
MOYERS: As you just saw, the administration put front and center today the two private citizens who have long made the case for invading Iraq: Richard Perle and Kanan Makiya. Makiya is with me in the studio.
Now a professor at Brandeis University, he was born in Baghdad and left Iraq to study architecture at MIT his father had been one of Iraq's most successful architects. But the terrors of life under Saddam Hussein became an obsession for Kanan Makiya and in 1989, he published REPUBLIC OF FEAR, a chronicle of Saddam's crimes against his people.
Written under a pseudonym, it became a bestseller during the 1991 Gulf War. Makiya then returned to Iraq to investigate reports of Saddam's atrocities against the Kurds. Armed guards protected him as he traveled. The resulting film won the Edward R. Murrow award for best television documentary on foreign affairs in 1992. It also established Makiya as a principle voice of the Iraqi opposition.
In 1993, he wrote CRUELTY AND SILENCE, a stinging critique of Arab politicians and intellectuals. His detailed plan for transforming Iraq, "The Transition to Democracy," has become a major blueprint for the Bush administration's plans for post-war Iraq. The President himself invited him to play a part in an Oval Office discussion of Iraq's future.
Kanan Makiya, welcome to NOW.
MOYERS: Kanan Makiya, welcome to NOW.
MAKIYA: Thank you.
MOYERS: Let me get right to the heart of the matter, here's what the under Secretary of State told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about a month ago. He said an American military occupation could last two years and would involve American control over civilian ministries and over the oil industry in Iraq. Quote.
While we are listening to what the Iraqis like you are telling us, the United States government will make its decisions based on what is in the national interest of the United States.
When you heard about this plan a month or so ago you wrote the government of the United States is about to betray those core human values of self determination and individual liberty. America is about to repeat its mistakes of the past.
MAKIYA: What's starting to happen, Bill, since that is a new kind of talk coming out of the White House, the President's speech at the American Enterprise Institute about two weeks ago or 10 days ago today...
He talked about democracy in greater detail than he has ever done before. Communication we had with the very high level American delegation that chose to come to the Iraqi opposition after those articles, after those statements, and made an effort to come and speak with him and reassure them. Now, I'm not saying those reassurances are enough, but I'm saying I think we had an effect on their thinking.
MOYERS: When you saw the President, when did you see him in the Oval Office? It was back in...
MAKIYA: January 10th.
MOYERS: January 10th. What did he tell you that reassured you?
MAKIYA: When I saw the President I believed and I still believe just looking at the man in the eyes, he spoke about democracy I think he genuinely meant it. I think he genuinely wants it to take place in Iraq. I really mean this on a personal level, a one to one level. The President himself said, "We're going to build anything we destroy." It was sort of like a promise.
MOYERS: I know you want to believe that, but you know, there are so many critics and skeptics who look at us and say, we...the United States and say, we don't have staying power, look what's happening in Afghanistan now, there's a reestablishment of Islamic justice, women are being denied the rights that we thought they were going to be given, and that with all due respect, you're being naive and romantic about...
MAKIYA: Maybe I am, but you have to build on the hope. What else can you build on? And there's a part of any new, exciting new order like that that is going to be filled with hope, but what I think is the problem is in between what the President wants in the United States and what actually happens, is a whole other story.
MOYERS: Where? In the American government?
MAKIYA: Yes, thousands of people, yes.
MOYERS: I mean, you've been very critical of what you call the coup backers at the CIA and...
MAKIYA: That's right.
MOYERS: ...the State Department.
MAKIYA: Yes, I have been.
MOYERS: So the President can state a principle, but these are the people who are in charge of implementing the policy.
MAKIYA: And that's where our problems, Iraqi democrats only ever ran into problems with the State Department and, well, indirectly with the CIA but that's a separate matter.
So yes, we had problems and there are different points of view inside the U.S. government. And this has been a government that was riven over this question of exactly how far to go.
MOYERS: Who is advocating not moving Iraq to a democracy and what is their motive?
MAKIYA: I'd rather not name names here, but the thought is this, the motive is this. We're in a nasty neighborhood. Everyone around here is worried about this.
The United States is isolated in the world on this question. Iraq has a history, a violent history. It's riven, the argument goes, by factions of one kind or another. This is a pipe dream. Democracy is a pipe dream.
You can't even...it's unimaginable. Let's do what's doable. Let's just replace this regime, remove the threat, weapons of mass destruction, and leave it at that. This is not a population ready for democracy. And this is, by the way, one of the most humiliating to me personally. And, what's the word, condescending things, that I've seen come out of people who claim to be speaking...claim to be pro Arab.
