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Full coverage of the impeachment
trial.
Jan. 8, 1999:
Shields
and Gigot on the Senate deal.
Jan. 7, 1999:
Shield and
Gigot discuss the impeachment trial.
Jan. 6, 1999:
Tom
Oliphant and David Brooks analyze the beginning of the impeachment
trial in the U.S. Senate.
Jan. 6, 1999:
Two
of impeachment managers on the Senate trial.
Jan. 5, 1999:
Four
former senators discuss the format and duration of the upcoming
impeachment trial.
Jan. 4, 1999:
Senators are wrestling with a proposal for a shortened impeachment
trial.
Dec. 23, 1998:
Four
foreign journalists discuss how President Clinton's impeachment
played around the world.
Dec. 21, 1998:
A growing number of voices are calling for a censure
alternative.
Dec. 21, 1998:
A discussion
on the vote to impeach President Clinton.
Dec. 21, 1998:
Some
public reaction from Oregon on the impeachment vote.
Dec. 17, 1998:
Shields
& Gigot give analysis of the House's decision to continue
with the debate on impeachment despite the military action in
Iraq.
Dec. 15, 1998:
More
moderate Republicans came out in favor of impeaching President
Clinton.
Dec. 15, 1998:
Deborah
Tannen and Shelby Steele debate the impeachment proceedings
of President Clinton.
Nov. 27, 1998: President Clinton answers
questions
about the Lewinsky matter put to him by the House Judiciary
Committee.
Browse the NewsHour's coverage of the White
House, Starr
Investigation,and Political
Wrap.
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|
 Mr.
Chief Justice. If it please the Senate. On behalf of the House of
Representatives, I thank the Senate for the opportunity to appear
today and present this argument. The House -- and I -- greatly appreciate
the time and effort the Senate has taken on this important matter.
You have heard the facts summarized by
my colleagues. They have described for you the law of perjury and
the law of obstruction. I will now discuss several of the specific
instances in which William Jefferson Clinton violated these laws as
set forth in the Articles of Impeachment presented to you.
The process facing you, the jurors, of
fitting the federal law of obstruction of justice and witness tampering
(18 USC Sections 1503 and 1512) and of perjury (18 USC Sections 1621
and 1623) into the facts of the case against President William Jefferson
Clinton, is not a case in which there is great difficulty. It is not
a problem of fitting a round peg into a square hole. Quite the contrary.
We have a case here in which the fit between fact and law is as precise
as the finely tuned mechanism of a Swiss watch. The evidence that
President William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and obstruction
is overwhelming. These are Pattern Offenses.
I beg your attention to the following
exposition of facts and law, but, before commencing, I would respectfully
ask each of you to remember that, under the Law of Impeachment based
on our Constitution, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the President
committed each and every element of one or more violations of provisions
of the federal criminal code, has never been required to sustain a
conviction in any prior impeachment trial in the Senate. However,
I speak for all House Managers, in relating to you our belief that
the record and the law applicable to these two Articles of Impeachment,
clearly establish that President William Jefferson Clinton did in
fact violate several provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code,
including Perjury, Obstruction, and Tampering with Witnesses. A
fortiori, there is more than sufficient grounds on which you
might base a conviction as to both Articles.
1. Submission of the False Affidavit
in the Jones Case.
We believe the evidence presented clearly
establishes that on December 17, 1997, the President encouraged a
witness in a federal civil rights action brought against him -- Monica
Lewinsky -- to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding which
he knew to be perjurious, false, and misleading. As the other managers
have outlined, Monica Lewinsky filed a sworn affidavit in the Jones
case that denied any sexual relationship between her and the President.
That affidavit was false. Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand
jury that the scheme to file this false affidavit was devised during
a telephone conversation with the President on December 17, 1997;
a call he initiated according to Ms. Lewinsky's from testimony, at
2:00 or 2:30 a.m. on the morning of December 17th, ostensibly to tell
her that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident,
but more importantly to tell Ms. Lewinsky her name was on the witness
list filed in the Jones case. During this conversation, the
President suggested to her she could file an affidavit in the Jones
case in order to avoid having to testify in that case. She testified
she and the President both understood from their conversation they
would continue their pattern of covering up their relationship. Ms.
Lewinsky testified she knew if she had filed a truthful affidavit
in the Jones case, the Jones lawyers most certainly
would have deposed her in that case. Vernon Jordan's testimony to
the grand jury confirmed the President knew Ms. Lewinsky planned to
file a false affidavit. He stated from his conversations with the
President, the President knew in advance that Ms. Lewinsky planned
to execute an affidavit denying their sexual relationship, and that
he later informed the President Ms. Lewinsky had signed the false
affidavit.
For his part, the President denies asking
Ms. Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit. Instead, as he asserted
in his response to the House Judiciary Committee's request for admissions,
he seeks to have you believe he sought simply to have Ms. Lewinsky
execute an affidavit that would, "get her out of having to testify,"
while being factually correct. This statement lacks credibility; in
fact, it reflects a virtual legal impossibility.
