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| Originally Aired: February 20, 2008 |
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Legal Experts Answered Your Questions on Sept. 11 Trials |
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| The Pentagon recently charged six Guantanamo detainees with crimes tied to the Sept. 11 attacks. They will now face trial by a military commission that could sentence them to death. Two legal experts answer your questions on the road ahead for the Sept. 11 trials and the debate over how the law applies to detainees. |
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RAY SUAREZ: Welcome to this week's Insider Forum, I'm Ray Suarez. Last week, the U.S. military announced six of the Guantanamo Bay detainees will face trial by a military commission for their alleged involvement in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The trial is set to be held in what's called Camp Justice in Guantanamo Bay. The accused include the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Mohamed al-Kahtani, the so-called "20th hijacker," who was barred entry to the U.S. a month before 9/11. Here to answer your questions about the legal aspects of the trials are two guests. Lee Casey is a partner at the law firm Baker Hostetler in Washington, D.C., where he focuses on federal and constitutional law. From 1986 to 1993, Mr. Casey served in various capacities in the Federal government, including the Office of Legal Counsel, which advises the White House, and the attorney general. Also joining us is Jonathan Hafetz. He's a lawyer at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University. He focuses on a range of post-Sept. 11 detention and government issues, along with immigration rights. He's currently representing Ali Saleh Kahlah Al Marri, the only enemy combatant being held in mainland America. Welcome to you both. Let me start by asking whether this architecture that we've built to try these men is really complete -- are there any questions yet to be answered, are there questions that we will only answer through the very act of trying these men. Lee Casey? LEE CASEY: Well, I think the basic architecture is complete, but it is true that there are questions that really, only the court can answer, and ultimately through the appeals process. Because of the way our judicial system works and the requirement of a case and controversy, there are certain things -- including, for example, the constitutionality of military commissions that ultimately will be resolved only once the commission process begins and you have individuals who have gone through a commission and then are appealing their verdicts up into the system, and ultimately into the Supreme Court. RAY SUAREZ: Jonathan Hafetz? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Yeah, I think it's an untested system with many, many unanswered questions and problems. You know, this is now six years since the -- or more than six years since the president first tried to establish military commissions. We haven't had one trial, and all of the evidence suggests that the commission system, it doesn't work, it's beset with problems and uncertainties, and I really don't think there's been a compelling case made for the use of the commissions, as opposed to the well-established procedures that we have in the criminal justice system, or even in the military courts martial system. RAY SUAREZ: Through the actual process, will answers emerge from this process, Jonathan Hafetz, that will satisfy you as to the legitimacy of this structure, the rules of evidence, the ability to question accusers, the ability for these men to have effective counsel? Recently, when I interviewed Gen. Hartman, who announced the indictments recently, and is running the show as an Air Force lawyer, he said, "well, some of these things really will only be possible to know, once we see how they work, when someone's actually being tried." Jonathan Hafetz, do you anticipate that there can be a process that emerges from this early design that could satisfy you? JONATHAN HAFETZ: No. While I think some questions may be answered, I think you really have two large problems; certain fundamental safeguards -- you mentioned one, the right, for example, to confront your accusers, are just absent. And you're never going to have fair proceedings without those fundamental safeguards. And second, you have a problem with legitimacy. The commissions, I do not think, will ever have the legitimacy that's really needed, and that America needs to have in terms of meting out justice for the Sept. 11 attacks and the horrors that were committed. And so, I think both because of certain inherent flaws, and because of a lack of credibility, the commissions are really doomed to fail. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, you heard Jonathan Hafetz talk about the lack of fundamental guarantees. LEE CASEY: Right. RAY SUAREZ: Are they fundamental to you? Or do these defendants -- should they be accorded the same kind of protections and guarantees as someone arrested for a crime in the United States? LEE CASEY: Well, these defendants are being accorded all of the fundamental guarantees that they are entitled to under the laws and customs of war. And, indeed, they are actually getting more than traditionally was granted in military commissions. I think it's important to understand that while the current military commission system, set up under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, is new, military commissions are very old. They have been a part of our legal tradition, really, since the beginning of the country and were used during the Civil War, and most especially after the Second World War in occupied Germany and in the Far East, to try individuals accused of war crimes. Those trials, actually, were conducted under procedures that were really far less well-fleshed out than the ones we have here with the Military Commissions Act, and ultimately they worked rather well, and did justice. In terms of the fundamental guarantees that the defendants will have, they will, in fact have much of what we would have in a civilian court; they will have a presumption of innocence, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They will have the ability to confront and cross-examine their accusers. But there are some differences, because of the sensitive nature of a lot of the information and a lot of the evidence, some parts of the trials may be closed to the public. And some of the evidence may be given to the defendant's lawyers, but not to the defendant's themselves -- in a summary form, but not in full form. But remember, these are military courts, they're not civilian courts, and so these differences do not mean that they're not fair. |
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Jonathan Hafetz
Brennan Center for Justice |
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You can use military force, when necessary, if there's some kind of direct connection to hostilities. But the real question is how you treat individuals when you capture them.
