VIII

The Official Campaign



ON DECEMBER 27, 1966, the Prime Minister, under the pressures of a Socialist boycott of the Diet and an incessant public demand for new elections, dissolved the Lower House and set January 29th as the day the nation's voters would elect a new House of 486 members. Under the law, candidacy must be registered within four days of the day of the official notification of the election (*kōji*).[1] This was set for January 8th. Since campaigning is allowed only during the period that extends from the day candidacy is registered to the day preceding the election,[2] the official campaign period for candidates who registered on January 8th was twenty-one days, January 8th through the 28th.

The candidate for public office in Japan is not only limited in time in conducting his official campaign but also must operate within the framework of an election law that sets extraordinary limitations on the types of campaign activities allowed.

Before 1950 separate laws governed elections for various offices in Japan. In the early Lower House Election Laws, those of 1889, 1890, 1900, and 1919, there were no restrictions on campaign activities except for a prohibition of campaigning in the polling places themselves. There was no limitation on the amount of money that might be spent on the campaign.[3] Revisions of the Election Law after 1919 have imposed increasingly severe limitations on permissible campaign prac-

[1] *Election Law,* Article 86.

[2] *Ibid.,* Article 129.

[3] Hayashida Kazuhiro, "Development of Election Law in Japan," *Hōsei Kenkyū,* XXXIV (July, 1967), 38; For the laws, see Senkyo Seido Nanajyūnen Kinenkai, *Senkyohō No Enkaku* (Tokyo, 1959).

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The Moment of Victory on Election Night

tices and have provided for a very considerable degree of government management of campaign activities. This trend has continued in the postwar period, having been interrupted only temporarily in the early period of the American Occupation.

In 1925 a full-scale revision of the Lower House Election Law imposed for the first time a great number of restrictions on campaign practices. These included prohibition of house-to-house calls (*kobetsu hōmon*), restrictions on the distribution of campaign literature, and a limitation on the amount of money that could be spent in the campaign. The revised Law also included strict disciplinary provisions providing punishments for violators.

The articles of the 1925 Law dealing with campaign practices were largely modeled after the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883,[4] and to some extent reflected a desire to eradicate corrupt election practices. In the year 1925 Japan also adopted universal manhood suffrage. Fears on the part of the government of the possible consequences of the new suffrage resulted in the adoption in the same year of the repressive Peace Preservation Law which gave the government broad powers to control political activities. The legal restrictions on campaign practices were more in accord with the spirit of this Law than with the democratic implications of universal manhood suffrage. They are said to have been so complicated and severe that they allowed the government in power to effectively intimidate candidates, campaigners, and electors, and provided a serious "obstacle to a free and unrestricted expression of the popular will."[5]

As the government became more repressive, restrictions on campaign activities were expanded. In the revision of the Election Law in 1934, the prohibition of pre-election campaigning was introduced for the first time. Other restrictions on campaign practices were also incorporated and penalties for violations made more severe. This revision also introduced

[4] Hayashida, "Development of Election Law," p. 38.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

a greatly expanded government involvement in elections, providing for government management of campaign speech meetings, government printing of campaign brochures, and government control over various other aspects of the campaign.

Almost all of the provisions regarding campaign practices adopted in the prewar laws are in effect at the present time. Only in the election of 1946 were candidates, campaigning under a new House of Representatives Election Law adopted in 1945 under U.S. Occupation auspices, free of many of the earlier restrictions on campaign activities. From 1947 on restrictions were steadily reimposed. The Public Offices Election Law of 1950 incorporated many of the prewar restrictions on campaign practices, and revision of that Law in 1952 marked a return to the 1934 Law in terms of the limitations it places on campaign activities.[6] A candidate for the Lower House campaigns within a legal strait jacket. His every campaign activity, from the number of speeches he may make to the size of the one-paper lantern he may hang outside his campaign headquarters, is regulated by law.

Certain campaign practices familiar in other countries are prohibited in Japan. Canvassing from house to house for votes, whether done by the candidate, his staff, or people acting on their own volition in support of a candidate, is prohibited (138[1]).[7] Signature campaigns are similarly prohibited (138[2]), and no one is allowed to publish popularity polls (138[3]). The serving of food and refreshments as part of the campaign is forbidden (139), and no activities are allowed which are intended to "raise ardor" (140), "such as running a procession of cars, marching a large group of people, using a siren, employing a band or making a clamor for the purpose of attracting the attention of voters."[8]

In addition to such outright prohibitions are a multitude

[6] Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime, and Sōma Masao, *Senkyo* (Tokyo, 1960), p. 57; cf. Sōma Masao, *Nihon No Senkyo Seiji* (Tokyo, 1963), p. 30.

[7] Numbers in parentheses refer to the relevant article in the Election Law.

[8] Jichishō Senkyo Kyokuhen, *Sōsenkyo No Tebiki* (Tokyo, 1967), p. 75.

of restrictions. Sidewalk speeches cannot be made later than nine in the evening (164[6]) and "repeated calling activities" (*renkokōi,* "the constant repetition of a fixed phrase in a short period of time"[9]) are prohibited except at a hall where the candidate is giving a private speech, while he is giving a sidewalk speech or from the campaign car, and are restricted to between the hours of seven in the morning and eight in the evening (140[2]).

Each candidate's campaign is permitted only one campaign car, which has to fit certain specifications and must be registered with the government. Its number of occupants and the size and number of signs that may be placed upon it are defined in the law (141).

Each candidate may have only one campaign headquarters in the district (131[1]), and the number and size of posters and signboards used in the headquarters are circumscribed (143). If the candidate wants to move the headquarters to another location he must file a formal request to do so with the government's Election Management Office. When the headquarters is moved all activity in the former headquarters must cease and all signboards visible from outside the former headquarters must be removed (130[2]).

The Election Law also places extensive restrictions on the types and quantity of written materials that may be displayed and distributed. All written campaign materials except those expressly permitted by the Law are prohibited. The only materials the Law allows displayed are signs, restricted in number and size, at the campaign headquarters, on the campaign car, and at a hall during the course of a candidate's private speech meeting, and campaign posters displayed along with those of the other candidates on official poster boards at specified locations throughout the district. The only material the candidate may distribute to the electorate are 25,000 campaign postcards. The government's Election Management Commit-

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

tee in addition distributes to all voters an election brochure (*senkyo kōhō*) that contains statements of 2,000 characters each by the candidates along with their pictures. Candidates and their supporters are prohibited from displaying or distributing any other written campaign materials to the constituents. Not only does this include posters, signs, handbills, buttons, and all the other paraphernalia familiar to American political campaigns but it extends also to noncampaign materials that might have the effect of influencing a voter's choice at the polls. Thus, "during the period of election campaigning, the distribution of greeting cards, New Year cards, winter greetings, summer greetings, and the like by a candidate or by supporters using the candidate's name is a violation of the law regardless of whether such distribution is for the purpose of campaigning or not. . . ."[10]

The speech-making activities the candidate may engage in are also defined by the Election Law. Candidate speeches during the official campaign period are restricted to three kinds: sidewalk speeches, joint speech meetings, and private speech meetings.

