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BALKAN TINDERBOX
Should NATO intervene in the war-torn province of Kosovo? June 22, 1998 |
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Questions asked
in this forum:
What is NATO trying to achieve in Kosovo? As Kosovo is a part of Yugoslavia, does Russia not see an analogy with its own problems in Chechnya? What is the difference between Kosovo and Bosnia? What are the possibilities of fighting in Kosovo leading to a greater war in the region? Do you think the NATO plan is the right plan for resolving the crisis? 
Mina Duncan of New York, NY, asks: As violence continues in Kosovo, do you think the NATO plan is the right plan for resolving the crisis? Stephen Walker of the Balkan Institute responds:
NATO has yet to make up its mind what it will do, if anything, to stop the war. In fact, it seems that the West has backed off and, once again, yielded to Miloševic.
I believe that, if there is any hope left of avoiding a broader Balkan war, it is that NATO will use the threat and use of air strikes against Serbia to force Miloševic to withdraw his forces and back down. Then it might be possible to compel the Kosovars to accept an interim arrangement that might buy time until a more democratic regime in Belgrade can come to power and make a negotiated solution for the long term possible.
The longer we wait, however, the more Miloševic will feel emboldened, if not encouraged, to continue his "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo, the stronger the KLA becomes, the more inflexible the Kosovars will become in insisting on in dependence, and the more likely the war will spread -- and the cost of intervention for the U.S. and NATO will rise exponentially and become more inevitable.
Miloševic has a clear record of behavior. When faced with appeasement and weakness from Washington and its allies, he grows stronger and more violent. When faced with determination and force, he backs down. That was the lesson of Bosnia.
Susan Woodward of the Brookings Institution responds:
In my view there is no NATO plan for resolving the Kosovo crisis, and therefore it cannot be correct.
Its current actions view the Yugoslav president and Serbian government as the stronger party, and therefore the one deserving (and more able to respond to) pressure. In the context of the Yugoslav conflicts since 1991, this only reinforces the view in Serbia that the international community ignores their views and strengthens the basis of Serbian nationalism, including the rule of Slobodan Miloševic, namely, a sense of injustice at their status, first, in former Yugoslavia, and now internationally. It therefore does not help those in Serbia and Yugoslavia who want to open dialogue among Serbs about alternatives for resolving the Kosovo conflict. It also keeps Miloševic in the drivers' seat because it does not change international behavior toward him, and he has learned how to deal with this very well.
Secondly, the rhetorical pressure of NATO and the Contact Group on Kosovo Albanian leaders, and now also the Kosovo Liberation Army, to negotiate, stop the violence, and give up on independence will not work. Those who want independence have been encouraged by the results of their boycott of Serbian political institutions, refusal to negotiate until they get a withdrawal of all security forces from Kosovo, and KLA violence. If these tactics have worked to get international attention, why should they change?
Third, NATO countries do not agree among themselves on an acceptable solution, and we are a long way from having a plan to propose to the two sides, which is the only way at the moment that a negotiation will work. The two sides themselves are too far apart to negotiate, and in fact they are farther apart now than they were last fall, when the current NATO approach might have borne fruit.
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