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The place to try war criminals
RAY SUAREZ: Do they belong in a military process in the first place, Jonathan Hafetz?JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, I think some do, potentially, and some don't. I mean, I think that's one of the big problems that we have and with the approach of the Administration, and essentially it's a conception of a "war on terror," which means you can really pick up anybody, anytime, anyplace, you know, even if it's, you know, remote from any kind of a battlefield situation. And so, I think that individuals who are subject, who commit war crimes, combatants who commit war crimes in an armed conflict, could potentially be subject to a fair -- and full and fair -- military system. But, I think there are other individuals who are really, including a number of people at Guantanamo, who are really civilians. And if they're going to be tried at all, they should be tried in criminal courts. RAY SUAREZ: A lot of the people at Guantanamo, Lee Casey, fought for no government, were no officers in any army, had not declared war in any legal sense on the United States. Is comparing them to the soldiers of previous conflicts and previous military commissions really a valid comparison? LEE CASEY: Well, I think it is. I think, first of all, that they have associated themselves with a group or a cause that, at least in its own mind, has declared war against the United States, and has actually carried out acts of war against the United States. I mean, it is certainly true that this war, the War on Terror, is unusual because our enemy is not another sovereign, and that creates certain real problems for fighting the war. But the law has recognized that you can be in a state of armed conflict with something other than another sovereign state. The Supreme Court recognized that in the late-19th century with respect to the Indian tribes. And being in a state of war, actually there's a lot of legal implications from that. Because, if in fact we are not or can not be in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda, that means for example, that we can't carry out armed attacks against al Qaeda. I mean, if they're criminal defendants, you can't just go shoot them. I mean, you know, no where is that the law. So, this conflict falls in, admittedly, an unusual area of the Law of Armed Conflict, but it clearly falls within the Law of Armed Conflict. RAY SUAREZ: Well, Jonathan Hafetz, how about that? That idea that if they were more akin to the mafia -- an ongoing criminal conspiracy -- you'd have to treat them differently, and you couldn't go with an army and shoot at them on the battlefield in order to kill them, and end their activities against the United States and its interests, its citizens. JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, I don't accept, and I disagree with the sort of duality that's been posed. I think that certainly it's not the case that you can't use military force outside of a state-to-state armed conflict, the question -- you certainly can use military force, although there are limits on when you can use military force. And certainly, we wouldn't want a situation where, if we accept the administration's position, essentially anyone they suspect of terrorism, associated with a terrorist group, you know it's someone who's a terrorist -- under their definition, you'd be an enemy combatant, you could literally be shot on the street of the United States. You can use military force, when necessary, if there's some kind of direct connection to hostilities. But the real question is how you treat individuals when you capture them. And my whole problem with the -- well, my main problem with the military commissions, is there's really not been a compelling case for going outside of the traditional framework that we have in the criminal justice system and the main -- one of the main arguments that's offered in favor of military commissions is sensitive information, but what that largely has come to mean, is information or evidence that was gained by coercion, what really are the modern methods of the rack and the screw, and you've got a system that has really kind of been built on, and created around, a propagation of illegal interrogation techniques. And for that reason, I think you're never going to really have a fair trial, and you're never going to have a system that has any kind of real credibility. |
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Lee Casey
Baker Hostetler |
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This is a situation where the state, in fact, does not have all of the power, the state is dealing with a foreign threat, and so we need to rejigger the balance a little bit.