The candidate may give sidewalk speeches but he "must be stationary. He cannot give speeches while walking or while riding on top of a car."[11] Of course he cannot use any posters or signs or distribute any materials while giving such a speech. He cannot have more than fifteen campaigners with him and each must wear an armband distributed by the Election Management Committee.

The major speech-making activity of the Diet candidate is participation in the joint speech meetings (*tachiai enzetsukai*) conducted by the Election Management Committee of the Local Autonomy Ministry. Most districts have an average of thirty-five such meetings, participated in by six to seven candidates with speeches lasting twenty minutes.[12] In Ōita's Sec-

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

ond District in the 1967 election campaign there were twenty-five meetings, participated in by five candidates with speeches lasting thirty minutes.[13] Participation in these meetings is not compulsory in law but in fact it is rare for a candidate not to take part. For one thing the Law prohibits him from doing anything else while a joint speech meeting is in session. The large number of joint speech meetings means in effect that for most of the official campaign period the candidates' itineraries are determined by the Election Management Committee. The usual pattern is for a candidate to arrive in the morning in the part of the district where the joint speech meeting is to be held, spend the day riding around in a campaign car, getting out occasionally to give sidewalk speeches, and appearing at the joint speech meeting to give his twenty- or thirty-minute speech.[14]

The candidate can also hold private speech meetings (*kojin enzetsukai*). Each candidate is allowed sixty such speeches, which must be registered in advance with the Election Management Committee. Such speeches may not be scheduled during the hours when a joint speech meeting is in process, and they are subject to several other legal restrictions (161–64). It is not permissible, for instance, to display signs outside the hall in which a private speech meeting is being held or in any way advertise it in advance. In Ōita's Second District none of the candidates held private speech meetings.

The advent of television and the general expansion and sophistication of communication media have affected political communication in Japan as elsewhere. But because of the restrictions the Election Law places on candidate use of the media, campaign strategies have as yet been little affected by Japan's highly developed communications network. No candidate for public office in Japan is allowed to buy time on tele-

[13] Ōita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo,* January 29, 1967 election (Ōita, 1967), p. 29.

[14] A revision of the Election law following the 1967 election reduced the number of joint speech meetings by about one-third.

vision or radio or buy space for advertisements in newspapers. Candidates for the Lower House are allowed to make, free of charge, three radio broadcasts of five minutes each. No provision is made for the use of television.[15] The candidate may also submit a short biographical statement for broadcast by station personnel three times on television and ten times on the radio. He can also place five newspaper advertisements of determined length. The costs for all candidate advertising in the mass media are assumed by the government (149–51). This is the total extent to which candidates can use the mass media in their campaigns. Obviously the problems of strategy and finance relating to the use of communication media that face the American candidate are nonexistent in Japan.

Over and above these and many other restrictions and prohibitions too numerous to discuss, the candidate in his campaign is allowed to spend only a limited amount of money and must account for all expenditures to the Election Management Committee. Japanese law does not provide the loophole present in United States laws that limitations on campaign expenditures do not apply to expenditures of committees independent of the candidate. In Japan the candidate is responsible for all expenses on behalf of his campaign. There is no way to create a "Citizens For Satō" committee to get around the law.

The formula used for determining the amount of money a candidate may legally spend is to multiply the number of registered voters in the district by 10.5 yen, divide the total by the number of candidates, and add 1,200,000 yen. A consequence of this formula is that the amount of money each candidate may spend decreases as the number of candidates increases. In Ōita's Second District the formula resulted in a maximum legal expenditure of 2,182,400 yen per candidate, which is a little more than 6,000 dollars in U.S. currency. The

[15] Another revision of the Law after the 1967 election provided each candidate three television appearances during the official campaign of four and a half minutes each.

highest figure was in Tokyo's Seventh District with 4,022,700 yen and the lowest was in Hyogo's Fifth District with 2,003,500 yen. The nationwide average was 2,573,800 yen, approximately 7,200 dollars.[16]

The purpose of the restrictions on campaign practices incorporated in the Public Offices Election Law is ostensibly to insure inexpensive and fair elections where no candidate because of political power or economic wealth has an advantage over another in appealing to the electorate for support. Defenders of the Law also maintain that restrictions on campaign practices are necessary because of the presence of modes of behavior in Japan antithetical to democratic practice. Prohibitions of house-to-house calls, the serving of refreshments, and even the prohibition of calling on supporters after the election to thank them for their help are necessary, so the argument goes, to insure a minimum interference of "feudalistic" customs and mores in the electoral process.

In fact the Law does little to realize such goals and has other undesirable effects.[17] The various restrictions have not made elections inexpensive. They have simply made most expenses illegal. The Japanese politician, as is discussed later in this chapter, expends considerable amounts of money on his campaign but, because of the Law, has developed ways to keep such expenditures hidden from public view. Furthermore, the restrictions on the use of the mass media, on the distribution of written materials, and on speech making have forced the politician to use other means of support mobilization less in accord with democratic ideals than the expensive but public appeal to the electorate utilization of communications media provides.

The most important consequence of the Election Law's provisions is to greatly enhance the strength of incumbents in

[16] *Yomiuri Shinbun,* January 6, 1967, p. 2.

[17] I have discussed some of these effects and other aspects of campaigning in "Nihon No Kyōikumamateki Senkyo," *Bungei Shunjū,* xv (June, 1967), 174–80.

elections. The Law "works to the benefit of those already elected, incumbents and former Diet members, whose names are known to the electorate. . . . [T]he law is clearly to the disadvantage of new men."[18] The various restrictions on campaign activities function largely to keep new candidates away from the public eye. The prohibition of pre-election campaigning, restrictions on the distribution of written materials and on the use of the mass media, and other seemingly minor things such as the prohibition of the use of convertibles or other open cars work their greatest hardship against the new and unknown candidate. The incumbent, who receives constant publicity in his constituency through his activities in the Diet, has all to gain by maintaining a law that effectively prevents new candidates from gaining public exposure. It is for this reason that efforts to substantially revise the Election Law have been doomed. Once a man becomes a member of the Diet he has all to gain by maintaining and extending the restrictions on campaign practices.

