Journalist Recounts His Experiences With Taliban in Afghanistan

ROBERT ZELIGER, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Nir Rosen is an author and journalist and a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security. He recently returned from Afghanistan where he wrote about the Taliban for Rolling Stone Magazine. Nir, thanks for joining us.

NIR ROSEN, a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security as well as the New America Foundation: Thanks for having me.

ROBERT ZELIGER: After spending time with these guys, what did you learn? What are they like?

NIR ROSEN: Well the whole trip was very revealing. Just getting there itself was a shock. We drove down the famous Kabul to Kandahar Highway which continues all around the country. It's called the Ring Road. It was a hallmark of the American reconstruction effort. And it's completely and utterly destroyed. It no longer exists. It's a series of potholes going all the way down -- I'm sorry, they're actually craters from, immense craters, not potholes -- and as a result of roadside bombs which were so successful in Iraq. And these roadside bombs are generally attacking convoys, logistical convoys that go to supply coalition NATO bases. And the entire road is littered on both sides with the charred smoldering carcasses of all these trucks and within like half an hour of leaving Kabul we were actually in the middle of a war.

The Taliban were fighting with the Americans a few hundred meters away from us. And the road was closed and we had to wait for the fighting to end. I had been picked up by two Taliban commanders. They drove up to Kabul, picked me up and drove me down to Ghazni province which is about 120 miles south.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And who are these Taliban commanders? Can you describe who your guides were?

NIR ROSEN: One of them was an experienced Mujahid, he fought the Soviets in the ‘80s and then had grown disenchanted with the Mujahideen who had began to fight each other following Soviet withdrawal. And eventually joined the Taliban out of frustration with the war lords who were terrorizing the Afghans and now continues to fight on behalf of the Taliban against the Americans.

And the other guy was a little more senior and he was also a liaison with the Taliban Minister of Defense. The Taliban actually has ministers and governors for each province. They have on paper at least a well established structure. Although I was to learn that in reality of course it falls victim to Afghanistan which is much more vociferous and bitter rivalries divide different groups just as they did the various Mujahideen parties in the ‘80s.

Both these commanders drove me down to Ghazni to the Andar District which is one of the hottest districts in terms of action these days. And there we entered various villages which were entirely under the control of the Taliban. In fact most of Ghazni Province is basically under their control even in, during the day they have checkpoints with the Taliban where they stop vehicles, take people out of them, kill them if they feel they have a good reason to, attack police and army checkpoints regularly.

 And we went on various patrols with the Taliban during the day. They go around with RPGs, rocket grenade launchers, machine guns, really not a care in the world as if there's no Americans in the country at all. They feel very confident. They adjudicate disputes between farmers, they hold trials and execute alleged spies, conduct operations against so-called collaborators with the occupation, whether they're police or army or government workers.

ROBERT ZELIGER: How did you arrange to . . .

NIR ROSEN: I was lucky. I have a friend who's, who I trust, who has a very good reputation throughout Afghanistan, due in part to his fight against the Soviets in the ‘80s. He explained to this one Taliban commander what I wanted to do. That guy requested permission from the Taliban Minister of Defense called Mullah Boradar. Mullah Boradar approved and that was it. We went down and they were going to show me around, take me on operations and give me about a 10 day view of their life.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And it didn't last long because you got into some trouble at one point right with, you were detained by a Taliban leader. Who was he and what did he want?

NIR ROSEN: It turned out that my commander that was sort of protecting me, taking me around had clashed with this rival commander called Dr. Khalil. My commander had killed 11 Pakistanis and two Arabs under the command of the other guy and because they had wanted to close down a girl's school which already is indicative of some pragmatism.

So there was a contest of authority as well between these two guys and as bad blood resulting from killing of the foreign fighters and upon hearing that there was a foreign journalist in the area, this commander was slightly more senior in the district, basically ordered me detained and put on trial for being a spy. It was never clear if he actually believed I was a spy or just wanted to hold onto me for the ransom.

But it took about 24 hours for my various contacts to be able to reach just about every Taliban commander they could think of and finally the Taliban Minister of Defense and only he was able to secure my release. The Taliban governor for the province actually tried and failed. So it was one look into the various rivalries that divide the movement. And what I also got to see was just some of the daily life, what these guys do when they come home. The commander I was with sat down and watched Indian soap opera.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And also Iranian, you said Iranian pop music.