The President has admitted Ms Lewinsky
was the woman with whom he had an "improper intimate relationship"
while President; and he has admitted he was very concerned over the
great personal embarrassment and humiliation he feared would have
occurred if that relationship had been revealed in the Jones
case. Yet, he would have you believe he cannot remember a call he
made to that woman, about that case, that occurred at 2 o'clock in
the morning and during which they discussed the unexpected death of
his own secretary's brother. His statement is not credible, because
it is not true.
As Vernon Jordan's grand jury testimony
corroborated, the President knew what Ms. Lewinsky planned to allege
in her affidavit in the Jones case, yet he took no action
to stop her from filing it. As you have heard in earlier presentations,
the President's lawyer, Robert Bennett, stated in court directly to
Judge Wright, when he presented the false Lewinsky affidavit, "there
is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form" and
that the President was "fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit."
The President took no action to correct his lawyer's misstatement.
As you have also heard, the President in his grand jury testimony
tried to disingenuously dissect the words of his attorney to remove
his conduct from further examination, even though obviously and by
any reasonable interpretation of the definition given the President,
his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky was covered. And he
disavowed knowledge of his lawyer's misrepresentations, by claiming
he was not paying attention when Mr. Bennett made those representations
to the court. However, it is by now clear the videotape of the deposition
irrefutably shows President Clinton looking intently and directly
toward his lawyer as the statements are made. Again, the President's
statement lacks credibility, because it is demonstrably and clearly
false. And it constitutes perjury.
Later in the deposition, when Mr. Bennett
read to the President the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit where
she denies their relationship and asked him, "[i]s that a true and
accurate statement as far as you know it," the President answered,
"[t]hat is absolutely true." Again, his statement is not credible.
Because again, it is a lie. It is perjury.
The inescapable conclusion from this
evidence is that the President has lied, and continues to lie about
the Lewinsky affidavit. His continual false statements and denials
about the affidavit bolster our conclusion that, in fact, he was part
of the scheme to file the false affidavit. The evidence supports Ms.
Lewinsky's account that such a scheme did in fact exist between them.
The evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, do not
support the President's denial. [Chart: Definition of Inference.]
Inferences, I might add, that, in your deliberations as
in any federal court, are to be, and should be, based on common sense
and in light of your experiences in judging human behavior.
Moreover, in engaging in this course
of conduct, referring to the words of the obstruction statute, 18
USC 1503 [Chart: 18 USC 1503], the President's actions constituted
an "endeavor to influence or impede the due administration of justice,"
in that he was attempting to prevent the plaintiff in the Jones
case from having a "free and fair opportunity to learn what she may
learn concerning the material facts surrounding her claim." These
acts by the President also constituted an endeavor to "corruptly persuade
another person with the intent to influence the testimony they might
give in an official proceeding," which are in fact elements
of the tampering statute, 18 USC 1512 [Chart: 18 USC 1512].
Ms. Lewinsky knew full well her only
hope of not having to testify in the Jones case was to file
an affidavit that did not truthfully reflect her relationship with
the President. The President also knew that if Monica Lewinsky had
filed a true affidavit, without any doubt, it would have caused the
Jones lawyers to seek her further testimony; something both
co-conspirators desperately sought to a void. In encouraging her to
file an affidavit that would prevent her from having to testify, President
Clinton was, of necessity, asking her to testify falsely in an official
proceeding. He was attempting to prevent, and in fact did prevent,
the plaintiff in that case from discovering facts which may have had
a bearing on her claim against the President. His motive was improper
-- in language of the law, "corrupt" -- and his actions did influence
the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky as a witness in the pending official
proceeding. Under both Section 1503 [Chart: 18 USC 1503] and
Section 1512 [Chart: 18 USC 1512] of Title 18, the President's
conduct constituted a federal a crime.
2. Perjury Before the Grand Jury
About the Affidavit.
When asked before the grand jury whether
he had instructed Ms. Lewinsky to file a truthful affidavit, President
Clinton testified, "Did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying
on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit?
No I did not." The evidence clearly establishes that the President's
statement constitutes perjury in violation of Section 1623 of Title
18, USC, for the simple reason, the only realistic way Ms. Lewinsky
could get out of having to testify based on her affidavit, would be
to execute a false affidavit. He knew this. She knew this. And the
President's testimony on this point is perjury within the clear meaning
of the statute. It was willful, knowing, material, and false.
3. Agreement to Use Cover Stories.
We believe that the evidence presently
to you also establishes that on December 17th, the President encouraged
a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to
give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called
to testify personally in that proceeding. This was, in essence, the
conspiracy to commit both obstruction and perjury.
Throughout their relationship, the President
and Ms. Lewinsky understandably wished to keep it secret. And they
took steps to keep it secret; steps that ultimately turned out to
be criminal acts. For some time, in fact until Ms. Lewinsky testified
under oath and under a grant of immunity, their efforts were remarkably
successful -- associates and employees testified in support of the
President's stories, and even several Secret Service officers testified
to the grand jury that they understood Ms. Lewinsky to be in the Oval
Office to "pick up papers." Yet, as Ms. Lewinsky testified, her White
House job never required her to deliver papers or
obtain the President's signature on any documents; it was all a sham;
a cover story; a conspiracy to obstruct.