The Law has another important and deplorable effect. It makes the general voter a mere observer of the campaign. By effectively preventing popular participation in campaigns it inhibits if not actually works counter to the political socialization of the electorate that should be a major function of election campaigns. The Election Law's ideal campaign is much like a beauty contest. When the official campaign period begins the contestants, supposedly having had no pre-contest opportunity for influencing the judges, walk out on the stage and go through a rigorously supervised series of performances that gives each an exactly equal opportunity to demonstrate his attributes to the judges. They then all leave the stage for the judges to make their decision. The voters are in the position of passive judges. They can read posters and listen to speeches but can take almost no direct part in the contest. Not only does this make an election campaign unbearably

[18] Kajiyama Toshiyuki, "Kane to Kōyaku No Matsuri Sōsenkyo," *Hōseki* (February, 1967), p. 54; cf. Sōma Masao, *Senkyo Seiji*, p. 35.

dull for the average voter. It makes a fundamental function of systems of representative government frightening to the politically concerned electorate because of the fear that efforts in support of a candidate may result in a violation of the Election Law. It is only in very recent years that political parties have come out with pamphlets explaining the activities "third parties" *(daisansha)* may engage in in support of candidates for public office.[19] The Law itself is mainly an exhaustive listing of the things voters may not do. In restricting the activities of the general electorate in the electoral process, the present-day Election Law is a direct descendent of the Law of 1925 which first introduced these provisions in an attempt to prevent universal suffrage from leading to mass movements which would threaten the continuation of conservative dominance.[20] A nonincumbent candidate such as Satō must attempt to gain support within the framework of an Election Law that limits to an extraordinary degree the campaign activities he may engage in and the activities that his supporters may undertake on his behalf. Inhibited by these restraints, Satō entered into the official campaign and the final three weeks of his struggle for election to the Lower House.

The three weeks of Satō's official campaign divide into three periods. The first encompassed the opening five days of the campaign. The second was the period of joint speech meetings that ran from January 13th to the 26th. The final two days of the campaign mark the third period.

As the discussion in the previous pages has indicated, the Election Law so restricts campaign practices that there is little opportunity for a candidate to employ imaginative or innovative campaign techniques. In Ōita's Second District all the candidates went through the same uninspired routine of driv-

19 See, for example, Jiyūminshutō, *Dare Demo Dekiru Senkyo Undō* (Tokyo, 1967).

20 For an excellent analysis of the effects on political participation of the Election Law's campaign practices provisions see Matsushita Keiichi, *Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbō* (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 195–202, 231.

ing around in a campaign car with a loudspeaker constantly repeating the candidate's name, stopping occasionally for short sidewalk speeches, and taking part in the joint speech sessions.

Satō spent the first two days of the campaign in Beppu. Taking one school district at a time, his official campaign car weaved in and out of the city streets, its loudspeaker droning out over and over again the monotonous phrase, *"Satō Bunsei de gozaimasu. Jimintō kōnin Satō Bunsei de gozaimàsu. Dōzo yoroshiku onegai shimasu."* ("This is Satō Bunsei. This is L D P-endorsed Satō Bunsei. I ask for your support".) A schedule giving the times he planned to pass through each neighborhood was issued to the neighborhood *sewanin,* who tried to round up groups of people to greet Satō as he came by. Whenever a group appeared the car stopped and Satō made a short sidewalk speech. Throughout Beppu these five-minute speeches all emphasized the same points. Satō is the native son candidate, the only candidate from Beppu. The L D P old guard is corrupt and the party must be reformed from within. Only young politicians like Satō, the youngest candidate in the district, could rejuvenate the party. Then back in the car and again the monotonous repeating: *"Satō Bunsei de gozaimasu. Jimintō kōnin Satō Bunsei. . . ."* Toward dusk Satō returned to the center of town and walked through its arcades with a megaphone, speaking to small circles of people and hitting at the same points: elect the native son candidate, rejuvenate the L D P and create a conservative party that is "loved by young people and women." At nine o'clock in the evening campaigning for the day came to an end.

This same procedure was followed throughout the first week of the campaign, that is, until the beginning of the joint speech sessions. On the third day of the campaign Satō moved north to Nakatsu and Shimoge county, then cut down through the central part of the district the next day, and spent the fifth day campaigning on the Kunisaki Peninsula.

In Beppu Satō appealed to local pride and constituent self-interest in getting "one of their own" into the Diet. He pre-

sented himself as Beppu's candidate, with the strong suggestion that it was both proper and in the voters interest to support the native son rather than some "outsider." Throughout the district, Satō's strategy as it evolved in these first days of the campaign was to take the offensive in attacking corruption in the LDP and stress the importance of getting young uncorrupted conservatives into the Diet. In other words, in his official campaign as in his activities in the period preceding the campaign, Satō's major efforts were directed at maximizing support within the conservative party supporting sector of the electorate. In the short sidewalk speeches Satō was able to completely avoid dealing with political issues other than the issue of political corruption. The only aspect of his appeal that was aimed at obtaining votes that might go to Socialist Komatsu was his argument that regardless of how poorly the LDP did in the election, it would still be the majority party in the new Diet. Therefore voters who were disgusted with the LDP should not "throw away" their vote by voting for an opposition party candidate but should vote for Satō so he could work from within the party to reform it.

In this first period of the official campaign, newspaper estimates of candidate strength pointed to a close contest between Satō and Komatsu for the third spot on the winners' ticket. Komatsu was generally pictured as the underdog because the votes of conservative independent Noyori Hideichi were expected to go to the other conservative candidates in this first election following Noyori's retirement. As one reporter wrote, "the votes the conservatives will pick up from Noyori supporters make it look like a bitter battle for Komatsu."[21]

The appointments of Nishimura as Construction Minister in Prime Minister Satō's third cabinet reshuffle immediately

[21] *Nishi Nihon Shinbun,* December 6, 1967, p. 10. The same view was expressed in articles in *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun,* January 1, 1967, p. 3; *Ōita Nichinichi Shinbun,* January 13, 1967; *Higashi Kyūshū Shinbun,* January 11, 1967; *Mainichi Shinbun,* December 25, 1966, p. 14; and *Ōita Shinbun,* December 28, 1966, p. 1.

preceding the election and of Ayabe as Speaker of the Lower House were seen as insuring the re-election of the incumbents. Both received a great deal of valuable publicity in the local papers[22] and the generally assumed implication of their appointments was indicated by a *Mainichi* newspaper reporter when he wrote that "Ayabe and Nishimura were facing a bitter fight because of the candidacy of Satō but with their appointments as Speaker and Construction Minister they have breathed a sigh of relief."[23] Their appointments, echoed another newspaper, meant that "their election victory can be considered a certainty."[24]

The incumbents themselves exhibited a new confidence. As Nishimura remarked in a television appearance with Ayabe following their appointments, "it would have been a difficult election if only one of us had received an appointment but, well, it has turned out very well."[25]

Though Komatsu was expected to suffer from Noyori's retirement, newspaper analyses recognized that he had overcome comparable odds in previous elections and that he could expect a significant number of votes from people upset with the "black mist" that enveloped the LDP. Thus the mass media was unanimous in its analysis. "Common sense," concluded one reporter, "shows that it is a fight between Komatsu and Satō for the third seat."[26]

Opinion among Satō's staff in the first days of the campaign was much the same as that expressed in the newspapers. The appointment of Ayabe came as a particularly heavy blow.

