A wave of fighting swept Iraq in August 2004, killing 65
American soldiers and wounding scores more. Although the violence
had been characterized by the CIA as a "classic insurgency,"
the enemy shooting at the Americans was not Islamic extremists
organized by al-Qaida, but instead Shiite Iraqis who U.S.
planners had assumed would welcome the American-led invasion.
 The
battles pitted U.S. forces against roving militias in the
narrow alleys and sprawling, dusty cemetery of the southern
Iraqi city of Najaf. The soldiers fought forces loyal to
a fiery populist leader whose newspaper had been shuttered
by the Americans earlier in 2004 for alleged anti-American
rhetoric.
The battle that played out in one of the world's most revered
centers of religious teaching for scholars of Shia Islam
between coalition forces and rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's
Mahdi Army raised a potentially troubling question -- what
would be the role of these armed militias in the new Iraq.
Sadr's Mahdi Army is one of dozens of militias in Iraq
-- armed groups that number anywhere in the low hundreds
to as many as 100,000, and whose training, arsenals and
goals vary widely. Many have existed long before the U.S.
invasion. Others are more recent incarnations. There are
those motivated by religious leaders, and those who serve
as regional ethnic armies. Some even offer basic services
like health care and water -- services the central government
is struggling to provide.
Despite their differences, the militias do have some common
traits. Most are better trained and more heavily armed than
the new Iraqi army, and despite various efforts to disband
them or fold them into a larger national force, the escalation
of sectarian violence has helped solidify their support
among local populations.
The Kurdish pesh merga
But not all militia groups are created equal. Perhaps the
most formidable of these groups is the pesh merga found
in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. The pesh merga (Kurdish
for "those who face death") comprises the armed
forces of the two main political parties in that part of
the country, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan. Numbering anywhere from 60,000 to 100,000
men, the pesh merga are considered to be among the elite
military forces in the country.
 With
roots extending back decades, the pesh mergas rose to prominence
after the Gulf War when they, with the aid of U.S. air forces,
fought to repel Saddam Hussein's military from the Kurdish
areas. But despite the fall of Saddam's regime in April
2003, and the more recent election of Kurdish leader Jalal
Talabani as Iraq's president, the Kurdish leadership has
given no indication it is willing to let go of the reins
of its armies, or even integrate them into the new Iraqi
military.
The leadership's reasons run deep. Kurds were on the receiving
end of a brutal military campaign in the 1980s during which
Saddam launched chemical strikes on Kurdish villages. And
as if to clarify Kurdish intentions, Massoud Barzani, leader
of the KDP and president of the Kurdistan Regional Government,
told the New York Times in February 2005 that the Kurds
"want to keep our pesh merga because they are a symbol
of resistance. ... It's not a matter to be discussed or
negotiated."
But some analysts worry a strong pesh merge could threaten
Iraq's fragile unity -- given the overwhelming support among
Kurds for independence from Iraq -- and derail efforts to
build an inclusive Iraqi military.
Already, the new Iraqi army can enter the Kurdish region
only with the consent of the Kurdistan Regional Government
itself. And, as Michael Rubin, a former Iraq policy adviser
at the Pentagon, noted recently in the National Review,
Kurdish border officials stamp passports "with the
emblem of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region," and "Barzani's
[KDP] militia forbids flying the Iraqi flag."
Still, the Kurdish leadership continues to publicly state
its desire to be part of a unified, federal Iraq. And while
it may field the most effective military force in the country
-- far more potent than any controlled by the central government
-- it's not Iraq's sole militia power.
Shiites field their own militias
Developments in southern Iraq in recent months have fueled
similar concerns about militias formed by Shiite leaders.
Of the Shiite groups the largest appears to be the armed
wing of the political party the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. Formed in Iran in the early
1980s, SCIRI says it was made up of "thousands of former
Iraqi officers and soldiers who defected from the Iraqi
army, Iraqi refugees" and others who fled Iraq during
its war with Iran. Its ranks swelled again after Saddam's
crackdown on the 1991 Shiite uprising in southern Iraq that
followed the first Gulf War.
