Bitter contest between the Japanese and the Americans that marked a turning point in the Pacific war. The struggle on Guadalcanal was protracted, and the period from August 1942 to February 1943 saw some of the most bitter fighting of the war. In all, there were some 50 actions involving warships or aircraft, 7 major naval battles, and 10 land engagements.

Guadalcanal is an island in the Solomon chain northeast of Australia. It lies on a northwest-southeast axis and is 90 miles long and averages 25 miles wide. Guadalcanal's southern shore is protected by coral reefs, and the only suitable landing beaches are on the north-central shore. Once inland, invading troops faced dense jungle and mountainous terrain, crisscrossed by numerous streams. The Guadalcanal Campaign encompassed not only Guadalcanal, but Savo and Florida Islands as well as the small islands between Florida and Guadalcanal: Tulagi, Tanambogo, and Gavutu.

In January 1942, Japanese amphibious forces had landed in the Bismarck Archipelago between New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. They quickly wrested Kavieng on New Ireland Island and Rabaul on New Britain from the Australians. The Japanese consolidated their hold and turned Rabaul into their principal southwest Pacific base. By early March, the Japanese landed at Salamaua and Lae in Papua and on Bougainville. Their advance having gone so well, the Japanese decided to expand their defensive ring to the southeast to cut off the supply route from the United States to New Zealand and Australia. On 3 May, the Japanese landed on Tulagi and began building a seaplane base there. Between May and July, the Japanese expanded their ring farther in the central and lower Solomons. These operations were carried out by Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi's Eighth Army from Rabaul. The first Japanese landed on Guadalcanal on 8 June. On 6 July, their engineers began construction of an airfield near the mouth of the Lunga River.

The discovery of the Japanese effort on Guadalcanal led to the implementation of Operation WATCHTOWER. Conceived and pushed by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, it called for securing Tulagi as an additional base to protect the United States-Australia lifeline and as a starting point for a drive up the Solomons to Rabaul. On 1 April 1942, the Pacific was divided into two commands: U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commanding in the South Pacific, was to take the southern Solomons including Guadalcanal, and General Douglas MacArthur's forces were to secure the remainder of the Solomons and the northwest coast of New Guinea, the final objective being Rabaul.

If the Japanese were allowed to complete their airfield on Guadalcanal, they would be able to bomb the advanced Allied base at Espiritu Santo. U.S. plans to take the offensive were now stepped up, and a task force was hurriedly assembled. From Noumea, Ghormley dispatched an amphibious force under Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, lifting Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift's 19,000-man reinforced 1st Marine Division. A three-carrier task force under Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher provided air support. This operation involved some 70 ships.

On 7 August 1942, the Marines went ashore at Tulagi, Florida, Tanambogo, Gavutu, and Guadalcanal, surprising the small Japanese garrisons (2,200 on Guadalcanal and 1,500 on Tulagi). On the same day, the Marines seized the harbor at Tulagi, and by the next afternoon they had also secured the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal, along with stocks of Japanese weapons, food, and equipment. Supplies for the Marines were soon coming ashore from transports in the sound between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands, but this activity came under attack by Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul. Vandegrift told Fletcher he would need four days to unload the transports, but Fletcher replied that he was short on fuel and in any case could not risk keeping his carriers in position off Guadalcanal for more than 48 hours.

Stakes were high for both sides. The fiercest fighting occurred for the airfield, renamed Henderson Field for a Marine aviator killed in the Battle of Midway. Vandegrift recognized its importance and immediately established a perimeter defense around it. Eating captured rations and using Japanese heavy-construction equipment, the U.S. 1st Engineer Battalion completed the airfield on 17 August. As early as 21 August, the day the Japanese mounted a major attack on the field, the first U.S. aircraft landed there. The Japanese now found it impossible to keep their ships in waters covered by the land-based American aircraft during the day, and they found it difficult to conduct an air campaign over the lower Solomons from as far away as Rabaul.