[22] Typical of the coverage were articles in *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun,* December 4, 1966, p. 2, December 5, p. 1, December 24, p. 3, December 28, p. 8; *Asahi Shinbun,* December 3, p. 1; and *Ōita Shinbun,* December 4, p. 1.

[23] *Mainichi Shinbun,* December 23, 1966, p. 14.

[24] *Beppu Yūkan,* December 27, 1966.

[25] *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun,* December 25, 1966, p. 1.

[26] *Beppu Yūkan,* December 27, 1966. Other articles making similar predictions may be found in *Ōita Shinbun,* December 28, 1968, p. 1; *Nishi Nihon Shinbun,* December 30, 1966, p. 5 and January 11, 1967, p. 3; *Mainichi Shinbun,* December 25, 1966, p. 14.

First reactions were that the appointment indeed gave new life to Ayabe's campaign and meant that Satō could only hope for a narrow victory over Komatsu. As the campaign continued, opinion within the Satō camp began to turn more optimistic. The Speakership, it appeared to Satō's supporters, may well have doomed Ayabe. It is a post without power easily translatable to the constituents in terms of benefits and there seemed to be a growing mood that his appointment was the climax to a long career and that Ayabe should now step aside, or be pushed aside, for a new generation. With the beginning of the joint speech meetings Satō's campaign began to gain new momentum.

Between January 13th and January 26th the candidates took part in a series of twenty-six government-sponsored joint speech meetings (*tachiai enzetsukai*). During this period there were two speeches a day, one at one o'clock in the afternoon and another at 6:30 in the evening on all but two days, when the candidates had to give only one speech. Of the district's twenty-three cities, towns, and villages all but the island of Himeshima hosted one joint speech session each, with the two largest cities of the district, Beppu and Nakatsu, each being host to two sessions.

Because of the demands of the joint speech meetings, all the candidates followed almost exactly the same route in the standardized routine of constantly repeating the candidate's name over the car loudspeaker, making sidewalk speeches, and speaking at the joint speech meetings. The strategy of concentrating support in restricted geographical areas, though crucial to the campaigns of all the conservative candidates, was reflected to only a very limited degree in the official campaign period because of the demands of the joint speech meetings. Only in the opening five and closing two days of the campaign could the candidates spend the entire day in the areas they considered most important for their election.

The joint speech meetings, along with the officially distributed election brochure, the sidewalk speeches, and the

limited advertisement allowed in the mass media, represented the sole methods by which the candidates publicly expressed their views to the electorate during the period of the official campaign.

In the joint speech meetings Satō was faced with the problem of convincing voters who generally vote conservative to vote for him rather than for one of the other two LDP candidates. In terms of policy all three LDP candidates were committed to supporting the party platform. An analysis of the statements of the three in the joint speech meetings and in the election brochure reveals no significant differences in policy. All advocated lower taxes, increased productivity, better housing, stabilized prices, better education, and increased welfare state legislation. There was no policy that one of the LDP candidates supported that another opposed. The differences between the candidates, where they existed, were largely differences of emphasis. Nishimura, for instance, emphasized the need for improving roads and reducing the high number of traffic accidents. As Minister of Construction he would be in a position, he modestly suggested, to do something about such problems. Ayabe was particularly concerned with the need to quickly settle the question of compensation for victims of World War II (bereaved families, wounded soldiers, repatriates) and establish government aid for the Yasukuni shrine. Satō, to the extent that his policy pronouncements differed in emphasis from those of his conservative opponents, stressed the LDP's concern with the "little man," with increased welfare legislation to protect "the young, the elderly and the mute," and with legislation that would improve the position of the worker and the small businessman. On foreign policy he stressed the need for Japan to increase its own defense capabilities and for the Self Defense Forces to gradually replace U.S. forces as defenders of the nation. In making this point in his speeches, Satō was able to give play to his concern that Japan exhibit greater "pride" in itself. It

was an insult to the nation's history, he told the voters, that Japan had to rely on foreigners for its security.

Important questions of policy, either domestic or foreign, were not of major concern in the election of January, 1967. The House was dissolved because of a public outcry over incidents of corruption by Diet members and the campaign, both in Ōita's Second District and nationally, was dominated by the issue of corruption and reform.

In their platforms all the political parties had a plank dealing with "political morality." In Ōita's Second District all the candidates dealt at great length with the question. It was given more attention in their speeches in the joint speech meetings than any other issue and accounted for more space in their statements in the official election brochure than any other single issue.

The LDP incumbents were at the greatest disadvantage in dealing with the issue of corruption. They both argued that only a few politicians were corrupt and that it was wrong to condemn the entire LDP. They maintained that they themselves were righteous politicians and were as concerned with eliminating corruption in the party as anyone else.

Ayabe was the most defensive. He argued that he had faithfully represented the people of the district and that the LDP had faithfully served the people of the nation. A few isolated incidents of corruption should not be allowed to blacken the name of the party and its great majority of members. Ayabe almost pleaded with his listeners: "I am an honest politician, a politician that does not tell lies. There has been a lot of talk of a black mist but I have been clean and honest. Please, re-elect an honest politician."[27]

Nishimura also made it a point to disassociate himself from corruption in the LDP in his speeches, and tried to take the offensive by attacking the Socialists for "undemocratic" actions, particularly their boycott of the Diet just before disso-

[27] Joint speech meeting in Beppu, January 26, 1967.

lution. He told his audiences that such action was threatening the development of parliamentary democracy and "the future of parliamentary democracy is at stake in this coming election."[28] "Insure parliamentary democracy" was the official slogan of the LDP in the election. Nishimura turned the black mist controversy into a call for support for the revision of the Election Law to provide for single member constituencies. This would allegedly allow for inexpensive elections and thus remove the major source of corruption.

