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| A NEW NATO? | |
 May 5, 1999 
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The leaders of the 19 NATO nations gathered in Washington, DC to mark the alliance's 50th anniversary and discuss the the war in Kosovo. But even as the Alliance celebrated that milestone, some foreign policy experts wonder if NATO will survive to see another 50 years. Ivo Daalder, former director for European Affairs on the National Security Council staff, and Doug Bandow, former special assistant to President Reagan, answer your questions |
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Simon
Collins of Miami, FL asks: If NATO claims the right to intervene in Yugoslavia, does it reserve the right to intervene in other domestic European disputes, such as Chechnya? Where does NATO draw the line? Is there a line? Ivo
Daalder of the Brookings Institution responds: The decision to intervene in Yugoslavia was one that was reached with great difficulty. As an Alliance formed on the basis of the UN Charter, its members recognized that the use of force for other then (collective) self-defense or at the invitation of the government concerned requires that the UN Security Council authorizes its employment. Although the UN Security Council passed three resolutions indicating that events in Kosovo represented threats to regional peace and security (a finding that can trigger such authorization) and even though it did repeatedly demand that Belgrade act in ways Milosevic refused to follow, the Council never authorized the use of force because Russia and China opposed doing so. The NATO countries were thus faced with a dilemma: by insisting on a UN Security Council authorization prior to acting, NATO would effectively agree not to act, given the certainty of a Russian or Chinese veto. Yet, Milosevic's behavior -- including the wanton killing of ethnic Albanians, the torching of 220 villages in 1998 alone, and the displacement of 500,000 people in 1998 alone -- was of a kind that needed to be stopped, by the use of force if necessary. In the end, NATO decided that its military action was legitimate. Does this set a precedent? Of course, but only if others are to follow in Milosevic's footsteps. Also, the question of efficacy and risks will naturally come into play. While Moscow's actions in Chechnya are arguable of a similar magnitude as Milosevic's (the number of deaths -- at 100,000 or more -- far exceeds current estimates in Kosovo), NATO intervention would have meant taking on a Russia still armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. The risks of such a confrontation outweighed the possible benefits of intervention in a way that is not true in Kosovo today. Doug
Bandow of the Cato Institute
responds: Alas, NATO has enunciated a principle which has no obvious stopping point. If it can intervene where 2000 people have died the previous year, it could theoretically intervene anywhere. In practice, it does seem to the draw the line at: 1) white Europeans dying (compared to black Africans and other peoples of color); 2) a non-ally (as opposed to Croatia or Turkey) doing the killing; and 3) the deaths receiving saturation media coverage (in contrast to the 6300 deaths in Sierra Leone in January alone, for instance). Perhaps the worst precedent is set not for NATO, but for other countries. The US can make no principled objection if Russia chooses to attack Ukraine or the Baltic states over the treatment of ethnic Russians, or if China and Pakistan choose to attack India over the treatment of Kashmiris, or if India chooses to attack Sri Lanka over the treatment of the Tamil minority. Indeed, the West can't even argue that the human rights violations aren't serious enough to warrant war since NATO has claimed the right to be judge and jury in its own case, refusing to go to the UN because it knows its effort would be vetoed by the Security Council. Washington and its NATO friends may eventually rue the day they set this precedent. |
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