese leaders? What is the Clinton administration trying to achieve in China? Will engagement really bring forth changes in China? Has President Clinton made the most of his opportunity in China? ![]()
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Cheryl of Shaker Heights, OH, asks: Given our history with China, just how much of an influence do you feel our President(not just Clinton, but future presidents) can have on Chinese leaders and how and in what form should that influence take? Robert Kapp, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, responds:
Great question, Cheryl. You've hit the central point squarely on the nose.If I can lightly advertise a book -- which I suspect Mike Oksenberg and Mike Jendrzejczyk would also endorse -- let me urge you to have a look at "China and the American Dream," by Prof. Richard Madsen, who teaches sociology at the University of California - San Diego. The book was published by the University of California Press in 1995. He speaks to many of the issues raised by your question.
Americans yearn to "influence" other societies. Some would say that this reflects our own historical origins as a nation built more on ideas than on territorial boundaries or royal bloodlines --- a "shining city on the hill," defined by our higher moral caliber than that of the degraded monarchies of Europe. Scholars debate about this, but most historians of U.S.-China relations would, I think, agree that two themes have persisted over more than a century in the U.S. approach to China. The first theme is a very strong element of moralism in our approaches to China: a perception of ourselves as the embodiment of moral and ethical norms, and of China as a primarily moral entity -- morally deficient, to be sure, in many American eyes at many times, but definable in moral terms. Thus, we have a long history of caring about China's moral state; caring for China in times of China's need (war, famine, civil disorder), hoping to lead China to a better life through our teaching and our example, and so forth. Though not the only theme in the long history of American interactions with China, one of the key themes has been a yearning to "Change China." (Yale historian Jonathan Spence wrote a fascinating book with that very title: "To Change China," about a series of foreigners from the 17th to the 20th centuries who devoted their lives to trying to "change China."
But how does America go about "changing China"? What is the role of the president in that? Will our president, or other elected political figures in our government, ever have the exquisite pleasure of knowing for sure that China "changed its ways" in a manner that our politicians might wish to be seen advocating, and then having China tell them that China made the changes BECAUSE the Americans told them to? Don't hold your breath.
In short, if we set up a standard of "proof of influence" by which to measure our president's influence in China, and demand some kind of direct attestation that our political leaders have directly wrought specific changes in China's political system, its political ideologies, its social ethics, its religious values, its family system, etc. we are setting ourselves up for a) endless political profiteering at home, since the goal will NEVER be achieved but it makes for good sound bites, and b) substantive failure; we're not likely to receive that kind of proof that our president had specific influences on China's internal affairs.
On the other hand, there's no question that a great many Chinese really are very, very interested in the United States. The U.S. does, believe, have a significance in popular consciousness of the world that distinguishes this country from Europe, Japan, or other parts of the world. Chinese people, especially in the cities, are often better informed about (and more interested in) world affairs including American affairs than Americans are in the world or in China's affairs. In that sense, the words and demeanor of the U.S. president on his visit to China will be of special interest, and could make a difference around the margins in how Chinese people view the U.S., the world, and their own nation. It could, of course, be another U.S. president, and not only Bill Clinton, who would be the object of such intense interest. But Clinton's our man, and his outreach to the people and audiences of China has surely been more intense and wide-ranging than anything that came before.
Professor Michel Oksenberg of Stanford University responds:
President Clinton already has had a considerable impact on President Jiang Zemin. The form of influence should be through private conversations, by personal example, through inclusion in multilateral fora and in visits to each other's country. Constant, regular high level exchanges are essential to a relationship that is crucial to the future of both countries. This is exactly what has resumed after an unnecessary hiatus that produced excessive suspicion and mistrust.
At the same time, we should recognize the limits of our influence. China's leaders are not in total control of their own country. Much happens beyond their reach. We must not harbor undue expectations about the rapidity and direction of change.
Mike Jendrzejczyk of Human Rights Watch responds:
The U.S. has substantial influence with China, though other internal factors may be more important in determining how the Chinese government balances economic reforms against the growing pressures for political reform. Recognition by the U.S. -- and in particular, by an American president -- of China's emerging great power status is of enormous value to China's leaders. Rampant corruption, lack of popular support for the Party and its ideology, ethnic unrest, and growing unemployment leave them feeling particularly concerned about maintaining social stability. But Jiang Zemin has apparently decided that his legitimacy can be enhanced by his association with the U.S. and with Clinton, despite China's past history with the U.S.
China's increasingly pragmatic leadership is more dependent than ever on access to American markets, technology, and investment to help fuel the economic reforms. For this reason, it is in their self-interest to reach an accommodation with the U.S., even if on some core issues they are unlikely to make major concessions. And even limited steps -- such as the release of prominent dissidents, or the signing of U.N. human rights treaties -- are often taken in face-saving ways that appear unrelated to international pressure. But the U.S. should not hesitate to exert pressure, using a combination of carrots and sticks, private and public diplomacy.
I believe U.S. influence has been compromised by the Clinton Administration's failure to effectively and consistently act on the basis of principle. For example, he caved in on MFN (Most Favored Nation trading status) in 1994, admitting that Beijing had not met the human rights conditions in his own executive order, but renewing MFN anyway. And early in 1998, the Administration dropped any attempt to promote a resolution on China at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The Chinese government has the impression that U.S. domestic politics have more to do with shaping the U.S. agenda with China than any commitment to broader objectives or principles -- and they are probably right!
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