Ms. Lewinsky testified that later, after
she left her White House job to go to work at the Pentagon. Phase
Two of the cover up went into effect. The two co-conspirators began
to use Mrs. Currie as a source of clearance into the White House.
This was so even though the purpose of Ms. Lewinsky's visits were
almost always to see the President.
As my colleagues have told you, on December
17th, during the 2. a.m. telephone conversation, the President told
Ms. Lewinsky her name appeared on the witness list in the Jones
case. Ms. Lewinsky testified that at some point in the conversation
the President told her, "You know, you can always say you were coming
to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters." Ms. Lewinsky testified
she understood this to be, "really a reminder of things that they
had discussed before." She described the President's statement as
something that was, "instantly familiar to me." As she put it even
more clearly, "I knew exactly what he meant"; so, I respectfully submit,
do all of us here know exactly what the President meant.
When the President was questioned about
before the grand jury if he ever had said something like this to Ms.
Lewinsky, he admitted that, "I might well have said that. Because
I certainly didn't want this to come out, if I could help it. And
I was concerned about that."
A cover story between two teenagers trying
to steal a date without their parents knowledge, is one thing. Such
would not constitute a crime; it would be something we might wink
at. However, we are not here dealing with two love-struck teenagers
trying to circumvent their parents' watchful eyes. We are dealing
with the President of the United States and a subservient employee,
concocting and implementing a scheme that, while perhaps not illegal
at its inception, deteriorated into illegality once it left the realm
of private lie to that of public obstruction.
However -- and this is critical in terms
of establishing the illegality of the President's
actions -- the situation at the time of that early morning phone call
from the President to Ms. Lewinsky was very different from that facing
the President during any earlier discussions of a "cover story." Now,
in early December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had been officially named as
a witness in a pending judicial proceeding. She was now under an obligation
to give complete and truthful testimony as part of that proceeding;
and he was under a legal obligation at that time, not to tamper with
her or her possible testimony. This is precisely where private lies
become public obstruction. This is the bright line between child-like
pranks, and deadly serious obstruction of our legal system. The President
and Ms. Lewinsky at that point, were in the big leagues; and the President,
a highly skilled lawyer, knew it; which is why he went to such lengths
to continue the cover up for so many months.
The President knew that if Monica Lewinsky
were to testify that she only brought papers
to the President or that she only came to see Betty, her testimony
would have been neither complete nor truthful. Yet, the President
encouraged her to give that untruthful testimony. And in so doing,
he broke the law of obstruction of justice; and in lying about it,
he compounded the problem by breaking the law of perjury.
As Mr. Cannon made clear [Chart:
18 USC 1503], a person commits the crime of obstruction of justice
when he attempts to influence the due administration of justice, which
includes all aspects of any civil or criminal case, including pre-trial
discovery. Mr. Clinton's encouragement to Ms. Lewinsky to tell something
other than the truth certainly would have influenced the discovery
process in the Jones case. Courts have consistently held
that civil discovery is part of the "due administration of justice"
protected by the obstruction statutes.
 And
as Mr. Cannon also made clear [Chart: 18 USC 1512], a person
commits witness tampering when he attempts to influence another person
to give false testimony in an official proceeding. Mr. Clinton encouraged
Ms. Lewinsky to give false testimony about her reasons for being in
the White House with the President.
By encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, the
President committed the crimes of obstruction of justice under Section
1503 and the crime of witness tampering under Section 1512.
4. The President's Statements
to Mrs. Betty Currie.
On January 18th and again on January
20th or 21st, President Clinton attempted to influence another potential
witness in the civil rights action pending against him, by relating
to her a false and misleading account of events about that case, and
again, with the intent that his recitation of facts would corruptly
influence her testimony. As the Managers have previously described
to you, the evidence in this case shows that on Saturday, January
17th, only two and half hours after the President had been deposed
in the Jones case, President Clinton called his secretary,
Betty Currie at home, and asked her to come to the White House the
next day, a Sunday. Mrs. Currie testified to the grand jury that the
President's request was unusual because it was rare for the President
to ask her to come in on a weekend. She met with the President about
at 5:00 p.m. the next day, Sunday, January 18th. Mrs. Currie testified
to the grand jury that during her meeting with the President, he said
to her, "There are several things you may want to know." He then proceeded
to ask her a number of questions in succession. You were presented
evidence of these five statements by other Managers. I will not repeat
the evidence here. But I will emphasize that it was at that time,
and in that way, the President led Mrs. Currie through a series of
statements and determinate questions to establish a set of facts describing
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House that supported
completely his [false] testimony. As you have heard, Mrs. Currie stated
under oath she indicated her agreement with each of the President's
statements, even though she knew that the President and Ms. Lewinsky
had, in fact, been alone in the Oval Office and in the President's
study. Prosecutors frequently see this pattern where you have a dominant
person "suggesting" testimony to another person in a subordinate relationship.