The irony is, the appeasers, that is people whose experiences are as diplomats in the Arab world, come back and say, they're supposedly fond of the Arabs, or they, like the Arab countries, and they come along and say, democracy is not here. Come on, be real. They're the ones who supposedly know about the Arab world.
MOYERS: This is the State Department view. I know that from my own reporting. Their concern is that their clients, our clients, our allies, you know, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others, are not democracies, and that if there's a democracy in their back door it makes them not sleep very well at night.
So they'd just as soon leave the Royal Families and the dictators who are friendly to us in power instead of threaten them with an invidious contagious democracy next door.
MAKIYA: September 11th opened up a new way of thinking. It was clear from September 11th that the pillars of American policy which had rested on sustaining autocratic regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt over very long periods of time blew up in the face of the United States not only with the Arab/Israeli peace process in tatters but the relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Suddenly Saudi Arabia is a fearsome ally. What kind of an ally is this that breeds people who can do something like September 11th? So this has forced a rethink.
MAKIYA: That is why what the President wants to do, democratize Iraq, dismantle the institutions of the security service, hopefully dismantle the army which is essential to maintaining a democracy over a long period of time.
Those are truly radical revolutionary steps, very far reaching. And if I might put it, very wise in the long run.
MOYERS: One can understand the administration's desire to make sure that after the war there isn't chaos, ethnic fighting, that there is a way to pick up the biological and chemical weapons, and that only the American military can do that.
I mean, do you have sympathy for the possibility that the Americans would have to put a military government there to just maintain control for a while? And get rid of that infrastructure...
MAKIYA: I have complete sympathy with the idea that the Americans largely should...the American army in particular should take control of getting rid of the weapons of mass destruction. I hope dismantling the security organizations of the Baath party.
People like myself are trying to convince then that they should do that.
MOYERS: Would you feel betrayed if in fact the administration didn't follow through quickly on plans to try to introduce democracy?
MAKIYA: Yes. Let me say, Bill, I think it would be a stark error.
But why? Because it would undermine the very attempts to build a long-term U.S.-Iraqi relationship based upon a new democratic Iraq. Let me explain why. I want Iraqis to make mistakes in the early period of their rule, not Americans.
I don't want American soldiers patrolling Iraqi cities. That would be a terrific mistake. They don't know the...they don't have the cultural cues, the signals, the ways of working with people. They desperately need to do that kind of work through Iraqis and with Iraqis together.
There needs to be a partnership between Iraqis and Americans. The problem with the scheme as it was originally presented, and I emphasize, I think the administration is moving away from that fast...
The problem with it is that it put the opposition, its natural allies, at arm's length. It marginalized them. That is not possible, that is not logical, that doesn't make sense.
And it therefore naturally built up the importance of the existing institutions, which are what? They're Baathist institutions.
MOYERS: Baath is Saddam Hussein's political party.
MAKIYA: Baath is the political party that the regime rules through. So we would be.... There's no way to create democracy if you rely solely on the repressive institutions of the Baath or the Baath party, because this is a totalitarian system.
MOYERS: How deeply do those...does the ruling party, Saddam's party, how deeply do the tentacles go down into the warp and woof of Iraq culture today?
MAKIYA: One simple statistic: there are two million members in the Baath party. They started in 1968 with less...with a few hundred and they now have two million.
Of course these are people who have to do that. They have to join the Baath party to get on in life. To be a teacher you have to be a member of the Baath party. To be a professional of any kind, you have to be a member of the Baath party. To get on in life in anything, you have to be a member of the Baath party.
MOYERS: As the Nazis in Germany.
MAKIYA: Exactly. And on top of that of course you have front organizations which are totally controlled by them, all professional associations. There is no sliver of public life, of social life, of civic life that is not controlled, dominated by the Baath party.
And it is legally so, that it is completely illegal to have any other form of organization. In fact, almost illegal not to be a member of the Baath party. You are shunned from school at a very young age if you all do not enter the youth organization, they have structures that start at ages three to five, five year old kids get put into the junior levels of the youth organizations which are not...believe me, they're not boy scouts type of affairs.
They take you through various degrees there are five levels of membership when you are still a teenager, right way up from five until 18, of different levels of organization within structures that eventually take you into the Baath party. That is the kind of organization of society that we have here.
MOYERS: You compare it to the Nazis, but it sounds to me more like the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union.
MAKIYA: You're right. It is far more similar in fact, it was modeled after the communist parties.
MOYERS: In fact, doesn't Saddam Hussein envision himself as a kind of modern Stalin?
MAKIYA: He does. He does.
And that is because the alter ego of the Baath in Iraq was the communist party. So it is a totalitarian form of organization basically.
MOYERS: But you describe a situation that is formidable. You describe a whole culture that is infiltrated by terror, by habit, by loyalties. That's not going to be an easy task to introduce democracy to in a country that hasn't known it.