NIR ROSEN: Yeah. Iranian pop music both of which the Taliban would have severely punished in the ‘90s certainly. This guy was a commander so he obviously knew that but he didn't seem to care at all. And there was very little separating him from your average Pashtun from the region. I think he could have almost just as likely joined the police or the army. In fact very little often separates tribes or villages who join the police or those who join the Taliban could be just an insult over a contract. It could result from the governor favoring one tribe over another, but I also found that these guys, many of them could, seemed like they could be brought into the system, into the process. They seemed willing to negotiate with the army and the police once the foreigners left, that was one of their requirements. When the foreigners leave they said they wouldn't have a reason to fight anymore.

ROBERT ZELIGER: What can you say about in terms of how much the Taliban has evolved since they were driven from power in 2001? I mean at one point you mentioned their attitude towards women seems to have changed a bit. Several commanders have told you that they thought women could have jobs and go to school. Now is that a major shift on their part?

NIR ROSEN: Acknowledging that women can work even be, even serve in the government and go to school is definitely a step forward. Because throughout Afghanistan the plight of women is just absolutely horrible and it's not like it's unique to the Taliban. They were also more, I would say the Taliban are becoming more of a Pashtun nationalist movement in the sense of Pashtun alienation. The Taliban are seizing upon that and in some way becoming less of purely Afghan or Islamist movement. And perhaps that's also a good thing in a sense that they're appealing to local grievances.

There is a danger, of course, that they're becoming more linked to, to global jihadist movements. They definitely resent foreigners which includes foreign fighters, it includes Pakistan, and the Arabs who join them, Pakistanis who join them. It was clear that the guys I was with disapproved of suicide bombings which are common tactic of the Taliban. And one of them actually complained that the Taliban are killing too many civilians. So these aren't exactly huge steps forward but they are a sign of an increased pragmatism.

So there are signs that perhaps could be taken advantage of. However, I doubt that the Americans have the elegance and the subtlety to be able to that. Moreover, I think the Taliban are so confident because they really are at this point becoming more and more victorious. They might see little reason to negotiate. Once you leave Kabul, you're entering Taliban territory. They're taking more and more land approaching Kabul in attacks in and around Kabul Province are more and more brazen. They've shut down the main roads leaving Kabul. And it really seems irreversible.

ROBERT ZELIGER: I know you've written a lot about insurgents in Iraq and also militants in Lebanon as well. Taliban you wrote about in this article seem to be very in certain instances disorganized and there's a lot of internal fighting. Are there similarities to these other groups that you've written about?

NIR ROSEN: Certainly in Iraq I think we saw much more internal fighting and eventually of course that resulted in the Sunni militias expelling al Qaeda, but I think we see throughout the history of various insurgent movements and anti-colonist movements that they often kill more of their own than they do of the purported enemy. So I think that this is not unusual. In fact, we could expect that the more successful the Taliban become the more divisions we'll see. The more small groups will emerge and the less control Mullah Omar and Pakistan will actually have over the Taliban.

ROBERT ZELIGER: And finally just explain what happened in your case, how you actually were able to eventually get away or how you . . .

NIR ROSEN: Well it's a, I've been in trouble before but usually I can understand what's going on. I can speak Arabic. In this case it was a little more difficult and it was very remote. The Taliban also shut down the cell phone towers at night. So it was, there was no way for me to communicate with the two contacts I had in Kabul to try to help me. But they managed to make enough phone calls to Taliban leaders in Pakistan and Kandahar and United Arab Emirates really anybody they could think of to put pressure on this one commander to let me go. And indeed in the end it took the Taliban Minister of Defense to call him up and threaten him until he changed his attitude and became much more friendly.

In fact, he himself drove me to the border of the district. He showed me, "This is where my control ends, and the government control begins." Pointed to the nearby American base. Really felt very confident this is his territory and the Americans conduct divisional operations and air strikes, but didn't seem to affect them at all.

ROBERT ZELIGER: The article is called, "How We Lost the War We Won" and is in the current issue of Rolling Stone Magazine. Nir Rosen, thank you very much.

NIR ROSEN: Thank you.