During the President's grand jury testimony,
he was asked about his statements to Mrs. Currie. He testified he
was trying to determine whether his recollection was accurate. As
he put it, "I was trying to get the facts down, I was trying to understanding
what the facts were." This fits the pattern of the classic obstruction
prosecution, in which the defendant "suggests" a story to someone
in the hopes they will later testify consistent with that earlier
"suggestion." When defendants in federal courts defend against obstruction
prosecutions in such cases, they frequently rely on the same defense
the President raises here; that he was merely and oh-so-innocently
encouraging the other person to "tell the truth." You may want to
see, as an example of this unsuccessful defense, United States v.
O'Keefe, 722 F2d 1175, 1181 (5th Cir. 1983). Mr. O'Keefe did not "ask
someone to lie"; he did not even say, "I suggest you lie"; rather,
as is almost always the case in white collar obstruction prosecutions,
his words, and their setting and context, suggested a certain story.
Just as Mr. O'Keefe did not expressly ask someone to lie, Mr. Clinton
never "asked someone to lie." He didn't have to.
He was too smart for that. And, he had witnesses who were willingly,
ready and able to do his bidding.
 The
President lied to the grand jury when he made these statements mischaracterizing
his earlier statements to Mrs. Currie, just as he tampered with her
as a likely witness nine months earlier.
The President's assertion -- that he
simply was trying to understand what the facts were -- lacks even
colorable credibility, when one considers that he had already testified.
It was obviously too late to try to recollect what the "facts" were.
He supposedly had already testified under oath what the "facts" were.
In any event, Mrs. Currie could not have told him what the true facts
were; he alone knew what they were.
The defenses and explanations the Presidents
defenders raise to justify why the President would make factual assertions
to Mrs. Currie about the circumstances of his relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky, are many. For example, one Administration witness who appeared
before the House Judiciary Committee actually suggested such "coaching"
is proper, as a method whereby an attorney "prepares" a client or
witness for testimony. Such a suggestion in this instance would be
ludicrous. President Clinton obviously did not and could not represent
Mrs. Currie as her attorney. Yet, this sort of explanation illustrates
the lengths to which the President's defenders have gone to try and
explain away the obvious -- there was no legitimate reason the President
made the statements to Mrs. Currie after his grand jury testimony,
other than to "suggest" to her what her testimony should be. In federal
criminal trials, defendants go to jail for such obstruction. In the
case before you, we submit this clearly forms a proper basis on which
to convict this President of obstruction of justice for witness tampering,
and for subsequent perjury.
Please keep in mind, also, it is not
required that the target of the defendant's actions actually testify
falsely. In fact, the witness
tampering statute can be violated even when there is no proceeding
pending at the time the defendant acted. And as the cases discussed
by Mr. Cannon demonstrate, for a conviction under either Section 1503
or 1512, it is necessary only to show it was possible the target of
the defendant's actions might be called as a witness. That element
has been more than met under the facts of this case.
In the case of Mrs. Currie, it was in
fact quite likely she would be called as a defendant in the Jones
case, or in some later proceeding. The President's own testimony on
January 17th pretty much guaranteed this. On several occasions during
his testimony in his Jones deposition, the President referred
to Mrs. Currie or made comments such as, "you'll have to ask Betty."
Even in the absence of the President's suggestive deposition testimony,
simply from her position, where she works closely with the President,
it was foreseeable that Mrs. Currie would be called as a witness in
the Jones case. Most importantly, the President knew Mrs.
Currie had some knowledge about some of the instances when he was
alone with Ms. Lewinsky. From that knowledge alone, the President
could have foreseen Mrs. Currie likely would be called as a witness
in some later proceeding involving his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
This is exactly what President Clinton wanted; a friendly witness
corroborating his false testimony. However, for this plan to succeed,
it required consistent testimony from both him and Mrs. Currie. Thus,
the meeting Sunday to "suggest" testimony.
His actions clearly, we believe, violated
both the general obstruction statute and the witness tampering statute.
4. Obstruction Regarding the
Subpoena for the President's Gifts to Monica Lewinsky.
As has been discussed, while the witness
tampering statute makes it a crime to attempt to influence the testimony
of a person, it also makes it a crime to influence a person to withhold
an object from an official proceeding; in order words, to tamper with
evidence [Chart: 18 USC 1512]. The facts of this case show
the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme
with Monica Lewinsky to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed
in the Jones case.
On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was
served with a subpoena in the Jones case. The subpoena required
her to produce each and every gift given to her by the President.
On December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky again met with the President in
the Oval Office, at which time they exchanged Christmas gifts. They
also discussed the fact that the lawyers in the Jones case
had subpoenaed all the President's gifts to Ms. Lewinsky, and specifically
a hatpin he had given her. The hatpin had sentimental significance
to both of them, in that it was the first gift the President gave
to Ms. Lewinsky. During the conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the President
whether she should put the gifts away outside her house some place,
or give them to someone, maybe "Betty." At that time, according to
Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded, "let me think about that";
apparently, he did think about it; because later that very same day,
only a few hours after Monica Lewinsky and the President had met,
Mrs. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky, setting motion the great gift exchange.