MAKIYA: It isn't going to be easy, but don't forget, we're talking about a population that doesn't owe its leadership an iota of loyalty. We're not talking about Germany post World War II where lots of people sympathized perhaps with the Nazi party at the time. We're talking with a population that is going to feel liberated the day after.
MOYERS: You left Baghdad, Iraq when?
MAKIYA: Originally as a young man, '68.
MOYERS: So you've been gone essentially, although you've been back and forth, you've been gone essentially for 30 years, right?
MAKIYA: True.
MOYERS: How can you be sure that the Iraqis who've lived all of this time under Saddam Hussein will welcome the Americans as liberators instead of invading imperialists?
MAKIYA: Family, friends. I have close family connections coming outside during summer holiday times, telling, advising me what I should tell the Bush administration as though it were in my hands to tell him to do this, that idea, tell them to hit here first, they've got to do this first.
Now, I'm telling you, nobody was going to fight in this regime. That is not just my experience, that is that of many, many Iraqis. Don't forget something else, Bill, very important. One third of Iraqis have now lived for 10 years or so outside the grip of this regime.
Many of them have lived in western countries. One goodly proportion of them, most of them are inside free Iraq, inside the northern Kurdistan where I've just come from. We're talking about very large numbers of people who have begun to enjoy in Iraqi Kurdistan today a modicum of democratic life.
They have Internet cafes, you fall all over them when you walk down a city like Suleymania, or satellite radio connections, people in northern Iraq today get every television station in the world and are more informed about world politics than many other peoples and in many other populations around.
MOYERS: What makes you think that democracy, a political...viable political system in a representative government in Iraq would be pro western and pro American?
MAKIYA: This is a country that would have been liberated by the United States. It's a country that will have seen the benefit of a war. The American army is not just going in there to destroy things; it's going there to build things.
Iraqi politics today is dominated, completely shaped, by experience of dictatorship.
MOYERS: Homegrown tyranny.
MAKIYA: Homegrown tyranny, tyranny for which we are responsible. Tyranny which we created and we blame no one else for.
A tyranny which is quite extraordinary, by even the Nazi standards of the region. That shaped a beginning of a new way of thinking. It means, the politics of national liberation, the politics of arms struggle, the blaming the United States and blaming Israel for all our problems has been shelved by Iraqis out of their own experience not out of some abstraction, not because they're better than anybody else, but their own experience of exceptional tyranny has brought that about.
So they come up with new ideas. They're allies of the west for the first time. Their allies are not Syria, their allies are not Saudi Arabia. Today people like me are anathema, I can't even travel in these countries, my life is in danger...
MOYERS: Because...?
MAKIYA: Because we identify with the values of the west because we're fighting for something else, because we espouse a very different kind of state system...
And because we say the be all and end all of Arab politics is not the Arab/Israeli question important as that is important as that is.
MOYERS: You say...
MAKIYA: We have problems. We have let those problems...we're responsible for what happened inside Iraq. Let's fix our problems at home. Sure we have opinions, Palestinians are suffering terribly. Yes. But let us face up to what we have done to our own world.
MOYERS: So Iraqis don't wake up in the morning thinking about the Palestinian question, and they don't go to bed at night thinking about the Palestinian question. They're thinking about Saddam Hussein.
MAKIYA: That's right.
MOYERS: You talked once when I was with you about the gulf that opened up in 1991 between Iraq and the Arab world. What kind of gulf do you mean?
MAKIYA: Precisely this different mindset that this preoccupation with dictatorship that has dominated Iraqi politics and discourse now for 10, 11 years and even longer, versus that which is focused on the Arab/Israeli question to the exclusion of all other questions in the Arab world.
That gulf is there. It's still there, and it's deepening, unfortunately. We have a problem. A million and a half Iraqis, Bill, have died violently at the hands of this regime since 1980. This is a regime that in the words of the United Nations itself is the worst violator of human rights since World War II, that's an official document that came out of Max van der Stoel' office years ago.
We've got evidence coming out of ears. I have lists of disappeared people. I just said, a million and a half people killed, Iraqis killed, since 1980, violently at the hands of the regime. That is an extraordinary number. That is eight percent of the population. That's like World War II or World War I in terms of the countries that waged it.
MOYERS: I have no question about that. I read your book. I didn't know you had written it, because you wrote it under a pseudonym...
MAKIYA: That's right.
MOYERS: ...describing the terrors of life under Saddam Hussein. Did you write that book under a pseudonym because you feared for your own life?
MAKIYA: Mainly because of my family's life inside Iraq. You simply...it's unimaginable to write a book like that in anything other than an assumed name.