The lack of a harbor compounded U.S. supply problems, as did Japanese aircraft attacks. Allied "coast watchers" on islands provided early warning to U.S. forces of Japanese air and water movements down the so-called Slot of the Solomons. The battle on Guadalcanal became a complex campaign of attrition. The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather vessels in driblets. American land-based air power controlled the Slot during the day, but the Japanese initially controlled it at night, as was evidenced in the 8 August Battle of Savo Island. Concern over the vulnerability of the U.S. transports led to their early removal on the afternoon of 9 August along with most of the heavy guns, vehicles, construction equipment, and food intended for the Marines ashore. The Japanese sent aircraft from Rabaul, while initially U.S. land-based aircraft flying at long range from the New Hebrides provided air cover for the Marines as fast destroyer transports finally brought in some supplies. American possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance. U.S. air strength there gradually increased to about 100 planes.

At night the so-called Tokyo Express - Japanese destroyers and light cruisers - steamed down the Slot and into the sound to shell Marine positions and to deliver supplies. The latter effort was haphazard and never sufficient; often, drums filled with supplies were pushed off the ships to drift to shore. One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific War was the failure of the Japanese to exploit the temporary departure of the U.S. carrier task force on 8 August by rushing in substantial reinforcements.

Actions ashore were marked by clashes between patrols of both sides. Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao, who had arrived with his battalion on Guadalcanal in early August, planned a large-scale attack that took little account of U.S. Marine dispositions. His unit was effectively wiped out in the 21 August 1942 Battle of the Tenaru River. Ichiki's men refused to surrender, and they and their commander were killed in the fighting. Marine losses were 44 dead and 71 wounded; the Japanese lost at least 777 killed. From 12 to 14 September, strong Japanese forces attempted to seize U.S. Marine positions on Lunga Ridge overlooking Henderson Field from the south. The Japanese left 600 dead; American casualties were 143 dead and wounded. Both sides continued building up their strength ashore as naval and air battles raged over and off Guadalcanal.

From 23 to 25 October, the Japanese launched strong land attacks against Henderson Field. Fortunately for the Marine defenders, the attacks were widely dispersed and uncoordinated. In these engagements, the Japanese suffered 2,000 dead, while U.S. casualties were fewer than 300. Immediately after halting this Japanese offensive, Vandegrift began a six-week effort to expand the defensive perimeter beyond which the Japanese could not subject Henderson to artillery fire. Meanwhile, Admiral Kondo Nobutake's repositioning of vessels and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's instructions to Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet resulted in the 26 October Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Fighting on land continued on Guadalcanal. On 8 December, Vandegrift turned command of the island over to U.S. Army Major General Alexander M. Patch, who organized his forces into the XIV Corps, including the 2nd Marine Division, replacing the veteran 1st Marine Division, which was withdrawn, and the 25th Infantry Division. At the beginning of January 1943, Patch commanded 58,000 men, whereas Japanese strength was then less than 20,000.

Ultimately, the Americans won the land struggle for Guadalcanal thanks to superior supply capabilities and the failure of the Japanese to throw sufficient resources into the battle. The Americans were now well fed and well supplied, but the Japanese were desperate, losing many men to sickness and simple starvation. At the end of December, Tokyo decided to abandon Guadalcanal.

Meanwhile, on 10 January, Patch began an offensive to clear the island of Japanese forces, mixing Army and Marine units as the situation dictated. In a two-week battle, the Americans drove the Japanese from a heavily fortified line west of Henderson Field. At the end of January, the Japanese were forced from Tassafaronga toward Cape Esperance, where a small American force landed to prevent them from escaping by sea. Dogged Japanese perseverance and naval support, however, enabled some defenders to escape. The Japanese invested in the struggle 24,600 men (20,800 troops and 3,800 naval personnel). In daring night operations during 1-7 February 1943, Japanese destroyers evacuated 10,630 troops (9,800 army and 830 navy).

The United States committed 60,000 men to the fight for the island; of these, the Marines lost 1,207 dead and the army 562. U.S. casualties were far greater in the naval contests for Guadalcanal; the U.S. Navy and Marines lost 4,911 and the Japanese at least 3,200. Counting land, sea, and air casualties, the struggle for Guadalcanal had claimed 7,100 U.S. dead and permanently missing. The Japanese advance had now been halted, and MacArthur could begin the long and bloody return to the Philippine Islands.

Troy D. Morgan and Spencer C. Tucker

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Citations

Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific. New York: Viking, 1996.

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990.

Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of Marine Corps Operation in World War II: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963.

Miller, John, Jr. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Guadalcanal, the First Offensive. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949.

Mueller, Joseph N. Guadalcanal 1942: The Marines Strike Back. London: Osprey, 1992.