According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mrs. Currie said, "I understand that you
have something to give me," or "[t]he President said you have something
to give me." In her earlier proffer to the Independent Counsel, prior
to her testimony before the grand jury, Ms. Lewinsky stated Mrs. Currie
had said the President had told her Ms. Lewinsky wanted her to hold
on to something for her. After their conversation, Mrs. Currie drove
to Ms. Lewinsky's apartment for only the second time in her life.
There she picked up a box sealed with tape, and on which was written,
"[p]lease do not throw away." Mrs. Currie then took the box, drove
to her own home, and placed the box under her bed. At her grand jury
testimony, Mrs. Currie testified she and Ms. Lewinsky did not discuss
the content of the box; nor did she open it once she got it to her
home; but she knew ("understood") the box contained gifts from the
President. Ms. Lewinsky testified Mrs. Currie did not seem at all
confused or surprised when Ms. Lewinsky handed over a sealed box.
 There
is no question that if the gifts had actually been produced to the
Jones lawyers, they would have established a significant
relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky; knowledge of
the gifts, at a minimum, would have caused the Jones lawyers
to inquire further as to the nature of that relationship. Ms. Lewinsky's
failure to turn over the gifts as required by the subpoena served
on her was, in the words of the witness tampering statute, the withholding
of an object from an official proceeding [Chart: 18 USC 1512].
We believe the evidence shows the President corruptly persuaded Ms.
Lewinsky to withhold these objects from the proceedings in the Jones
case.
In his grand jury testimony, the President
asserted he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to turn over the gifts to the
Jones attorneys. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony directly contradicts
that assertion, and all other evidence of subsequent acts corroborates
her testimony. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky testified she was never under
any impression from anything the President said, that she should turn
over the gifts to Ms. Jones' attorneys; quite the opposite.
Also, the President asserts he never
spoke about this matter with Betty Currie. Instead, the President
would have you believe his personal, confidential secretary would
drive to the home of the woman with whom he was having an "inappropriate
intimate relationship," take possession of a sealed box which she
believed to contain gifts given by the President, hide the box under
the bed in her own home, never question the person giving her the
box as to why she was being asked to take the gifts, and never even
mention to the President she had received the box of gifts. The President's
position is simply not credible. It defies the evidence. It defies
any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. It defies common sense.
And it defies the law [Chart: 18 USC 1512].
The only reasonable interpretation of
the facts is that, following the discussion between the President
and Ms. Lewinsky earlier in the day on December 28th, the President
decided Ms. Lewinsky's suggestion about the gifts was a pretty good
one; the gifts should be put away outside her home. As jurors, you
may reasonably presume, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, along with common sense, that it was the President who
directed Mrs. Currie to call Ms. Lewinsky to tell her she understood
Ms. Lewinsky "had something for her."
This is an entirely reasonable inference
from the evidence. For example, because Mrs. Currie would have no
independent reason to even consider such a course of action.
Mrs. Currie drove to Ms. Lewinsky's home only for the second time
in her life, not because she developed a sudden hankering to do so,
or because she routinely visited interns at their homes, or because
she had a vision; but because the President would have asked her to.
Mrs. Currie did not ask about the contents of the box; she didn't
have to. She knew what was in the box. Mrs. Currie took the box and
hid it under her bed because the President had asked her to hide the
gifts in a place no one else could find. These inferences are plausible.
They are reasonable. They are consistent with common sense and with
the evidence. And they constituted a criminal endeavor by the President.
The President points out Mrs. Currie
has testified that Ms. Lewinsky called her to arrange to pick up the
gifts, rather than the other way around. In fact, Mrs. Currie has
testified inconsistently as to whether Ms. Lewinsky
called her or she called Ms. Lewinsky; actually deferring to Ms. Lewinsky's
superior knowledge of these facts. However, even if one were to accept
for purposes of argument that it was Ms. Lewinsky
who initiated the call, the President's avowal that he had no knowledge
of or involvement with the hiding of gifts is still not plausible.
It is totally unreasonable to presume that the private secretary to
the President of the United States would drop what she was doing,
leave the White House or wherever she was on duty on a normal work
day, travel to the home of a former intern, pick up a box and hide
it in her home, simply because that former intern demanded she do
these things, without either checking with the President or having
prior knowledge from him as to this course of action.
We therefore believe and respectfully
urge you to conclude the only conclusion that can be drawn is that
the President directed Betty Currie to drive to Ms. Lewinsky's home,
pick up the gifts, and hide them; which is what ultimately happened.
In so doing, he persuaded a person to withhold objects from an official
proceeding and obstructed the due administration of justice [Chart:
18 USC 1512]. In so acting, he committed the crime of witness
tampering under Sections 1512 and 1503 of Title 18 of the United States
Code.
Further, and without repeating all the
arguments of my colleague Managers, when the President testified falsely
as to these transactions involving the secreting of the gifts, his
statements to the grand jury on this matter constitute perjury in
violation of Section 1623.
But there's more on this point.