Only for Satō among the LDP candidates could the political morality issue be used to advantage. He was able to almost entirely avoid discussion of specific policy issues by concentrating on the issue of LDP corruption and the need for a "rejuvenation" and "cleansing" of the party. While Nishimura and Ayabe stressed their history of service in the Diet and the powers they had to do favors for the constituents, Satō emphasized his purity. He tried to turn being a new candidate to advantage by presenting himself as the somewhat virginial alternative to the incumbents. He wrote in his election brochure statement that his basic desire was "to become a virtuous politician, to keep my associations with others honorable, to effect a rejuvenation and reform of the political world, to clearly separate public and private matters. . . ." He added that "within the LDP corruption and errors have arisen. It is essential for the nation that well-intentioned representatives be elected who will be pioneers in cleaning up and reforming the LDP. As one of the progressives of the LDP I will reform the political world and effect a rejuvenation of the nation." In his speeches Satō hit at the same point. "In the next Diet the LDP will still have power and that makes it essential to change the old politics and create a new LDP."[29]

Satō's remarks on political morality were echoed by new LDP candidates all over the country. As one nationwide newspaper put it, " 'When scandals occur, new candidates profit'

[28] Quoted in *Nishi Nihon Shinbun,* January 13, 1967, p. 10.
[29] Joint speech meeting in Nakatsu, January 23, 1967.

is election common sense. . . . Formerly candidates used to criticize the policies of the other parties but now the case is entirely different. First to be attacked is the new candidate's own party. . . . The new candidate stands forward as the young politician who will conduct 'undirtied' politics."[30] While incumbent conservatives could appeal for support on the basis of deeds done, the new candidates, through a fortuitous turn of circumstances, could appeal for votes because of deeds not done. Satō, in emphasizing his purity, was to repeat time and time again to his audiences "I was born in the year of the sheep. This is also the year of the sheep and it is only the white sheep that can clear away the black mist."[31]

On January 26 the last joint speech meeting was held in Beppu. The size of the audience testified to the heightened interest in the campaign as it came to a close. While an estimated 1,500 people had attended the first meeting in Beppu on January 13th, an overflow crowd of 2,700 tried to cram into Beppu's largest auditorium on the evening of this last day of the joint speech sessions.[32] Satō once again asked for the support of "everyone of my home town." The other candidates made their pleas for support, and with the closing of the meeting by the Chairman of the Election Management Committee the middle phase of the campaign came to an end.

During the period of the joint speech meetings, newspaper estimates of candidate strength changed dramatically from earlier predictions of a battle between Satō and Komatsu for the third spot. The re-election of the incumbent conservatives was no longer seen as being a foregone conclusion and Satō appeared to demonstrate increasing strength. On January

30 *Yomiuri Shinbun,* December 11, 1966, p. 1.

31 Quoted in *Asahi Shinbun,* January 9, 1967, p. 14.

32 This was 1,200 more than had attended the closing meeting in Beppu in the same hall in the previous election. In the district as a whole, by contrast, attendance in 1967 (16,326 people) was less than in 1963 (20,613). Greater interest in Satō's 1967 campaign than in his 1963 race was probably responsible for the large turnout in his hometown.

18th the *Mainichi* newspaper summed up the changed estimate with its statement that "At the present moment Nishimura has a small lead. Satō is second and Ayabe and Komatsu appear to be heading for the goal line neck and neck."[33] No candidate, however, was seen as commanding overwhelming support, and in the final week of the joint speech meetings all the newspapers forecast an extremely close race. Newspapers are prohibited by Article 138(3) of the Election Law from publishing the data of polls taken to judge the popularity of the candidates. The prohibition applies only to the publication of the data, not to the conduct of polls or the use of their results in articles. During this middle period of the campaign the Japan Broadcasting Company took a poll of 800 voters in the district which resulted in an estimate that, though Satō and Nishimura were apparently strongest, differences in projected votes for the four candidates were not significant enough to allow any predictions.[34] At the same time (January 21–22) the *Ōita Gōdō* newspaper ran a survey of its own, interviewing 1,598 voters. To the astonishment of the entire editorial staff the results showed the highest vote going to Satō and the second highest to Socialist Komatsu, while Ayabe and Nishimura were fighting for the third spot. In the poll, in fact, Nishimura received 800 votes less than third-placed Ayabe.[35] Two other newspapers ran public opinion polls and the results of all of these led the editors to the same conclusion. "It is," wrote the *Yomiuri* correspondent, "anybody's guess who will lose."[36]

The candidate's campaign in the official campaign period has two dimensions. One is the public dimension in which the

[33] *Mainichi Shinbun,* January 18, 1967, p. 1. The same view was expressed in articles in *Nishi Nihon Shinbun,* January 19, p. 11; *Higashi Kyūshū Shinbun,* January 19; *Bunshū Gōdō,* January 19.

[34] The results of the N H K poll were provided by the editor of the news desk, Kudō Takashi.

[35] Data concerning this poll were provided by the editors of the *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun.*

[36] *Yomiuri Shinbun,* January 20, 1967, p. 14.

candidate appeals for voter support through speeches, posters, and the other limited means of publicity and exposure allowed him. There is also a private dimension in which the candidate's campaign boss and a few top-level supporters maintain communication with the members of the candidate's organization throughout the district and make vital decisions concerning campaign finances.

Campaign funds are of crucial importance in Japanese election campaigns, as they are of course in the United States and other countries. But unlike his counterpart in the United States, the Japanese candidate spends no money whatsoever for advertising in the mass media. The limited advertising allowed, as discussed above, is paid for by the government. The Election Law's provisions regarding television, radio, and newspaper advertising combined with the other articles in the Law that restrict campaign activities might lead one to expect campaigns in Japan to be rather inexpensive. On the contrary, however, campaigning is on the whole an extraordinarily expensive proposition.

The cost of campaigns for the Diet are estimated to run anywhere from ten million yen for a very strong incumbent in a safe district to one hundred million yen for a new candidate fighting a difficult battle.[37] These figures represent the extremes. It is probable that the cost of most Diet election campaigns for conservative candidates falls somewhere in the range of fifteen to thirty million yen or approximately between forty and eighty thousand dollars. What makes these figures especially formidable is that they refer to money spent between the day of dissolution of the House and election day, a maximum of forty days. They do not include the rather substantial noncampaign expenses incurred in the months preceding the official campaign.

The legal maximum campaign expenditure, it is to be re-

[37] For one LDP Diet member's account of the actual amount and uses of campaign funds, see Ikeda Masanosuke, "Seijika Ga Tsukau Bōdai Na Uragane," *Gendai*, July, 1967, pp. 54–61.

membered, averages about two-and-a-half million yen. There has never been a case of a candidate being convicted for spending more than the legal limit,[38] and accounts of expenditures submitted to the Election Management Committees by the candidates show that nationwide they spend 20 to 30 per cent less than the statutory limit.[39] Yet it is an open secret that the great majority of candidates do not stay within the legal limits.