Tregaskis, Richard. Guadalcanal Diary. New York: Random House, 1943.

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Guadalcanal Naval Campaign
(August 1942-February 1943)

Significant and prolonged South Pacific sea-land-air campaign. The campaign for Guadalcanal comprised several naval engagements and several vicious land battles fought from August 1942 to February 1943. On Guadalcanal (90 by 25 miles in size) in the Solomon Islands, U.S. Marines and army troops attacked Japanese land forces, while the U.S. Navy battled the Japanese navy offshore.

Before the battle, U.S. planners were able to build up Pacific Theater resources more quickly than anticipated and take the offensive against the Japanese. This campaign, Operation WATCHTOWER, was the brainchild of U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King. It had as its objective the seizure of the islands of Tulagi and Gavatu as a preliminary step in securing the Solomons and then the recapture of the Philippines and the eventual defeat of Japan. These plans soon changed when intelligence revealed that the Japanese were building an airstrip on the nearby island of Guadalcanal. Once operational, such a base would pose a serious threat to Allied operations in the South Pacific. Therefore, its seizure became the primary objective of the campaign.

Although hamstrung by a lack of adequate resources because of sealift required for Operation TORCH, the British and American invasion of North Africa, Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley pieced together forces from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the invasion. Resources were so meager that some of his officers nicknamed the plan Operation Shoestring. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift commanded the 1st Marine Division landing force, and Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher had charge of the naval support element.

The U.S. Navy's tasks were to sustain forces ashore and provide naval and air protection for the Marines defending the airfield, which was captured shortly after the landing and renamed Henderson Field. The lack of a harbor compounded supply problems. The Japanese operated aircraft from Rabaul and later from other closer island airfields, but Allied "coast watchers" on islands provided early warning of many Japanese naval movements.

The Marines went ashore beginning on 7 August, but the sealift was so limited that they were without much of their heavier equipment and heavy artillery. The first naval engagement with the Japanese occurred on the night of 8-9 August 1942 in the Battle of Savo Island. A Japanese cruiser squadron overwhelmed an Allied force of equal size, sinking one Australian and three U.S. cruisers and damaging several destroyers, losing none of its own ships. The battle clearly showed the superiority of Japanese night-fighting techniques. The battle was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy in a fair fight, but it was only a tactical success, because the Japanese failed to go after the vulnerable American troop transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

Nonetheless, the Battle of Savo Island and Japanese air attacks led Fletcher and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner to withdraw supporting naval forces from Guadalcanal, leaving the Marines ashore isolated, bereft of naval support, and short of critical supplies. Long-range aircraft and destroyers did bring in some resources. The Japanese made a critical mistake in not capitalizing on the U.S. vulnerability to commit their main fleet assets. For the most part, they sent only smaller units in driblets, chiefly in the form of fast destroyers. The so-called Slot was controlled by the United States during the day but the Japanese owned it at night.

The next major confrontation at sea off Guadalcanal came on the night of 24-25 August in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher's carrier-based aircraft intercepted and attacked the covering group for a Japanese convoy of destroyers and transports carrying 1,500 troops to Guadalcanal. The Americans sank the Japanese light carrier Ryujo and damaged another ship, but the U.S. fleet carrier Enterprise was located and attacked by Japanese aircraft and badly damaged. The Japanese destroyers and transports delivered the reinforcements and the destroyers and then shelled Henderson Field, although a U.S. Army B-17 sank one of the Japanese ships.

On 31 August, the U.S. carrier Saratoga was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine and put out of action for three months. That left only the carrier Wasp available for operations in the South Pacific. On 15 September, the Wasp was in turn torpedoed and sunk while it was accompanying transports lifting the 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo. A Japanese torpedo also damaged the battleship North Carolina, which, however, held her place in the formation. Admiral Turner continued to Guadalcanal, delivering the 7th Marine Regiment safely three days later.

Heavy fighting, meanwhile, was occurring on Guadalcanal; the Japanese were mounting unsuccessful attacks to recapture Henderson Field. The next big naval encounter off Guadalcanal was the Battle of Cape Esperance during the night of 11-12 October. The Japanese sent in their supply ships at night (the so-called Tokyo Express). U.S. ships equipped with radar detected a Japanese convoy off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. In the ensuing fight, the Japanese lost a cruiser and a destroyer, and another cruiser was heavily damaged. The Americans lost only a destroyer and had two cruisers damaged. The first Allied success against the Japanese in a night engagement, the Battle of Cape Esperance, was a great boost to U.S. morale. A few days later, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz replaced the methodical Ghormley with the offensive-minded Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey.