Ms. Lewinsky testified she met with the
President for 45 minutes on December 28th, at which time
they discussed the fact she had been subpoenaed, along with the need
to conceal the gifts. The President's testimony directly conflicts
with Ms. Lewinsky's on this point and constitutes perjury.
 First,
the evidence establishes that his professed inability to remember
whether she and the gifts had been subpoenaed is false. Please keep
in mind: when evaluating the circumstantial evidence to determine
whether a false statement was made intentionally, the most important
evidence to consider is the existence of a motive to lie. It is the
calculated falsehood, combined with a clear motive to lie that leads
to the conclusion that it was an intentional false statement. Also,
please bear in mind the law will not allow someone to testify "I don't
recall" or "I'm not sure" when such answer is unreasonable under the
circumstances. Former United States Representative Patrick Swindall
tried this course of action when he appeared before a grand jury in
the Northern District of Georgia in 1988. His evasive and false answers
to the grand jury provided the basis for his subsequent conviction.
See, for example, U.S. v. Swindall, 971 F 2d 1531 (11th Cir.
1992).
Feigned forgetfulness, or feigned assertions
that grand jury questions are ambiguous, cannot, and in fact in federal
criminal proceedings, do not, shield defendants from criminal liability
for perjury or impeding the conduct of a federal grand jury. Nor should
such efforts be allowed to shield President Clinton from conviction
on these two Articles of Impeachment. The President, a man of considerable
intelligence and gifted with an exceptional memory, can and should
be inferred [Chart: Definition of Inference]
to have clearly understood what he was doing, the logical
and reasonable consequences of his actions, and the questions put
to him by the Independent Counsel in the grand jury questioning.
He had a clear motive to falsely state
to the grand jury that he could not recall that he knew on December
28th that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and that the
subpoena called for her to produce the gifts. To have acknowledged
as much would have helped to establish a motive on his part for orchestrating
the concealment of the gifts.
And there is no doubt the President's
statement of feigned forgetfulness was material. Again, to have acknowledged
the truth would have helped to establish a clear motive to conceal
the gifts; precisely the kind of wrongdoing being investigated by
the grand jury. But the President didn't just feign forgetfulness,
he testified that he wasn't concerned about the gifts, and that he
told Ms. Lewinsky she would have to turn over whatever gifts she had.
The President's testimony is not credible.
The President's counsel will likely argue
the fact that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on
that same day is proof of the President's assertions. Their argument
cannot be sustained in the face of so much evidence to the contrary.
The evidence points to a much more plausible explanation. The additional
gifts given that day demonstrate the President's continued confidence
that Ms. Lewinsky would keep to their earlier agreement to conceal
their relationship. It is also plausible that the additional gifts
were intended as a gesture of affection by President Clinton to Ms.
Lewinsky, to help ensure she would not testify against
him. Ms. Lewinsky clearly understood the dangers of being truthful,
as did the President. And that is why he testified
he could not remember whether he knew at their December 28th
meeting she and the gifts had been subpoenaed, even though he really
-- and obviously -- could remember. And that's why he was concerned
about the gifts, even though he testified he wasn't. And that's why
he clearly conveyed to her the need for concealing the gifts, even
though he testified he didn't. And that's why he orchestrated, or
at a minimum participated in, an illegal scheme to conceal the gifts,
even though he testified he didn't.
The President's testimony on these points
before the grand jury was knowingly false as to material matters under
investigation. As such, the President committed perjury in violation
of Section 1623.
5. Intensification of the Job
Search.
We believe the evidence shows that beginning
on about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January
14, 1998, the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to
secure job assistance for a witness in a federal civil rights action
brought against him, in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony
of the witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony
of the witness would have been harmful to him.
As my colleagues have detailed for you,
after Ms. Lewinsky lost her job at the White House, she made several
attempts to convince the President to return her to the White House.
Eventually she learned a decision had been made on a staff level to
prevent her from returning. She decided to change tack. She wrote
directly to the President, asked for, and received a meeting in which
she asked him to find her a job in New York City. The day before the
President filed his answers to the interrogatories in the Jones
case, he asked Mrs. Currie to set up a meeting for Ms. Lewinsky with
Mr. Vernon Jordan. Two days after he filed his answers in which he
refused to answer whether he ever had any extra-marital relationships,
that meeting occurred. But Mr. Jordan made no efforts to assist her
in November. In fact, Mr. Jordan later testified that he "had no recollection
of an early November meeting." There was, of course, at that early
stage, no urgency.
The situation changed dramatically in
early December 1997. On the afternoon of December 6th, the President
became aware Ms. Lewinsky had been named as a witness in the Jones
case. Earlier that day, she had thrown a tantrum at the White House's
Northwest gate when she was unable to meet with the President because
he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. Despite the President's initial
anger over Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and over the acts of some of the
Secret Service officers, just five days later, Ms Lewinsky had her
second meeting with Mr. Jordan. But this time, unlike previously,
this powerful Washington lawyer jumped for the former intern. He immediately
placed calls to three major corporations on her behalf.