Japanese campaign expenses fall into two broad categories. One is headquarter or administrative expenses. Included here are salaries for office workers, the costs of renting a campaign car and campaign office, printing posters and postcards, and the like. These expenses generally consume most of the money the candidate is legally allowed to spend. They account for only a fraction of the money actually spent in the election, however. The second category is what might be called organizational expenses—funds expended to mobilize the candidate's district-wide organization. In some cases 80 or 90 per cent of a candidate's total campaign expenses will go to providing campaign funds to the men who run the campaign in the district's cities, towns, and villages and in the neighborhoods and hamlets of all these areas.

It is apparently common practice for campaign funds to be distributed to campaigners in three installments. The first follows immediately upon House dissolution and is intended to set the candidate's machine in operation. It is a kind of down payment given to the leaders of the local town and village organizations in order that they get the campaign under way. The second installment is the largest and comes in the first days of the official campaign, the days immediately following *kōji*, the official notification of the election. In two or three days a campaign headquarters may be divested of ten or fifteen million yen, given out largely in 100, 500, and 1,000 yen notes. One by one the leaders of the city, town, and village organizations come to the campaign headquarters to discuss

[38] *Asahi Shinbun,* December 7, 1966, p. 8.
[39] *Japan Times,* January 26, 1967, p. 16.

the situation in their area with the candidate's campaign boss. Because all this activity is a violation of the Election Law, the candidate himself never takes part directly in the discussions. His campaign boss discusses with the local leader a vote quota for the area and gives him funds to be taken back and distributed to the campaigners in the local organization. The third installment of funds is distributed in the last days of the campaign. These funds are dispersed in order to strike at new targets of opportunity, to respond to demands of local supporters, and in part for no other reason than that the money is there to be spent. In a close race the fear of the candidate and his financial backers that all the sizeable resources already committed to the campaign might be lost in a narrow defeat leads them, in a spasm of fear, to divest the campaign headquarters of whatever money is remaining. A file cabinet that thirty days before had twenty million yen may be completely empty by election day.

The sources for campaign funds for an LDP candidate for the Diet fall into four groups: the party, the faction, the business community, and the candidate's own resources.

It is customary in Japan for political parties to give party-endorsed Diet candidates a set sum of money for their campaigns. In the 1920s the conservative parties are reported by one author to have contributed about 10,000 yen in terms of today's currency values to their candidates' campaign chests.[40] In the Diet campaign of 1967 the LDP gave each of its candidates three million yen in campaign funds. This alone is more than the candidate may legally spend in even the largest district in the country. The LDP maintains that the money is to help cover expenses that are legal but not included in the law-designated expenses. Despite its explanations, the party came under immediate attack in the highly "black mist" conscious mass media.[41] In spite of the temporary uproar the

[40] Takahashi Makoto, "Seiji to Kane no Akuen," *Asahi Jānaru,* VIII (December 11, 1966), 13.

[41] See, for instance, *Asahi Shinbun,* December 30, 1966, p. 10; *Asahi Evening News,* December 30, 1966, p. 1.

LDP Diet candidate had three million yen in his campaign chest.

The largest single source of funds is the candidate's faction leader. A faction leader's strength largely depends on his ability to financially aid Diet members and nonincumbent candidates who would join his faction upon entering the Diet. The amount of money a candidate receives from his faction leader varies in particular cases but five million yen is generally considered to be the average.[42] In some cases a Diet candidate may receive support from politicians other than his faction leader. This might be a locally powerful politician who is committed to the candidate's success or another faction leader who sees a long-term benefit to be derived from contributing to the campaign and thus strengthening his personal ties with the candidate.

A third major source of funds is the business community. Here it is almost impossible to generalize because of the tremendous variations in the nature of the support provided by businessmen to Diet candidates.[43] Perhaps one partial generalization that can be safely made is that the nonincumbent locality-oriented candidate relies on support from local businessmen rather than from large corporations in Tokyo. The candidate usually has close connections with a small number of firms in the district or prefecture that provide him with a steady income outside the official campaign period to finance his daily political activities. Such firms, having made a sizeable contribution by the time the election comes around, are anxious to protect their investment by insuring the reelection or election of the candidate they are sponsoring. They consequently contribute large sums to their candidate's campaign, the amount of their investment often being comparable to the sum given by the candidate's faction leader.

[42] This is the figure cited, for instance, in Watanuki Jōji, *Nihon No Seiji Shakai* (Tokyo, 1967), p. 62.

[43] An effort at such generalization is made by Fujiwara Hirotatsu and Tomita Nobuo, *Seijiaku E No Chōsen* (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 56–58.

In addition to large contributions from such select firms, the candidate appeals for small donations from a large number of local businesses. Contributions of from 5,000 to 50,000 yen from tens, or in some cases even hundreds, of firms[44] is a major source of funds for many candidates.

Finally, a fourth source of campaign funds is a candidate's own resources. In prewar Japan it was common to talk of "well and fence politicians" *(idobei seijika).* What was originally the object of the phrase was the landlord who entered politics and in so doing spent so much money that he lost everything but his well and the fence surrounding his house. It is a phrase that has come to be used to refer to anyone who spends his own resources in election campaigning. It is often said that in the postwar period candidates have learned how to run for office with other people's money and that there are no *idobei seijika* left.[45] While there are perhaps fewer politicians that rely as much on personal resources for their campaign funds as did politicians in the prewar period, some degree of personal financial investment in the campaign appears to be the rule rather than the exception among LDP candidates.

The party, the candidate's faction leader, and other powerful politicians supporting his candidacy, the business community, and the candidate's own resources are the major sources of campaign funds. Within this general pattern variations are enormous, depending on the particular candidate's financial connections, his length of service and his influence in the Diet, and partly, obviously, by the amount of money he thinks is necessary to run a successful campaign.

The question of how a candidate expends campaign funds is a more difficult one to deal with than the issue of the sources of his funds. The secrecy surrounding the expenditure of funds renders most analyses elaborate cases of guesswork.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 58.

[45] See, for example, Okano Kaoru, "Daigishi To Senkyoku," *Ushio* No. 77 (November 1966), 180.

