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 James Woolsey |
POWER POLITICS?
James Woolsey and Noam Chomsky debate how far the U.S. can go in its foreign policy. March 12, 1998 |
 Chomsky |
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Questions asked
in this forum:
Does the U.S. have a moral obligation to intervene in international affairs? Is America's willingness to use force against Iraq just a continuation of previous policies? Do you think the U.S. government, including Congress, is overstepping its limits? Do you believe that the U.S. public has an adequate opportunity to form rational opinions about U.S. policy given the quality of media coverage? What does the recent crisis tell us about the direction U.S. foreign policy is headed in the post-Cold War world? 
Alexis Samuels of Miami, FL, asks Considering U.S. interventions during the Cold War, i.e. Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, etc., is America's willingness to use force against Iraq just a continuation of previous policies? Or does it illustrate a fundamental shift in how the U.S. intervenes, from a covert model to more overt action?
Mr. James Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responds:
The three countries you cite were very different cases.
In Iran in the early 1950's the CIA, under President Eisenhower's instructions, helped overthrow the Mossadeg government and re-install the Shah. Given what's happened in Iran since 1979, Mossadeg looks pretty good by comparison. In retrospect it would have probably been a better idea to let Iran take its own course then -- there might not be so much resentment against the U.S. there now if we had kept our hands off.
"I believe...that Castro's regime won't last much, if at all, beyond Fidel and that opening up to the Cuban people may, now, be the best way to weaken his regime's power. "
In Cuba, our Bay of Pigs operation early in the Kennedy Administration was botched both by President Kennedy and the CIA; the CIA's attempts to assassinate Castro -- I believe it's quite clear at the direction of Robert Kennedy and thus, almost certainly, of President Kennedy as well -- were both wrong and comically clumsy. But unlike the case of Mossadeg in Iran in the early 50's, the Kennedy Administration was, in Castro, dealing with a real tyrant. Furthermore, most of the histories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis show that Castro was dangerous beyond Cuba's shores, because he was an important player in pushing the Soviets toward the 1962 missile deployments and hence toward behavior that almost led to nuclear war. Since the end of the cold war, he has not been a threat beyond Cuba's shores. I think the best way to deal with him now is to trade with Cuba, send lots of visitors, broadcast to it, etc. I'll go with Pope John Paul II, in other words. I believe, by the way, that Castro's regime won't last much, if at all, beyond Fidel and that opening up to the Cuban people may, now, be the best way to weaken his regime's power.
Nicaragua was, for a time, essentially a communist dictatorship under the Sandinistas. The substantial majority of the Nicaraguan people turned against them for their dictatorial ways (although most probably af first welcomed their overthrow of Somoza). They have rejected Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas now twice in Presidential elections. Our support of the Contras in the early 1980's is a complicated subject because, although it was at first done legally by the Reagan Administration, Congress then legislated against it leading the Administration to support the Contras in a manner that was clearly illegal -- the Iran-Contra Affair. As long as our support for the Contras was being undertaken pursuant to law, I think it was justified because of the dictatorial nature of the regime. Once Congress legislated against it though, the support should have stopped.
"What I would support against Iraq is not covert action -- there is no reason, in my view, for the CIA to be involved."
What I would support against Iraq is not covert action -- there is no reason, in my view, for the CIA to be involved. We have, however, in Saddam, a killer and terrible tyrant who is doing everything possible to obtain weapons of mass destruction. I would, openly, recognize a democratic government in exile, give it the funds of Iraq's that have been frozen overseas, stop Saddam's smuggling of oil (while still permitting that which can legally be exported under U.N. oversight, since the proceeds go for food and medicine for civilians), protect (with air power) the Kurds in the North and the Shia in the South if Saddam attacks them again, establish a no-fly zone over the whole country, and broadcast into Iraq to counter Saddam's propaganda (Radio Free Iraq).
Is this a continuation of the policies we had with regard to Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua? Unlike those three cases, it would not be covert. Like Cuba and Nicaragua (and unlike the case of Iran), it would be directed against a totalitarian dictator. So there would be some continuity, some discontinuity.
Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at M.I.T., responds:
The U.S. has often resorted to overt action in past years. To mention only one example, in 1961-1962 the Kennedy Administration moved from support for large-scale state terror in South Vietnam, which had already killed tens of thousands of people, to a direct attack, including U.S. Air Force bombing, napalm, crop destruction, and numerous other crimes. These assaults -- aggression by any reasonable standards -- laid the basis for further escalation from 1965, by then extended to the rest of Indochina. Millions were killed in the ruined countries. Unknown numbers more have suffered and died from the effects of chemical warfare and from unexploded ordnance, and still do. Those were not covert actions.
There have been many other cases. George Bush's invasion of Panama -- condemned by two U.N. Security Council resolutions that Washington vetoed -- was overt. It is also worth recalling that when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait a few months later, the prime concern of the Bush Administration was that he would emulate what the U.S. had just done in Panama. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell posed the problem sharply: "The next few days Iraq will withdraw," putting "his puppet in" and "Everyone in the Arab world will be happy."
If so, the outcome would have been much like the recent U.S. invasion of Panama, though Latin America was far from happy; it was in an uproar, bitterly opposed to the U.S. actions, particularly the Group of Eight Latin American democracies, which expelled Panama (already suspended) because it was under the rule of a puppet regime maintained by foreign force.
"Overt actions are nothing new. In fact, because of internal changes in the U.S., Washington may be less likely to resort to overt action than in the past."
Overt actions are nothing new. In fact, because of internal changes in the U.S., Washington may be less likely to resort to overt action than in the past. The Reagan Administration sought to emulate in Central America what Kennedy had done in South Vietnam, but quickly retreated in the face of unanticipated popular reaction; it turned to clandestine and state terror throughout the region, rather than direct U.S. assault, and was indeed condemned by the World Court for the "unlawful use of force" and ordered to desist, a judgment dismissed here with contempt; its crucial wording was not even reported in the mainstream press, nor was there any concern when the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international law, mentioning no one, though all understood what was intended. A leaked National Security Policy Review in the first months of the Bush presidency concluded that "In cases where the U.S. confronts much weaker enemies, our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them decisively and rapidly"; delay might "undercut political support," understood to be thin. That is part of the reason why U.S. doctrine shifted to "Low Intensity Conflict" or quick demolition of a "much weaker enemy."
U.S. military doctrine is unusual in that U.S. casualties are not tolerated and overwhelming force must be available. That is why the U.S. has so rarely taken part in difficult peacekeeping operations, which involve interactions with civilians that require restraint and carry risks; these are left to Canada, Ireland, Norway, Fiji, and others. In Somalia, for example, U.S. forces were sent only after the worst fighting had declined, and recovery from famine was underway. The intervention turned into a disaster because U.S. forces resorted to massive force, following Pentagon doctrine, as soon as problems arose. The U.S. command estimated 6-10,000 Somali casualties in the summer of 1993 alone, two-thirds women and children. What happened was later attributed to U.N. incompetence, but that is an evasion.
"The patterns of U.S. intervention depend ultimately on decisions by American citizens, including the decision to stay quiet or even not to know. "
The patterns of U.S. intervention depend ultimately on decisions by American citizens, including the decision to stay quiet or even not to know. In principle such actions are under popular control; in fact too, if we so choose.
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