Also, on December 11th, Judge Wright
ordered the President to answer Paula Jones' interrogatory regarding
extra-marital relationships. On December 17th, the President suggested
to Ms. Lewinsky she file the affidavit and continue to use their cover
stories in the event she was asked about her relationship with the
President. The next day she had two interviews in New York City arranged
by Mr. Jordan. On December 22nd, Ms. Lewinsky met with an attorney
at a meeting arranged by Mr. Jordan. The following day, she had another
job interview arranged by Mr. Jordan.
On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky signed
the false affidavit and proudly showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan;
the next day, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan
with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York; an interview that went poorly.
To remedy this, she called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Mr. Jordan
then called the CEO of MacAndrews and Forbes, Ron Perelman, to, in
his word, "make things happen, if they could happen." After Mr. Jordan's
call to Mr. Perelman, Ms. Lewinsky was called and told she would be
interviewed again the next morning. The following day she was re-interviewed
and immediately offered a job. She then called Mr. Jordan to tell
him and he passed the information on to Mrs. Currie: "Tell the President,
"Mission Accomplished."
What are you, as jurors, entitled to
conclude from all of this, as a matter of law and of fact? Until it
became clear Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the Jones case,
little was done to help her with her job search. But once she was
listed as a witness, things changed dramatically and rapidly. Just
days after she is listed on the Jones witness list, she gets
a second meeting with one of the most influential men in Washington.
But, unlike their first meeting, Vernon Jordan now makes three calls
on her behalf to get her job interview. A week later the President
proposed the affidavit and cover stories. The next day Ms. Lewinsky
has two job interviews in New York. A few days later, Mr. Jordan arranges
for an attorney to represent her. The next day she has another job
interview he arranged. Two weeks later, she signs the affidavit. The
next day another interview. When that doesn't go well, Mr. Jordan
gets her another interview the next day. And on that very day, she
gets a job. "Mission Accomplished." Obstruction Accomplished. Another
potentially embarrassing witness in the bag.
Were Monica Lewinsky to get a job and
move to New York, this would help the President substantially in two
ways. First, it would, presumably, create a happy and probably compliant
witness; one willing if not eager, to support the President's false
testimony. Second, it would make Ms. Lewinsky much more difficult,
if not impossible, to reach as a witness. In fact, this is precisely
what the President himself suggested to Ms. Lewinsky during their
December 28th meeting, according to her sworn testimony.
To put it plainly, but respectfully,
if that is not obstruction by witness tampering, one would be hard
pressed to find a fact pattern that was.
This aspect of the case against the President
is important. She gets the job, even after she flubs the interview.
And what did the President get? The key affidavit to throw the Jones
lawyers off the trail, asserting that there was no sexual relationship
between them. And possibly a witness outside the practical reach of
the Jones lawyers; much like the absent witnesses we've seen
in large numbers in the campaign finance investigations.
The President's efforts were designed
to and did obstruct justice and tamper with a witness. His actions
were crimes under section 1503 and section 1512.
6. The President's False Statements
to his Senior Aides.
As previously discussed, under the statute
and federal case law, the witness tampering statute may be violated
even if there is no proceeding pending at the time the defendant attempts
to intimidate or influence the testimony of a potential witness. All
that need be shown to prove a violation of the statute, is that the
defendant engaged in "misleading conduct" toward another person with
the intent to influence that person's testimony in an official proceeding.
"Misleading conduct" is specifically defined at Paragraph (a) (3)
of Section 1515 [Chart: 18 USC 1515], and includes, among
other elements, "knowingly making a false statement" or "intentionally
omitting information from a statement." When you, as jurors, properly
apply these definitions to the terms of Section 1512, the federal
witness tampering statute, and then turn your attention to the facts
of this case, wherein the President repeatedly and deliberately gave
false explanations to aides he knew or should reasonably have known,
would be witnesses in federal judicial proceedings, the conclusion
he violated this statute, is, we respectfully submit, unavoidable.
Importantly under federal case law, "misleading
conduct" had been interpreted to involve a situation where a defendant
tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true,
intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it before
the grand jury. See, for example, O'Keefe, supra.
In January 1998, the President made statements
to a number of his senior aides, we believe, in order to corruptly
influence the testimony of those persons in an official proceeding,
whether that be the Jones case or some later proceeding.
It is not necessary to recount here the
evidence and arguments already presented to you, concerning the documented
efforts by the President, to convince several of his top aides (to
say nothing of the entire population of the country), that his relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky was something other than what it was in fact.
Insofar as several of these attempts were made in the context
of possible witnesses in judicial proceedings, they in fact fall within
the ambit of the federal obstruction statutes, Sections 1503 and 1512.
We respectfully argue this jury would be on sound legal ground to
so find as the basis for conviction of the President on the Second
Article of Impeachment.
As has already been presented to you,
the President's statements to Messrs. Ickes, Podesta, Bowles, Blumenthal,
and others, were all lies; misleading statements; all statements intended
to create a false impression. They all constitute witness tampering
within the terms of section 1512 as further defined by section 1515
[Chart: 18 USC 1515].