In general, writers who have dealt with the issue have argued that most campaign expenses, over and above what is allowed in law, are for the purpose of bribing voters and buying the support of local politicians who in turn bribe the voters within their sphere of influence. There is also general agreement that there is somewhat less bribery in Diet elections than in local contests. Unlike the Town Assembly candidate, for instance, who has to deal with a relatively small number of voters, the Diet candidate must have a fairly extensive organization of supporters to reach enough voters in the district. Consequently a thousand yen note intended to buy a vote has to pass through the hands of so many people on its journey from campaign headquarters to voter that by the time it hits bottom there is hardly enough to pay the campaigner much less bribe the voter. As one study remarks, "it is usual for most of the money intended to buy votes to end up in the pockets of the big bosses, the middle bosses and the little bosses."[46] The candidate illegally distributes something like ten times the legal maximum amount of campaign funds to local bosses who pocket a large share of the money, pass the rest down to smaller bosses who keep a healthy share for themselves, and who then hand out the remaining money to the politically ignorant peasants for their votes.

Such analyses contain a modicum of truth but are at best exaggerated caricatures of campaign practices. The great bulk of a candidate's campaign funds is usually spent illegally. But the money expended is neither simply to buy votes nor to buy off local politicians. While some amount of money is certainly used for such purposes, most of the funds function to compensate the candidate's campaigners and, in part, to fulfill the demands of custom.

In the Japanese setting monetary compensation for campaigners of conservative candidates plays an extremely important role in holding a campaign organization together.

[46] Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, *Seitō* (Tokyo, 1965), p. 21; cf. Watanuki Jōji, *Seiji Shakai*, p. 222.

Loyalties to the party, even where they exist, have little relevance to the decision to support a particular candidate because of the multimember districting system; loyalty to the candidate is not pervasive for, as has been seen, campaigners largely owe loyalties to other campaigners in the organizational hierarchy rather than to the Diet candidate himself; patronage is of little significance in the Japanese political system because of a highly developed merit civil service, and is of no meaning to the anonymous *buraku* campaigner. While the reasons for a man offering to campaign are diverse, a small "thank you" present reimburses the campaigner for any expenses incurred in his activities and makes him cognizant of the candidate's recognition and gratitude. Unlike elections in the prewar period when one powerful landlord could deliver a large number of votes, campaigns today depend on an extensive organization with supporters on all levels down to each *buraku*. Even a small monetary reward to all these campaigners represents an enormous expense.

Not only for the *buraku* campaigner but for the leaders of the village or town organizations as well, money given in the campaign is more often a recompense for support long given than a bribe to obtain support. Most of the men who organize the campaign in local areas for the Diet candidate are associated with and work for that candidate long before elections are called. While there are cases of a candidate buying the support of local bosses at the last minute, the more usual pattern is for the candidate to have obtained his elitist support well in advance of the official campaign. The politically unavoidable if legally illegitimate need to compensate these supporters for their efforts on the candidate's behalf puts the greatest demands on the candidate's financial resources during the campaign period.

This is not to argue that the element of bribery is absent from this picture. Often top-level supporters demand sums for the campaign that cannot be justified either as equitable compensation for their work or as necessary for the campaign. The

candidate often has no alternative but to pay the amount requested because he is so completely dependent on the support of the local leader and his organization. He often sees his choices as one of paying an exorbitant amount for the votes the local supporter is believed capable of delivering or taking the chance of not getting anywhere near the number of votes needed. More often than not the candidate will opt for the former alternative. Even here, however, there are countervailing pressures against local leaders making exorbitant demands on the candidate. A supporter who takes too much advantage of his position of strength in demanding funds will force the candidate to seek other locally powerful people to organize his campaign. This is one reason the campaign expenses of new candidates are generally much higher than those of incumbents. It takes a few elections to find out which supporters are functioning effectively and at reasonable cost. The incumbent Diet member gradually weeds out of his organization many of those who are obviously not mobilizing votes commensurate with the monetary demands they place on the candidate. It is the new candidate who most often has to accept support proffered and at the price demanded.

On the *buraku* level the question of what is a fair recompense for a campaigner and what is a bribe for a voter is often extremely difficult to distinguish. The Japanese language itself clouds this distinction. Seldom is a voter clearly offered a bribe. When given money for his vote, the phrases used express appreciation to the voter for his support of the candidate in such a way as to make him feel like a campaigner.[47] It sometimes becomes a difficult matter to decide whether a man given 500 yen to campaign for a candidate has been simply compensated for his work or bribed when the "campaign" amounts to asking the members of his family and a neighbor to vote for a certain candidate.

[47] Translated freely, a typical approach goes something like "Look, I know this doesn't amount to very much but I'd really appreciate it if you could see what you can do to get some votes for X. We need every vote we can get, so as long as I know that I can count on yours I'm really grateful."

It is problems such as this that raise the issue of custom in determining campaign styles and in affecting the amount and uses of campaign funds. In a sense the provisions of the Election Law in what they prohibit regarding campaign practices provide a concise description of Japanese social customs. The prohibition of many activities commonly accepted as proper social behavior was predicated on the assumption that such behavior, though common, is in contradiction with democratic practices. Accordingly many campaign activities that are illegal are engaged in, particularly in local elections and in rural areas, because the candidate feels more constrained to respect cultural norms than legal rules. The prohibition of house to house calls is a case in point, and it apparently resulted from a concern with the political effects of certain "feudalistic" attitudes concerning obligation. Besides providing opportunities for outright bribery, house-to-house calls would make it difficult for a voter who was visited by a campaigner and asked for support to refuse. It would be embarrassing to say no and the voter would feel an obligation to vote as requested to do in such a face-to-face confrontation, particularly if he had in any way incurred a debt to the person making the request. Activities such as house-to-house calls were made illegal in order to prevent the input into the political system of customs that violate assumed tenets of democratic practice. In fact, however, the making of house-to-house calls is a widely employed campaign technique. All the law has done is force candidate and campaigner to be somewhat discreet in conducting this and other similarly prohibited activities. It has not eliminated the practice itself.