I had to...I have cousins, I have uncles, I have close members of my family. Fortunately the immediate members of my family left. They too...they are also personas non grata. I had my passport taken away in the early eighties, there's no way I could write a book like that in anything other than an assumed name. This is a regime which has repressed identity in all its different forms. We need a new...figure out a new system. We need to build this state in a different way.
So we come up with an idea, very familiar to you Americans, Federalism. Federalism is an idea that was first coined in 1992 at the Salahaddin conference of the Iraqi opposition. I was I think the first Arab to publicly...I spoke at that conference in defense of it in a major way.
It is now currency, it's the common currency. There is not a single Iraqi opposition group that does not accept the idea. Now, what they mean by it, what definition you give to it, what different interpretation, that's the issue of politics amongst the Iraqi opposition.
But do we doubt for one second that what we want is a future federal Iraq, democratic federal Iraq? No, we argue instead that federalism is the thin end of the wedge for democracy in Iraq.
MOYERS: Would that include the Kurds?
MAKIYA: Yes, essentially...
MOYERS: Well...
MAKIYA: The Kurdish experience is the driving force of federalism in Iraq.
MOYERS: The Kurds in northern Iraq.
MAKIYA: Yes.
MOYERS: But my understanding is that the United States has agreed with Turkey that if Turkey went along Turkish troops would be able to occupy northern Iraq where the Kurds live in order to prevent the Kurds, their mortal enemies, from gaining power in the new political order.
MAKIYA: That is a terrifying prospect, an unwise prospect. I think it was something that was imposed on the Bush administration in order to get rights to passage for the American army through Turkey.
MOYERS: Imposed by the Turkish government.
MAKIYA: The Turkish government imposed that condition, that Turkish troops enter northern Iraq. Now, I think the United States for all kinds of technical military reasons thought that maybe that was a price worth paying, but...
MOYERS: It certainly puts an end to your desire for an Iraqi federalism, which.... If the Kurds are excluded from the beginning because of a deal with Turkey, your dream is dead on arrival.
MAKIYA: Certainly parts of it are dead on arrival, and that's why we've argued against it at the conference in Salahaddin. We took a position against it, we discussed this matter at great length with an American delegation that came, a high level delegation.
And I think that delegation saw with its own eyes the fear that existed amongst Kurds. There's a real sense in which they didn't realize what they were doing when they agreed that. So that Turkish issue is not settled yet. As you know, the Parliament did not bring the requisite majority to have it passed and that is, I think, American frustration with the Turks is also building up.
So right now they're talking about negotiating air rights, not the entry of troops. So we're hoping, person...people like myself are hoping the Turkish troops do not enter Iraq as part of the deal, a package deal about this war.
MOYERS: Some Iraqi dissidents, some of your peers, say Kanan Makiya is just simply too idealistic and too bullheaded, that we have to make our peace with the United States and with all of the elements and just to have a place at the table. And we're willing to get that place at the table and not press as aggressively as you would have us do, as Kanan would have us do.
MAKIYA: It's my job to be bullheaded, Bill, in this business. I'm there, I'm with the opposition, I'm on the ground with them. They are pointing me to head the constitutional commission. I will be... it is the decision of the Iraqi opposition that I run that commission, that's a big thing. That's a statement of trust.
MOYERS: What do you say to the critics like Edward Said, Noam Chomsky who argue that you are...you have become a philosopher king to the right wing architects of the Bush administration, the war party, like Wolfowitz and Perle, and that once they get an opportunity, choo! You're gone.
MAKIYA: I think that's nonsense. They have become arguers for the status quo in the Arab world. They are the ones who suddenly defending stability of countries like Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world as though those were desirable things to maintain the way they are.
Suddenly they, the great radicals, are turning into the great appeasers of Arab...of the bankruptcy of Arab politics. No, I am stick true to those principles that I grew up with, true I change my politics along the way. All these categories, left, right, are changing roles today in the world.
And I don't think in terms of boxes, who's who and who's not. I know Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Perle truly and genuinely believe that democracy is possible in Iraq. They truly and genuinely believe that Iraqis can make it, and they're giving us a chance. We have a whole program for how democracy can come about in Iraq, and all we need now, the big single big missing chink in this whole thing, is U.S. recognition of these efforts by the opposition and a working together, a genuine partnership between the U.S. government and what it's about to do in Iraq and the Iraqi opposition.
MOYERS: And you are convinced war is the right option.
MAKIYA: There's no alternative.
MOYERS: With all the unintended consequences.
MAKIYA: There's no alternative. There's a war already going on. And it's a war being waged on the Iraqi people.
MOYERS: Kanan Makiya, thank you very much for joining us on NOW.
MAKIYA: Thank you, Bill.
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