We believe the President made all these
statements with the intent to influence the testimony of these aides
in the event they were called to testify about their knowledge of
the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Given that the Lewinsky
story had just become known throughout the nation, it was clearly
likely, and reasonably anticipated by the President, that the Jones
lawyers would seek to depose Ms. Lewinsky. It was also reasonably
foreseeable they would seek to depose Mr. Clinton's senior aides to
learn what they knew about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and
especially concerning whether they had seen the two of them together
at the White House.
Each of these individuals then, was a
potential witness in the Jones case. It was also reasonably
foreseeable this matter might result in some other judicial proceeding
at a later time, given that the President had made statements under
oath denying his relationship to Ms. Lewinsky; statements which exposed
him to potential criminal penalty. Thus, it was likely his senior
aides would be called as witnesses in a later judicial proceeding
concerning the President's false statements. Indeed, they were later
called to testify before a judicial proceeding. Each of them relayed
the story the President told them. Thus, the tampering "succeeded";
the intended result happened. And the administration of justice was
-- temporarily -- thwarted.
In making these statements to his aides,
the President was engaging in "misleading conduct" (as defined and
contemplated by federal statute) toward those aides, with the intent
to influence their testimony in an official proceeding. When
he did this -- and he did this -- the President committed witness
tampering in violation of federal law (18 USC Section 1512).
7. Statements by the President
and his Lawyer About the Affidavit During the Jones Deposition.
The obstruction statute may also be violated
by a person who gives false testimony. In the Jones case,
the President allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements
to a federal judge. This part of the obstruction scheme was accomplished
by characterizing as true the false affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky,
in order to prevent questioning by the Jones lawyers which
had already been deemed relevant by the judge in the case.
As has already been discussed, during
the President's deposition on January 17, 1998, an attorney for Paula
Jones began to ask the President questions concerning his relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's lawyer, Robert Bennett, objected
to the "innuendo" of the questions and pointed out Ms. Lewinsky had
signed an affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the President.
He then asserted "there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape,
or form." Following the statement, Judge Wright warned Mr. Bennett
about making an assertion of fact in front of the witness, to which
he replied, "I am not coaching the witness. In preparation of the
witness for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of [the] affidavit,
so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't know." The President's
lawyer didn't know what an understatement that was.
On September 30, 1998, long after the
deposition, and after the full evidence of Ms. Lewinsky's relationship
with the President became public, Mr. Bennett wrote to Judge Wright
[Chart: Bennett Letter] to inform
her that she should not rely on the statements he made during the
President's deposition, because parties of the Affidavit were "misleading
and not true" [Chart: 18 USC 1515]. "Misleading and not true."
Sounds like 18 USC 1515.
Which brings us full circle. Full circle
from a false affidavit confirming earlier concocted cover stories,
through a web of obstruction, to a letter from a distinguished lawyer
forced to do what no lawyer wants to do, but every honorable lawyer
must do when confronted with clear evidence their client has misled
the court, and that is, to correct the record of falsity to the court,
to the detriment of his client.
Closing.
What we have before us, Senators, and
Mr. Chief Justice, is really not complex. Critically important, yes.
But not essentially complex. Virtually every federal or state prosecutor
-- and there are many such distinguished persons on this jury -- has
seen such cases of obstruction before in their careers, probably repeated
-- a pattern of obstruction of justice compounded by subsequent perjury
to cover it up.
The President's lawyers will almost certainly
try to weave a spell of complexity over the facts of this case. They
will nit pick the time of a call, or parse a specific word or phrase
of testimony, much as the President has done. We urge you, the distinguished
jurors in this case, not to be fooled. Use your common sense. Your
reason. Your varied and successful career experiences.
Just as any juror in any jury box anywhere in America does each day
a court is in session. Just as does the average juror, so too have
each of you sworn to decide these momentous matters impartially. Your
oath to look to the law and our majestic Constitution demand this
of you. As this great body has done so many times in the course of
our nation's history, I am confident you will neither shirk from nor
cast aside that duty.
Rather, I urge, and fully anticipate
you will look at the volume of facts, hopefully supplemented by live
witnesses, and to the clear and fully applicable statutes; and conclude
that William Jefferson Clinton in fact and under the law, violated
his oath and violated the laws of this land, and convict him on both
Articles of Impeachment, of Perjury and Obstruction of Justice. Even
though such a high burden is not required of you under the Law of
Impeachment, in fact it is there; it is met. The perjury is there.
The obstruction is there. We ask you to strike down these insidious
cancers that eat at our system of government and laws. Strike it down
with the Constitution so it might not fester as a gaping wound; poisoning
future generations of children; poisoning our court system; and perhaps
even poisoning future generations of political leaders. Just as Members
of both Houses of Congress have been convicted and removed from office
for perjury and obstruction; and just as federal judges have been
removed by you from life tenure for perjury and obstruction, so must
a president; so, sadly, should this President.
Thank you Mr. Chief Justice. And thank
you members of the United States Senate, sitting as jurors in the
Trial of President William Jefferson Clinton.
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