JOSE RAMOS-HORTA

October 25, 1996
		Jose Ramos-Horta, exiled East Timorese resistance leader and 1996 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, responds to viewer questions and comments.

Forum introduction Can Western human rights concerns overcome commercial interests? What is the motivation behind Indonesia's interest in East Timor? How can you capitalize on the attention the Nobel Prize has brought? How can you convince Indonesia to pull out? How would an independent East Timor support itself? Are the East Timorese committed to democracy? Was East Timor a part of pre-colonial Indonesia?   Online NewsHour Special Report: The Crisis in East Timor Online Backgrounder: Behind East Timor's conflict with Indonesia. Nov. 13, 1996: A discussion with Jose Ramos-Horta. Oct. 11, 1996: Two East Timorese dissidents win the Nobel Peace Prize. Browse the NewsHour's coverage of Asia.

Debbie East of Lander, WY asks: Please explain the motivation behind Indonesia's interest in East Timor. Is there a natural resource of interest, some historical connection or some other perceived benefit to Indonesia? I ask because conquest as once practiced in the world seems to have lost its imperative. Thank you.   Jose Ramos-Horta responds: Indeed there are no positive reasons for Indonesia to be interested in East Timor. Initially, in the days of the cold war, they feared an independent small state in their neighborhood which would pursue a foreign policy quite independent of the big Western powers and of Jakarta. The scare of 'communism' was intensively exploited, portraying the East Timorese as likely clients of the Soviet Union or China. A major fear was that an independent minded democratic state could serve as an example to the Indonesian people, particularly to the minority groups in the Eastern regions of the archipelago, which are closer in cultural, religious and ethnic characteristics to the East Timorese, and who in general have a lesser loyalty to the Javanese dominated Indonesian Republic. Nowadays the obstinacy in holding on to ET is primarily from the military which are not prepared to acknowledge their failure in East Timor. Failed campaigns can be very costly to military power holders, as examples such as that of the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands/Malvinas war has shown. Any rational policy makers would acknowledge that the invasion of East Timor has been a highly costly disaster for Indonesia, and would seek ways to extricate themselves from this quagmire. It is a sign of the lack of touch with reality of the Suharto government, that they still steadfastly refuse to budge.