Vanja Filipovic of Haverford, PA asks:

My question is: Despite the fact Karadzic and Mladic have been officially removed from the public life, and despite the fact that their party (SDS) has lost, it is still true that they are major influences on RS politics, and main supporters for Poplasen and his Serb Radical Party.

In your opinion, how much is the Poplasen's electoral victory tied to the unwillingness of the Western powers to remove from influence the two main indicted war criminals - Karadzic, Mladic?  

Steven Walker responds:

Poplasen's victory is a serious setback for the recent U.S. and Western approach toward Bosnia and implementation of the Dayton Accords. In May 1997, the Clinton Administration realized that the Dayton Accords were unraveling and a more vigorous approach was necessary. Reluctant to openly confront and remove from Bosnian Serb society the most senior war criminals -- Karadzic and Mladic -- they set out to marginalize them, in part by promoting Biljana Plavsic. Plavsic had been a Karadzic deputy and was a committed ultranationalist, but she had begun to criticize the Karadzic clique and its corruption after being elected president of the Bosnian Serb entity.

The U.S. was successful in its efforts to bolster Plavsic's position in and around the Bosnian Serb capital, but elsewhere Karadzic allies and other ultranationalists remained in power. Most war criminals remained at large and many of them retained much of their wartime influence and control. Plavsic became closely identified with the U.S., leaving her vulnerable to charges that she was a Western puppet. Ironically, Plavsic was not compelled by the West to explicitly repudiate her nationalist ideology and carry out fundamental changes that would have eroded support for the nationalists and facilitated reconciliation, like refugee returns. As a result, many Bosnian Serbs retained the fears and insecurities created by years of nationalist propaganda and police state-control, which still exists in many areas, and did not trust Plavsic.

The U.S. had hoped that Plavsic would begin to deliver on some of her promises, especially on refugee returns, after securing her reelection. Then reintegration and reconciliation would have been possible without having to confront the nationalists head-on -- including by arresting Karadzic and Mladic. The failure to extract real concessions from Plavsic and bring about more dramatic change in the Bosnian Serb entity made Poplasen's victory possible.

Now, with Poplasen's victory, the original dilemma will likely face the U.S. and its allies again. It is a stark reminder of the need to once and for all remove Karadzic, Mladic, and their allies from power and compel real compliance with the Dayton Accords. A more consistent, aggressive and assertive Western policy on key issues like refugee returns is needed now more than ever.