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April 10, 1996
JOURNALIST AND AUTHOR DON OBERDORFER ON THE SITUATION IN KOREAIn the past weeks, the world has watched as North Korea announced that it would no longer abide by the criteria outlined in the peace agreement that ended the Korean War forty years ago. Within a week of the announcement, the North Korean military had entered the De-Militarized Zone [DMZ] separating the communist North Korea from the pro-west South. Although no shots of anger have been fired, the United States, which has troops stationed along the border, has been closely monitoring the situation.
Don Oberdorfer, former Washington Post diplomatic correspondent and author of a soon-to-be-released book examining the relations between the two Korea's, took your questions on the situation. Mr. Oberdorfer, currently a foreign policy fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, answers your questions on what is motivating the North Koreans, what are the U.S. interests, and what will likely happen.
A question from Joseph A. McDonald of Burlington, VT:
How stable is the North Korean leadership? They seem to be sending a lot of mixed political signals, which could mean that their leaders disagree over national policies and goals.
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
The stability of the North Korean leadership is one of the most serious underlying - and unanswered - questions about the current situation. There is no overt or public sign of instability (there probably could not be one in a totalitarian system) but there have been for some time clear signs of disagreement on policy in the North Korean leadership establishment.
Kim Jong Il, the son and heir of Kim Il Sung, has not yet taken up his father's posts as leader of the Workers' (communist) Party nor as president of the country, though North Koreans suggest he will do so this summer. He is rarely seen in public and has not made a public speech that is broadcast or telecast in his entire career. The recent move of North Korean troops into the DMZ is disturbing to me primarily because it cuts across other things that North Korea is doing - especially its new appeal for food aid an a humanitarian basis - and seems to suggest a weakness of central authority in Pyongyang.
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A question from Randal Haithcock of Durham, NC:
Given the devotion of so much of the North Korean economy to military spending, how do North Korean forces play in the balance of power among China, Japan, South Korea, and smaller East Asian powers? What should the U.S. role be in stabilizing this balance of power?
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
In terms of sheer numbers, the North Korean military is a big player in the region, with forces estimated (by the U.S.) at 1.1 million under arms. However, much of the equipment is antiquated, energy supplies and even food are short, and the forces probably wouldn't be worth much outside Korea. North Korea's missiles have a regional reach, however. If North Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons, that would have a major impact.
The presence of U.S. forces in Korea and backup forces in Japan is a major stabilizing factor in East Asia, not only in the Korean context but also in the context of the potential rivalries involving China, Japan and other powers. Probably the most effective thing the United States could do militarily is just to continue what it has been doing for decades - deploying a substantial force in the area.
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A question from Rocci Hildum of Cashmere, WA:
What are the United States' vital interests in Korea and how vital are they?
What nonviolent conflict resolution interventions should the United States consider and how should these be developed?
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
U.S. vital interests in Korea are to some extent historical - the U.S. led the 1950-53 coalition that stopped North Korea's invasion of the South, at the cost of 54,000 American lives. South Korea has been a close ally of the United States ever since. Beyond this, the fundamental U.S. interest is in regional and world order. East Asia is the most economically vibrant part of the world and by all odds the most important area of the world for U.S. trade. The conquest of South Korea by military force could destabilize the region, especially if the long-standing and repeated U.S. assurances to the contrary proved to be hollow.
As to conflict resolution interventions, I'm not at ease with the jargon, but I think the United States should do all that it can to keep the situation as peaceful as possible in and around Korea. This means alliance with South Korea while engaging North Korea, and encouraging the two Korean states to engage each other.
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A question from David Sudmeier of Seattle, WA:
The death of Deng Xiaoping appears to be imminent, and many are concerned that a military takeover of the People's Republic might follow. What likelihood is there that China's military might be looking at the Korean peninsula again? If they do support a North Korean attack, could the American public be convinced that U.S. interests require the kind of response we made in 1950?
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
China has made it very clear to North Korea that it will not assist North Korea in any attack on South Korea, though it will help defend North Korea if the South attacks. The latter is very unlikely. At the moment, China is assiduously courting South Korea rather than its old communist ally in the North. Chinese President Jiang Zemin was recently in South Korea on a six day state visit, an extraordinary period of time. He did not go to the North. Trade between China and South Korea is booming. I doubt that the Chinese military, even if it should come to power, would want to interrupt it.
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A question from James Nathan of Montgomery, AL:
I had thought there was, as a part to the agreement negotiated by Ambassador Gallucci, a requirement that North and South Korea begin a formal talks regarding their relations. Further, that this part of the agreement had to be operative before the various underwriters of this accord provided the several billion dollars they offered to North Korea if it would de-nuclearize. How does the current militant alerts and rhetoric fit into a process of reconciliation or is the agreement now in danger?
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
The Framework agreement negotiated by Amb. Gallucci in October 1994 does contain a promise by North Korea to restart the North-South dialogue. The North resisted this provision to the very end and has not fulfilled it. However, neither the United States nor South Korea wants to invalidate or hold up implementation of the nuclear accord because of this. It is in their overwhelming interest for North Korea to freeze its nuclear weapons program - as it has done - regardless of the status of the North-South talks. So far, North Korea has been implementing the accord meticulously -- except for this provision.
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A question from Lynn Brielmaier of Houston, TX:
Isn't the main fear now that N.Korea could possibly overrun Seoul before the U.S. could react with troop reinforcements. Isn't that exactly what happened the last time?
Mr. Oberdorfer responds:
The security of Seoul, which is only a half-hour drive from the DMZ, is the great strategic weakness of South Korea as it has always been. The situation today, however, is very different from that of 1950. At that time, the U.S. troops had pulled out of Korea, and South Korean forces were minimal and weak. Today there are 37,000 American troops, heavily armed and with the most modern equipment [see the article in today's Washington Post] stationed in Korea, and South Korea has more than 600,000 under arms. A massive North Korean attack could devastate Seoul but the attackers would have a fierce battle on their hands from the start. In the meantime, U.S. and South Korean forces would devastate the North - and the North Koreans know it. This is deterrence of a type that did not exist in 1950.
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