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Civilian courts vs. military courts
RAY SUAREZ: We got a lot of questions from listeners on just these points. Bob Schwalbach writes from Saipan, "I have difficulty understanding what's wrong with the American court system, that it's not up to the job of trying men accused of conspiracy to murder. And I find myself becoming alarmed and suspicious when the government says, 'Trust us, these are special circumstances in which the regular American system of justice won't work.' Can you explain, if it is that the regular American justice system is not good enough to try these men, or is there some reason military courts are being used?"Lee Casey? LEE CASEY: Sure, I mean, I think there are two fundamental reasons. First of all, because these individuals are enemy combatants, they're not entitled to trial in the civilian system. And, in fact, because they have organized themselves as unlawful enemy combatants -- they don't wear uniforms, they don't carry -- they don't play by the rules, basically -- giving them trials in the civilian system would be rewarding inappropriate, unacceptable, and illegitimate conduct. But, in addition, there are problems with the civilian system, because of the rules of evidence, because of the kinds of chains of evidence you need to show, the ability to collect and obtain the type of evidence that would be admissible in a civilian trial, from overseas battlefields, in many cases -- is just not realistic. It does happen in some cases, you know. In the Jose Padilla case, for example, there was evidence, quite serendipitously, discovered by a CIA agent, apparently, in Afghanistan, and he just kept it. And so, at the trial, they were able to show that there was a chain of custody there. But that's very catch-as-catch-can. The civilian system is set up very much to protect the rights of the individual as against the state in a situation where the state has far more power. This is a situation where the state, in fact, does not have all of the power, the state is dealing with a foreign threat, and so we need to rejigger the balance a little bit. RAY SUAREZ: David writes, from Tempe, Ariz., "What theory of constitutional law supports executive authority to make the ultimate determination that certain individuals must be tried in a newly created legal system which has never had jurisdiction over any person? President Bush's order determined that the men at Guantanamo are 'detainees.' Only detainees may be tried by the military commission, and the detainees have only limited recourse to any judicial review outside of the military commission system. Which statute authorized President Bush to make the determination discussed above?" Jonathan Hafetz? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, to give the response, the administration's argument would be there's a force authorization that was passed by Congress. A joint declaration in the wake of Sept. 11, which essentially paved the way for the military campaign in Afghanistan, is the principle source of legislative authority that the administration had initially relied on in designating individuals as enemy combatants, and they've since relied on the 2006 Military Commissions Act. But, I think it's an excellent question because the notion that was discussed a minute ago about, that these people don't deserve the protections of American justice begs the question of whether the people are who the government says it is. And the system that we have, that we've always had, for determining whether a person is a criminal or a bad person, is to charge them with a crime. I mean, people are presumed innocent until found guilty. I think it's also, you know, slightly misleading to suggest the criminal justice system is something that coddles defendants. It does give procedural protections, but it also metes out severe punishments. You know, the recent verdicts in the Jose Padilla case, where he was given 17 years. That's just one example. A number of individuals since Sept. 11 have been tried for terrorism charges, for conspiracy charges, for providing support to terrorism, and have gotten lengthy, lengthy sentences. By contrast, the only person, so far, whose been actually put before a military commission in six years, David Hicks, and who pled guilty, was given a nine-month sentence, and is now free. So, it's actually ironic that the criminal justice system actually is much harder and more severe, and in that sense, may be more protective of national security than military commissions. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, John Walker Lind, Jose Padilla and Zacarias Moussaoui were all tried in American mainland courts with a full panoply of guaranteed rights -- what was wrong with those trials that make this separate Guantanamo process necessary? LEE CASEY: Well, I think those were instances where we were lucky enough to have the evidence available in admissible form. Now, keep in mind, of course, Walker Lind pled guilty, and so they never actually went to trial and in the other cases, Moussaoui, of course, was arrested, captured here in the United States, and the evidence was here, on which he was convicted, at least largely. And Padilla, as I mentioned, had, you know, there was some good fortune involved in that case, as well. It's not that it can't work in individual cases, but as a systematic matter, when you're dealing with an armed conflict that is fought largely overseas -- at least we hope continues to be fought largely overseas -- it presents problems that can ultimately result in individuals, frankly, going free to return to the battle, which kind of makes it kind of very, very kind of sick game. And I mean, I think that is why the resort to military commissions was made in the first place. |
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Jonathan Hafetz
Brennan Center for Justice |
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the person would not necessarily go free, even if acquitted by a military commission, that's been the administration's position all along. That they would continue to be able to hold individuals, to detain them as enemy combatants. |
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The possibility of acquittal