Another aspect of this problem is the serving of food and refreshments as part of the campaign, a practice Japanese call *kyōō*. There are clearly instances where such practices are consciously intended to buy support. One campaigner I know of brought in groups of fifteen to twenty people every evening for a period of two weeks to a certain restaurant (where he made an agreement with the owner that no records be kept that could fall into the hands of the police) in order to get the

support of an entire *buraku* for the candidate he was supporting. There was no question here but that the campaigner was attempting to buy support for the candidate. Under some circumstances, however, social custom makes the practice of *kyōō* imperative. The candidate and campaigner must decide between observing the law or observing social custom. The tendency is to side with the latter as much as is strategically possible without incurring the penalties for violating the law.[48]

Certain social practices can of course provide opportunities for a considerable degree of corruption, and it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between campaign styles made imperative by social custom and styles that simply take advantage of custom in order to buy support. It is apparently very common, for instance, for voters in rural areas to receive, as a matter of course, extremely small sums (100 yen seems a popu-

[48] The legal prohibition of the serving of food and refreshments as part of a campaign is but one manifestation of an almost obsessive concern with the assumed incompatibility of traditional social practices and the requirements of democratic practice. In the United States no one has proposed a legal ban on campaign barbecues or picnics or on the serving of Coca-Cola in campaign headquarters. In Japan such practices are violations of the law. There are several dangers inherent in such severe restrictions on campaign practices. They can, for one thing, be so unrealistic as to result in flagrant violations and a consequent disrespect for the law. For another, the all too apparent inconsistency between legal provisions and actual campaign practices encourages among many Japanese a feeling that Japanese are still motivated by undemocratic, feudal values. It perpetuates the belief that the Japanese political system is less "democratic" than the parliamentary democracies of the West and undermines public confidence and pride in the nation's political institutions. The prohibition of the serving of food and other activities creates the false impression that candidates for office in Western parliamentary systems do not engage in such practices and sets for the Japanese a standard of conduct probably impossible to achieve and, at any rate, observed by candidates in no other country. Finally, the greatest danger inherent in the law is the effect of its successful application. The law so thoroughly constrains candidate and voter alike in permissible campaign activities, that its strict enforcement would result in an almost total lack of direct contact between the candidates and the electorate.

lar denomination) as an advance "thank you" present *(orei)* for voting for a particular candidate. One campaigner I had the opportunity to know estimates that "almost all" of the people in his town that voted for the candidate he supported, close to 2,000 voters, received such 100-yen presents. Such a practice cannot simply be dismissed as bribery. The sum of money by itself is insufficient, even in most rural areas, to buy votes. This 100-yen *orei* is intimately related to the concept of the hard vote. The voter who is known as the supporter of a particular politician need not be bribed to vote for that politician or for the candidate supported by that politician. In rural areas, a Diet election provides such a politician not so much the chance to bribe the voter as the opportunity to express in a small but tangible way his gratitude to the voter for his continued support. In giving the voter the envelope with the 100 yen, the campaigner expresses his apologies for not being able to more fully demonstrate his appreciation for the support the voter has given him and implores the voter to take the 100-yen note as simply a token of his gratitude. Once the voter accepts, his continued support, and most importantly his vote in the imminent election, is considered assured. To argue that this is not bribery is not to assert that it may not be an insidious technique for mobilizing support. Such practices, however, find their rationale deep within the fabric of society, and many politicians, being more concerned in the short run with winning an election than with leading a revolution in social mores, spend a considerable amount of campaign funds in engaging in them.

The relationship between the hard vote and the small monetary present is in contrast to the floating vote and the outright bribe. Bribery, contrary to the popular conception of the politically apathetic farmer being the object, apparently prevails in urban areas where the voter does not feel a particular attachment to any one candidate and is therefore more likely to make his vote available to the highest bidder. In urban areas it is common to pay 500, 1,000, or even as much as 2,000

yen per vote. In a district that contains both rural and urban components, outright bribery in the final days of the campaign appears to invariably be concentrated in the urban sector.

These aspects of the campaign, because of the Election Law's restrictions, are kept the closely guarded secrets of a few top-level members of a candidate's staff. They form a current that flows beneath the surface and, though of great importance for the candidate's success or failure, are of necessity kept hidden. The public dimension of the campaign, the candidate's public campaign activities, forms a current of its own that grows more frantic and frenetic as the final days of the campaign approach.

With the last joint speech meeting in Beppu on January 26, the candidates had two final days free to campaign. Satō spent the last three days entirely in Beppu and in a paroxysm of walking. From seven in the morning until eight or nine in the evening Satō walked. Through the narrow neon-lighted streets lined on both sides by bars, coffee houses and pachinko parlors, through the former red-light districts now dominated by small inns, through the cramped backstreets of the downtown area that house many of the service trade workers whose votes would largely determine Satō's future, he walked and talked and shook hands. Shaking hands is not a common practice in Japanese campaigning, at least not outside of large metropolitan areas. Perhaps the major effect of having a foreigner staying with him was to encourage Satō to adopt two campaign techniques not used by other candidates in the district or by himself in previous elections. One was to undertake a telephone campaign. There are no restrictions in the law on campaigning by telephone. Adopting and adapting a suggestion about telephone campaigning, Satō delegated two members of his staff to use the telephone directory to make calls to unknown voters to ask for support. Interestingly, he decided that using the Japanese equivalent of the "Yellow Pages" would be more effective than the regular directory since this would increase the chances of contacting conserva-

tive party supporting voters. The other technique he adopted was shaking hands. Satō was impressed with a story he heard of how John Kennedy had shaken so many hands in his campaign for President that toward the end of the campaign he needed to have injections to lessen the pain. Satō set himself a goal of shaking 9,000 hands in Beppu in the last three days of the campaign. At six in the morning on each of those days he was at one of the three fruit and vegetable markets in Beppu shaking hands with the dealers he represents as President of the green grocers' union. By the evening of the final day of the campaign Satō was able to show somewhat proudly a raw and swollen right hand.

Satō's efforts in the last days of the campaign created a ground swell of enthusiasm. Sensing this, the largest newspaper in the prefecture, the *Ōita Gōdō,* carried an analysis of candidate strength under the headline "Satō-Top."[49] The major Kyūshū newspaper, *Nishi Nihon,* predicted in its edition on the last day of the campaign that Satō would receive 59,000 votes, highest among the candidates.[50] Several papers saw the fight for the top vote as one between Satō and Nishimura,[51] but the *Ōita Gōdō* predicted that Socialist Komatsu might take the second highest vote.[52] What was clear in all the predictions was that Ayabe Kentarō was most in danger of losing. On the last day of the campaign eighty-year-old Ayabe, the last of the prewar politicians from the prefecture still involved in national politics, dragged his legs through the main streets of Beppu in a pathetic attempt to "walk the city" like Satō. Ōita Prefecture has only had two men chosen to serve as Speaker of the Lower House. The first, Motoda Hajime, lost the election following his appointment. It seemed very likely as the campaign came to an end on the evening of January 28 that history was about to repeat itself.

[49] *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun,* January 26, 1967, p. 1.

[50] *Nishi Nihon Shinbun,* January 28, 1967, p. 1.

[51] *Mainichi Shinbun,* January 27, 1967, p. 7; *Konnichi Shinbun,* January 28, 1967; *Yomiuri Shinbun,* January 27, 1967, p. 14.

[52] *Ōita Gōdō Shinbun,* January 26, 1967, p. 1.