From these members, SCIRI formed its militia, the Badr
Corps. Now known as the Badr Organization, the group is
named after a seminal battle in the early days of Islam.
Initially trained and armed by Iran's Revolutionary Guards
to carry out attacks on Iraqi military units, the group's
original goal was Saddam's ouster, and his replacement by
a religious regime friendlier to Iran.
And while it was those guerilla attacks that earned it
a reputation for ruthless effectiveness, SCIRI officials
now hold some of the highest elected positions in Iraq,
including the office of vice president and several regional
governorships. Even as its political leaders have risen
in the ranks of the new Iraq, SCIRI officials have resisted
calls to disband their militia, and a March 2005 Library
of Congress report estimated the Badr group numbered roughly
10,000 fighters.
In addition to remaining a potent military group, Badr
also has been accused of helping impose stricter Islamic
business and dress codes in southern Shiite areas, including
the closure of liquor stores and the calls for more conservative
dress.
 Sunnis
have also blamed an elite Interior Ministry commando unit
called the Wolf Brigade -- thought to be made up of Badr
soldiers -- for revenge attacks on Sunni clerics and other
officials. Also, Iraqi police officers loyal to the Badr
organization are suspected of having tortured Sunni prisoners
at an Interior Ministry facility near Baghdad in November
2005, charges Iraq's Shiite prime minister has promised
to investigate.
The reach and potential impact of groups like the Badr
Organization continue to worry advocates of a strong central
government in Baghdad. A southern police commander told
a British newspaper during the summer of 2005 that three-quarters
of his men were loyal to militias like Badr. Additionally,
some senior SCIRI officials have called for Shiite autonomous
regions in southern Iraq, as the Kurds have in the north,
escalating fears of a breakup of the country.
Despite the concerns, SCIRI officials have rejected calls
for the group to disband. SCIRI's leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
was quoted by the Associated Press in June 2005 as saying,
"Badr is a patriotic group that works for Iraq's interests
and it will not be dragged into sectarian or any other kind
of conflict."
The situation remains largely the same with Muqtada al-Sadr's
Mahdi Army, whose forces have battled U.S. troops on many
occasions. With as many as 10,000 lightly to moderately
armed men, the Mahdi Army finds its recruits in the poor,
disaffected youth of Shiite slums such as in Sadr City in
eastern Baghdad, or various Shiite cities across Iraq's
south. And while Sadr's political goals in Iraq have yet
to crystallize, the Mahdi's mere existence can still complicate
the American or Iraqi plans.
Broader struggle
Because of these various allegiances and clashes among
groups, it is unclear whether militias and their affiliated
political parties are focused more on advancing their own
goals or moving toward a stable Iraq.
The Sunni community, which does not field any discernible
force of its own, has expressed concern that the sectarian
violence could spiral into civil war. It also has voiced
fears that Shiite Iran may develop too much influence in
fledgling Iraq.
But American commanders point to signs of progress. A former
Kurdish pesh merga commander now leads one of Iraq's new
national army divisions. More Sunni Arabs are being recruited
into a military accused of being dominated by former members
of Shiite and Kurdish militias. And more Iraqi military
units are leading raids against insurgents.
But most observers contend the future of Iraq's militias
will be determined not on the battlefield but by the political
fortunes of the various constituent elements of the country.
For now, the leaders of the central government in Iraq
are hailing the role of the militia in combating groups
like al-Qaida in Iraq and others that continue to carry
out attacks against Iraqi civilians.
"Today, there is a sacred mission of sweeping away
the remnants of the dictatorship and defeating the terrorism,
and your role with your brothers in the [Kurdish] pesh merga
is required and necessary to fulfill this sacred mission,"
President Talabani told a Badr gathering in June 2005.
Outside links
Iraqi Government
Najaf
Kurdistan Regional Government
Kurdish Democratic Party
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
Central Intelligence Agency
-- By David Butterworth for the Online NewsHour
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