RAY SUAREZ: Rachel asks from Washington, D.C., "If one of the recently charged detainees is acquitted, would the U.S. release, or continue to detain him? If it would continue to detain him, would the only purpose of the tribunal effectively be to determine whether to impose the death penalty, as opposed to indefinite detainment?"Jonathan Hafetz? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, I think that's an excellent question that points to, really, two fatal flaws in the commission system, and at Guantanamo, generally. First, is that, no, the person would not necessarily go free, even if acquitted by a military commission, that's been the administration's position all along. That they would continue to be able to hold individuals, to detain them as enemy combatants, and recently it was stated by the individual who oversees the tribunal process, effectively that no one should be acquitted. And so, you have this command influence that permeates the commission process. But the second point is that the commissions are really part of a larger system at Guantanamo, and in some ways, a small part -- only a handful of individuals in more than six years have even been charged. As I mentioned, none have been tried other than David Hicks, who pled guilty. And the rest of the individuals, the 750 people who have passed through Guantanamo, and the approximately 300 who remain, have simply just been detained, indefinitely, without charge. And the administration says that only a third or even less than a third of the individuals who are there now are ever going to be tried. So, what you really have is a system where people are being locked up, most people are being locked up for years, maybe for decades, without being charged in any system, let alone a full and fair system. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, you just heard Jonathan Hafetz depict an almost, "heads I win, tails you lose" house advantage against the detainees. Even if they manage to prevail in court, that isn't likely to get them out of prison. LEE CASEY: Well, it is, actually an important point, but it shows you how different this systems actually is. Because the individuals being held at Guantanamo, except for those who have been referred to military commissions, are not being held as criminal defendants, they're being held as captured enemy combatants. Now, there's good and bad to that. The good part to it, from their perspective, is that when the war is over, when hostilities come to an end, they have to be set free, unless some criminal act can be proven against them. Now, when does the war end? Well, I would say the war ends when al-Qaida is no longer capable of carrying out military operations against the United States -- hopefully that will be sooner rather than later -- but it has obviously gone on longer, now, than I think anyone expected at the beginning. But, they still are entitled to be released when that conflict does end. For those who go to military commissions, if they are convicted of war crimes, yes, they could face the death penalty, or they could face life in prison, i.e., they could be held regardless of whether al-Qaida dissolves, or not. And I think that is fairly important difference here. RAY SUAREZ: Sam asks from San Francisco, Calif., "Can evidence gathered when using waterboarding be allowed in the court?" And perhaps, Jonathan, you can explain a little bit the idea in American jurisprudence of "the fruit of the poisoned tree" and whether the use of torture would be enough to poison that fruit. JONATHAN HAFETZ: Yes, the doctrine about, that you can't use evidence gained by torture, really has two, sort of, bases. The first is that evidence gained by torture techniques, like waterboarding -- even techniques that don't meet the definition of torture, but that are nonetheless, highly coercive -- are inherently unreliable. The Supreme Court has said that on numerous occasions, and for obvious reasons. If you apply significant physical or mental pressure to someone -- waterboarding, or the other techniques, some of the other techniques that have been used like locking people chained in freezing cells, or making them stand for lengthy periods of time -- people will say anything so that the pain will stop. So, it's unreliable. And the second reason that these techniques, or evidence gained by these techniques is not admissible, is because they are morally unacceptable. It contradicts the values of a civilized society. So, the Supreme Court has outlawed the use of evidence gained through coercion for both of these reasons, and the military commissions have been set up in part to -- as an end-run around this prohibition, and there are ways, numerous ways, in the commission system for this evidence to come in. And that's why the commissions are not going to be fair, and that's why the commissions are not going to be, ever have the credibility that a justice system will have. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, can the judges sitting at the military commissions at Camp Justice, decide that evidence gained through extreme physical coercion is admissible, just by their own majority vote? LEE CASEY: Well, that will be an issue for the court. Under the Military Commissions Act, any evidence gained through torture is excluded, period. Evidence gained through other forms of coercion -- things that are not torture, but are still coercive -- there they will have to decide whether, and it will be a totality of the circumstances test, to determine whether the evidence possesses sufficient probative value. And that will be up to the individual judges in each individual case to determine whether it, you know, is unreliable, or whether, in fact, it is reliable. RAY SUAREZ: Dr. Robert Chacona asks from New York, "The Justice Department and the military have not moved to charged the Guantanamo detainees for 6 years. In a constitutional U.S. Supreme Court decision, Boumediene v. Bush, is now imminent. At this juncture, why is the Justice Department and military not waiting for this important -- and directly related -- Supreme Court decision by choosing to try these six detainees now?" Lee Casey, what is Boumediene v. Bush? LEE CASEY: Well, that is a case brought by several detainees at Guantanamo, seeking to have their detention reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings, and it does raise some very important issues of the extent to which the Constitution may apply to aliens overseas, and the extent to which any potential for appeal outside of the Military Commissions Act system, which does have opportunities for appeal, but outside of that -- is permissible. Because Congress did attempt to cut off those appeals, except through the system set up in the statute. RAY SUAREZ: Anything to add, Jonathan Hafetz? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, only that the timing is somewhat suspicious, and it is an, you know, attempt to try to create the impression that there's actually a viable system at Guantanamo, which I don't believe there is. And as the question indicates, you've had more than six years to try individuals, and only now is there, are these charges brought. I mean, I don't know for certain the exact reasons behind the timing, but I do think it is suspicious, and it is an effort to kind of color, I think, the impression of Guantanamo as a place where people are getting justice, when most people aren't getting any justice, let alone, justice of a criminal trial. |