A major engagement occurred on 26-27 October in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and his Task Force 16 centered on the carrier Enterprise followed Admiral Halsey's instructions to engage Japanese forces under Admiral Kond? Nobutake. Each side conducted carrier strikes against the other. U.S. aircraft inflicted severe damage on the heavy carrier Shokaku, putting her out of action for nine months, and damaged the light carrier Zuiho. On the U.S. side, the heavy carrier Hornet was badly damaged and had to be abandoned while under tow; she was soon sunk by Japanese destroyers. Kond? then withdrew. He had won a major victory over the Americans, but he had also lost 100 aircraft and experienced pilots, half again as many as the Americans. Had he continued to pursue the withdrawing U.S. ships, he might have destroyed the Enterprise.

During 12-15 November, a series of intense sea fights occurred in what became known as the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. It took place near the entrance to Ironbottom Sound (so named for being the resting place of many Allied and Japanese ships) off Savo Island between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. In the first, U.S. ships and aircraft fought to block reinforcement of the island by 13,000 Japanese troops in 11 transports, escorted by destroyers, all commanded by Admiral Tanaka Raizo. At the same time, a powerful squadron under Abe Hiroaki arrived to shell Henderson Field. In a confused engagement, both sides suffered heavily. The Japanese lost the battleship Hiei and two cruisers sunk; all other Japanese vessels were damaged. The Americans lost two cruisers and four destroyers. A cruiser and a destroyer were close to sinking, and all other ships, save one, were damaged. Among those killed were Rear Admirals Daniel Callaghan and Norman Scott. Tanaka was obliged to retire, and the planned Japanese bombardment of Henderson Field did not occur.

On 13-14 November the Japanese returned, and their heavy cruisers shelled Henderson Field. But the Americans sank seven Japanese transports and two cruisers. During the third phase on 14-15 November, U.S. warships under Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee met and defeated yet another Japanese force under Kond? when the two sides met near Savo Island. The Americans lost two destroyers, but Kond? lost the battleship Kirishima and a destroyer. The net effect of the three-day battle was that Tanaka landed only some 4,000 troops (he rescued another 5,000 on his return to Rabaul), whereas the Americans regained control of the waters around the island.

The last major naval battle for Guadalcanal occurred on 30 November at Tassafaronga Point. The Japanese again attempted to land reinforcements on Guadalcanal and were surprised by a larger U.S. Navy task force. However, the Japanese once more demonstrated their superior night-fighting ability. In the exchange, the Japanese lost a destroyer, and the Americans lost a cruiser.

Japanese leaders now came to the conclusion that they could no longer absorb such losses in trying to hold on in Guadalcanal. The final battle of the campaign was a skirmish off Rennell's Island on 30 January 1943. In early February 1943, the Japanese evacuated their remaining ground forces from Guadalcanal.

The Americans won the campaign thanks largely to their superior supply capability and the failure of the Japanese to throw enough resources into the battle. The Tokyo Express down the Slot was haphazard and inadequate; often drums full of supplies were simply pushed off ships to drift to shore. The campaign for Guadalcanal proved to be as much a turning point for the United States as Midway. The Japanese advance had been halted, opening the way for the long island-hopping advance toward Japan. In combatants the Japanese lost 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers, and 8 submarines. Particularly serious from the Japanese point of view was the loss of 2,076 aircraft (1,094 to combat) and many trained pilots. U.S. Navy losses were 2 heavy carriers, 6 heavy cruisers (including the Royal Australian Navy Canberra), 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers, but new U.S. naval construction more than offset the U.S. losses. The campaign also destroyed the myth of Japanese naval superiority.

U.S. control of the air had rendered the Japanese ships vulnerable to attack. It also allowed Allied forces to determine the timing and location of offensive operations without Japanese foreknowledge.

William P. McEvoy and Spencer C. Tucker

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Citations:

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990.

Grace, James W. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, 13 November 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Hamel, Eric M. Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13-15, 1942. New York: Crown, 1988.

Hough, Frank O., Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Lundstrom, John B. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 5,The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948.