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COLUMN: The pickle in Iraq
By Jeremy Oehlert
Iowa State Daily (Iowa State U.)
06/13/2006
(U-WIRE) AMES, Iowa It goes without saying that U.S. involvement in Iraq has become problematic. In spite of phenomenal strides toward liberty and representative government, a persistent undercurrent of instability continues to exist that is continuously boiling over into all manner of violence.
Although recent events, such as the death of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, give the impression of improvement, crucial flaws in Iraqi national stability exist that indicate we are in for much more than the "long, hard slog" Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld predicted in 2003. In fact, without a radical shift in U.S. policy in Iraq, the situation could easily devolve into our generation's Vietnam.
History has proven that whenever there are fundamental conflicts of interest sharing the same socio-political sphere, peace only exists when there is a power strong enough to impose it. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are excellent examples of this; once the power structure that imposed the peace broke down, the units that comprised the nation disbanded. Iraq is very similar in that it is a nation of many ethnic and religious rivalries, created not by the people, but by edict.
Iraq was originally part of the Ottoman Empire. When the last vestiges of the empire were dissolved the nation we know as Iraq was created by the British. It was the British, and a subsequent line of kings established by Great Britain, that held Iraq together by force.
With these facts in mind, it was a bold move for the United States to invade and attempt to motivate Iraqis to unify and govern themselves. The U.S. motivation for invading Iraq was simple to the point of being simple-minded: Take out a troublesome dictator, foster Iraqi unity and transform a problematic nation into a strategic ally. The problem with this strategy is that it underestimated the power vacuum that ensued, fomenting unrest and encouraging a much worse state of affairs than previously existed.
At this point, the best-case scenario is that the Iraqi people will put aside centuries of disputes and embrace democracy under the wing of the U.S.-led coalition. Unfortunately this scenario is not very realistic. The current state of affairs in Iraq is proof of this in that the insurgency is every bit as much Sunni vs. Shia as it is Iraqi/foreign terrorist vs. the U.S.-led coalition.
Even if Iraqis come together, and unite to form a cohesive, representative government, the fact that at least half of Iraqis are Shia Muslims must be taken into account. Shias in Iraq could align with Shia-dominated Iran, locking up oil reserves and potentially forming a terrorist superpower alliance with one of the most problematic nations on the planet. In this scenario, the United States would not only have to maintain stability in Iraq, but impose its will on Iran, as well.
The most logically appealing alternative would be to divide the country into three separate nations. Unfortunately, dividing Iraq's oil wealth among three rival nations the Kurdish nation being at odds with NATO member Turkey, the Shia nation being allied with Iran and the Sunni nation resenting the U.S. more than ever before does not serve U.S. interests and would make all of our efforts in Iraq pointless.
The final, conventional alternative to the problems that have arisen due to U.S. involvement in Iraq is to simply pull out. Were this to happen, however, words could barely describe the chaos that would ensue.
Iran would likely invade, supporting the Iraqi Shia majority. Turkey would likely invade, as well, in an effort to crush the Kurdish insurgency and secure some of Iraq's richest oil fields. Sunni Iraqis would be crushed in the crossfire.
With a NATO ally involved in full conflict with a nation within the spheres of influence of both China and Russia, the situation could easily devolve into World War III. Our only hope in this scenario would be to encourage China to invade Iran as well, which would work out well for China and be poetic justice in a sense considering the Iranians would be encouraged to become atheists as a result.
With these facts in mind, it becomes obvious that there is no easy solution to our involvement in Iraq. If we are to solve the problems that have arisen as a result of our involvement in Iraq, we must begin considering new solutions.
If we are not willing to divide Iraq among its ethnic constituents, risk its potential alliance with Iran or surrender it to utter chaos, then we must keep in mind that the only thing that has ever worked in Iraq is dictatorship. Installing a dictator would strengthen the Iraqi power coefficient, divert attention away from U.S. involvement and secure an ally in the Middle East.
Granted, this is not a morally agreeable arrangement, but neither are any of the other scenarios. Unless we are prepared to have invested so much in Iraq for them to divide themselves or align with Iran, it is our only effective option.
With power consolidated and firmly under Iraqi control, Iraqis could begin to negotiate their own terms for the future of their nation, guided by an U.S.-leaning authoritarian leader. U.S. troops could return to their homes and leave the business of Iraq to Iraqis, not unlike our relationship with Iraq under the Reagan administration.
The Iraqi solution will not be an easy pill for U.S. to swallow. The ultimate fix to this issue will likely lead to international condemnation, and may eventually come back to bite us like our support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. For now, however, installing a U.S.-backed dictator will give Iraq the centralized power it needs to bring peace and buy the United States the time it needs to begin the process of fostering the development of a powerful strategic ally.
Copyright ©2006 Iowa State Daily via UWire
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