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Lee Casey
Baker Hostetler |
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I mean, the international tribunals actually have large portions of their records closed, I think we should try to avoid that as much as possible so that people can, indeed, see the level of justice that we are giving to these individuals. |
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The whole world is watching
RAY SUAREZ: Gen. Hartman said on the NewsHour recently, that these men will go into court with the presumption of innocence, which is an extraordinary legal safeguard, given the circumstances.But what about the judges themselves? Do they have to go through any equivalent of voir dire, where a juror has to promise that they will be dispassionate, that they're not going into the procedure with their thumb on the scale, already believing defendants to be guilty or innocent. Lee Casey? LEE CASEY: Well, the individuals selected for military commissions cannot have any particular connection to the individual case -- they can't have been part of the investigation, they can't have been part of the prosecution, they can't have been part of the team that may have captured the individual, so they do have to be, essentially strangers to that individual. I'm not sure whether there's any in the selection of the panel, the people who would actually be acting as the equivalent of jurors, whether there is a voir dire process. I certainly think that the fact that they are in the military, military officers, does not in any way suggest that they can not be fair. And if anything, if anyone is worried about command influence, they just have to look at the record of the defense counsel, the military defense counsel of many of these people who are largely responsible for the six years because they have been challenging every jot and tittle from the president's first order, all the way to the Military Commissions Act in court. So, they don't seem to be very much afraid of any kind of retaliation. RAY SUAREZ: Jonathan Hafetz, are these commission trials moving ahead with one eye on the courtroom and one eye on the rest of the world? Is there a degree to which this process should be conscious of how this proceeding looks -- not only to law professors, but to the average guy on the street in Jakarta, Baghdad, Cairo, and elsewhere? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Absolutely, and I think that being conscious of this larger impression, both in the U.S. and particularly outside of the U.S., is vital. Because the fight against terrorism has to be seen as one that has integrity and where justice is provided. And I think that the commissions are not going to be seen that way. They've not appeared that way before, and I think that they will never have legitimacy. RAY SUAREZ: Even though these men are getting what seems like as much or more protection than you would get in Jakarta, Baghdad or Cairo? JONATHAN HAFETZ: Well, I think that, I don't know, I think they may be getting more or less than Jakarta, but they're certainly getting less than what you get in the United States, and what you get in the, you know, in other Western countries, and what you really have is a, you know, a two-tiered system where individuals -- all of whom are foreign nationals, all of whom or most of whom are from Muslim countries -- are getting, you know, really a second-class justice system. And that's going to be the impression that's taken away. And I think even countries like, for example, Indonesia, maybe, or other countries that, you know, we don't necessarily, aren't, you know, Western democracies, prohibit things the commissions would allow -- evidence that is gained through coercion. I just think that, you know, if America has got to put on and create an impression that it is giving full and fair justice, and it is not giving second-class justice and inferior trials where coerced evidence is allowed, if it's going to have, if the system is going to have any kind of legitimacy in the world. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, talk a little bit about the whole world watching, and especially in light of the fact that the prosecution has announced its intention to seek the death penalty in these cases? LEE CASEY: Well, I certainly agree that the world is watching. I think what they will see is a level of justice that, if not as protective of the defendants as the United States common law system would be, is at least as protective as international criminal tribunals. Both international criminal tribunal in the Hague, and the two ad hoc U.N. tribunals, for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which have by and large very similar procedural protections to the U.S. military commissions. But, I think obviously, it will be very important how the commissions play out. I think obviously we should have as much of these commissions in public as possible. I mean, the international tribunals actually have large portions of their records closed, I think we should try to avoid that as much as possible so that people can, indeed, see the level of justice that we are giving to these individuals, and you know, they're going to have to judge by what they see. RAY SUAREZ: Lee Casey, thanks a lot for joining us. LEE CASEY: Thank you. RAY SUAREZ: Jonathan Hafetz, good to talk to you. JONATHAN HAFETZ: Very good to talk to you, thank you. RAY SUAREZ: And I want to thank all of our viewers for taking the time to send in their questions for this week's Insider Forum. Until next time, I'm Ray Suarez.
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Legal Experts Answered Your Questions on Sept. 11 Trials |
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